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Abstract 
The Disability Support Pension (DSP) is the payment for people of working age with 
an illness or injury for a prolonged period of time that prevents them from 
undertaking full time employment. 
The number of DSP recipients has grown very rapidly over the last three decades, 
much faster than the DSP age eligible population. Both the increase in DSP inflow 
rate and the decrease in DSP outflow rate have contributed to past growth of the DSP 
program. But the increase in the inflow rate appeared to have contributed more than 
the decrease in the outflow rate, especially in the 1990s when a set of new eligibility 
criteria for DSP benefit was introduced. 
As for changes in the inflow rate, using aggregate data, it is found that labour market 
conditions represented by the unemployment rate had a significant positive impact on 
the DSP application and grant rates. Also important were policy changes which 
altered the eligibility requirements for DSP benefits. The policy change in 1980 
reduced the application and grant rates as expected, but the policy change in 1991 
increased these rates, a result which was probably not expected at the time the policy 
was introduced. Other factors, such as the relative value of the DSP benefit and 
changes in population structure ( or population ageing) did not appear to have any 
significant impact on the application and grant rates and therefore no significant 
impact on past growth of the DSP program. 
Using the FaCS LDS data, it is found that, over the period between 1995-96 and 
1999-2000, about 40 percent of new DSP recipients came from former unemployment 
benefit recipients. Among those who transferred from unemployment to DSP, not 
only did a large proportion (50-70 percent) experience multi-spells of income support 
payment recipiency prior to the transition, but also 5 5 to 66 percent had more than 
half a year pre-transition unemployment duration, with the average pre-transition 
unemployment duration being more than one year. It is also found that, among other 
factors, unemployment duration had a significant impact on the transition from 
V 
unemployment to DSP. The longer the duration on unemployment the more likely 
was the transition from unemployment to DSP. 
Since the number of DSP recipients is also determined by the duration of recipients, 
determinants of duration on DSP are examined. Using the FaCS LDS data, it is found 
that the age at entry into DSP, gender, country of birth, amount of earned income, 
whether having unearned income and recipient source were statistically significant 
determinants of the hazard rate of DSP recipients. That is DSP recipients with 
different characteristics have different potentials for leaving the DSP program. The 
average expected completed duration of DSP recipients is estimated to be about 9 
years, but it varies with gender, entry age and recipient source. 
Among those who exited DSP during a specific time period, the proportion returning 
to work was very small and the majority transferred to the Age Pension. In addition, it 
is found that recipients who exited to different destinations appeared to be different 
groups of people, especially comparing those who returned to work with those who 
transferred to the Age Pension. Compared with those who transferred to the Age 
Pension, those who returned to work were more likely to be young when entering into 
DSP. They were also more likely to be male, have earned income when receiving 
DSP benefit and be multi-spell recipients. 
One important point to emerge from the findings of this thesis is that DSP recipients 
are quite clearly different groups of people. They came from different sources. 
Recipients with different characteristics behaved differently in terms of leaving speed 
and exit destinations. This has important implications in terms of policy development 
and future research. To put it simply, future research should probably study DSP 
recipients by different groups (say by recipient source or entry age) rather than as a 
whole. Similarly, policy developments should also be differentiated to target different 
recipient groups so that policy will be more effective. 
VI 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Purposes of the study 
The Disability Support Pension (DSP) is the payment for people of working age with 
an illness or injury for a prolonged period of time that prevents them from 
undertaking full time employment. Prior to 1991, this payment was known as the 
Invalid Pension (IP) 1. In this thesis both the Invalid Pension and the Disability 
Support Pension are referred to as DSP. 
Over the last three decades, the number of DSP recipients has grown very rapidly. In 
1971 there were 134,000 recipients. By 2000 the number of individuals receiving a 
DSP had reached over 600,000 (Figure 1.1 ). 
The growth rate of the number ofDSP recipients has been much faster than that of the 
DSP age eligible population2• As a result, the proportion of population receiving DSP 
has increased (panel ( a) in Table 1.1 ). This proportion has increased for all age groups 
. 
1 Legislation to enact the Commonwealth Invalid Pension (IP) program was introduced into Parliament 
along with that for the old age pension in June 1908. The Invalid Pension came into operation in 
December 1910 when it became payable to persons from the age of 16 years who had resided in 
Australia for at least the previous five years and who were permanently incapacitated for work, 
provid~d that the incapacity arose within Australia and was not self-inflicted. With the introduction of 
the Disability Reform Package (DRP) in November 1991, the Invalid Pension was replaced by the 
Disability Support Pension and the eligibility criteria were also changed. 
2 The eligible age band for DSP is between 16 and the Age Pension age. For males the Age Pension age 
is 65 . For females the Age Pension age was 60 years before 1995. But from 1995, every two years the 
female Age Pension age has been raised by a half-year and this will continue until it reaches 65. 
However, for simplicity, most of this thesis does not consider the change in the female Age Pension 
age and therefore defines the DSP age eligible population as 16 to 64 for males and 16 to 59 for 
females. 
1 
and reveals a sharp contrast to the fall in full-time employment (panel (b) in Table 
1. 1 ). For the male 60-64 age group population, for example, the proportion receiving 
DSP in 1999 was not very different from the proportion working full-time. But this 
was not the case 30 years ago. Today, one in four males aged 60-64 receives the DSP. 
For males aged 45 years and over, the DSP and sickness benefit are the main sources 
of welfare receipts, far more important than the unemployment benefit (Bond and 
~teford, 2000). 
700 
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_, 400 
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Figure 1.1: Number of DSP recipients, 1971 to 2000 
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Year 
Sources: Annual Report ( each year) of the Department of Social Security (DSS). DSS Customers ( each 
year from 1994 to 2000) compiled by DSS or the Department of Family and Community 
Services (FaCS) . . 
The primary question is why the number of DSP recipients has grown so rapidly? 
This thesis firstly addresses this question by looking at inflows and outflows ( or 
completed duration) of DSP recipients. It is found that over the last three decades both 
changes in the inflow and outflow rates have contributed to the growth of the number 
of DSP recipients ( or program growth), but the change in the inflow rate was more 
important, especially in the 1990s. In addition, while the outflow rate showed a 
relativ~ly smooth trend of decrease, the inflow rate varied considerably, and in the 
1990s the inflow rate increased substantially. 
A second group of questions then arises: Why did the inflow rate vary more than the 
outflow rate? What determines the inflow rate and what are the reasons for the past 
changes in the inflow rate which have led to the rapid growth of the program over the 
last three decades? Why was the inflow rate so high in the 1990s? These questions 
are answered in Part I of this thesis using aggregate data. 
2 
Table 1.1: Proportions of population receiving DSP or working full-time, male 
1971 1981 1991 
(a). Proportion of population receiving _DSP (%) 
15-24 0.62 0.78 0.89 
2.92 
9.03 
25-44 
45-59 
60-64 
,:;ii ~~!{~fflf 
1.14 2.22 
2.62 6.64 
9.79 15.41 22.76 
(b ). Proportion of population working full-time (%) 
15-24 66.50 62.27 45.36 
92.08 87.55 82.30 
89.88 82.54 76.00 
44.34 36.64 
1999 
1.67 
3.60 
11.14 
25.23 
·-:- -.~:15i~;J:tfttf •· 
40.07 
79.50 
72.73 _ 
Sources: 1. DSP recipients by age group are from Bond and Whiteford (2000). Note that DSP age 
groups 15-24 and 25-44 include persons receiving the sickness benefit. 
2. Population and full-ti.me employment are from Australian Demographic Statistics, 
ABS 3101.0, Employment and Unemployment, ABS 6213.0, and Labour Force, 
Australia, Preliminary, ABS 6202.0. 
To better understand changes in the number ofDSP recipients, the second part of this 
thesis examines inflows and outflows from a micro perspective, using administrative 
data from the Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS). Specifically, it 
addresses the following questions: what is the composition of DSP inflows? What 
determines whether a person is to participate in the DSP program? Once granted a 
{ 
DSP benefit, what determines the duration on the DSP benefit before leaving the 
program? How long is a recipient expected to be on the program? For those who 
leave, where do they go? Do recipients who leave for different reas~ns have the same 
characteristics? 
By providing answers to the above questions, this thesis enhances our understanding 
of the dynamics of DSP recipients and the reasons for the growth of the program. This 
understanding will hopefully serve as guideline to policy development. 
3 
1.2. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of two parts. The first part includes Chapter 2 and 3, which uses 
aggregate data to explain the growth of the DSP program from a macro perspective. 
The second part, consisting of Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7, looks at inflows and outflows 
from a micro perspective to provide the micro foundations for understanding 
variations in aggregate inflows, outflows and growth. The following is a brief outline 
of each chapter. 
Part I 
Chapter 2: Inflows, outflows and the growth of the DSP program - an overview 
By providing an inflow-outflow framework for analysing the growth of the DSP 
program, this chapter addresses the following questions: (i) what have been the 
contributions of inflows and outflows to the growth of the program over the last three 
decades? (ii) Of inflows and outflows, which is more important as a contributor to the 
past growth of the program? (iii) What factors determine the inflow rate, and what 
contribution have they made to the change in the inflow rate over the last three 
decades. 
Chapter 3: Labour market conditions, DSP applications and grants 
Since inflow rate changes were more important than changes in the outflow rate as 
contributors to the growth of the program, this chapter examines the reasons for the 
changes in the inflow rate, focusing on the effect of labor market conditions on the 
applications for, and the grants of, disability benefit in the context of program growth. 
The impact of labour market conditions on DSP applications, grants and the 
restrictiveness of implementing the eligibility criteria rules by the administrative 
authority ( or policy changes) are also examined and shown to be significant. 
4 
The impacts of the population structure change (population ageing), the relative 
benefit level and policy changes are also examined. The -results confirm that the 
unemployment rate has a statistically significant impact on DSP application and grant 
rates. Also important are the policy changes in the eligibility criteria for DSP. 
Population ageing and the benefit level appear to have little effect on the change in 
the inflow rate. 
Part II 
Chapter 4: Transition from unemployment to DSP 
Although data are not available for examining the determinants of DSP participation 
for all new recipients, this chapter examines one main source of DSP inflows -
transition from unemployment to DSP, to study inflows from a micro perspective. 
Administrative data on income support payments show that a large proportion (more 
than 40 percent) of DSP inflows are from unemployment benefit recipients. This 
chapter examines the pre-transition experience of those who transferred from 
unemployment to DSP and identifies the factors that impact on this transition. It is 
found that a large proportion of those who transferred from unemployment benefit to 
DSP had multi-spells of income support payment recipiency before the transition and 
that the average duration on unemployment benefit before the transition was also 
quite long. In addition, it is found, among other things, that the probability of 
transition from unemployment to DSP is affected by duration on unemployment 
benefit. This chapter reaffirms the results of Chapter 3 that there is a close link 
between unemployment and DSP inflows. 
Chapter 5: Determinants of duration on DSP - an application of the duration model 
After being granted a DSP benefit, what determines duration on the program? This 
chapter addresses this question by applying a duration model to a selected sample of 
new recipients from the FaCS one percent longitudinal data set (LDS). The 
determinants of duration are important because the number of DSP recipients is also 
determined by the duration of recipients. Identifying factors that determine the 
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duration on benefit may provide knowledge on how to increase the outflow rate and to 
reduce the number of DSP recipients. The results show that entry age, gender and 
recipient source, among other factors, are important determinants of the hazard rate 
and duration. 
Chapter 6: Length of stay on the DSP program 
The commonly reported duration on DSP (including other income support payments) 
by the administrative authority is misleading. The reported data refer to interrupted 
spells. To fully understand the length of stay, the duration of completed spells should 
be estimated. This chapter uses the estimated parameters from Chapter 5 to estimate 
duration of completed spells of DSP recipients. For an entry cohort, the average 
expected duration of completed spells is about 9 years, but it varies with entry age, 
gender and recipient source. 
Chapter 7: DSP Exits-where do they go? 
DSP recipients do not stay on the program forever, nor do all recipients stay until the 
Age Pension age. When they leave, where do they go? What are the most common 
reasons for leaving DSP? If there are different exit destinations, who is more likely to 
leave for a specific destination? These questions are addressed in this chapter. The 
data show that among those who left DSP during a given period of time, a very small 
proportion returned to work, while a large proportion transferred to the Age Pension. 
It is also found that those who returned to work had different characteristics from 
those who transferred to the Age Pension. Those who returned to work were more like 
to be younger on entering DSP, male, have earned income when receiving DSP 
benefit and have multi-spells ofDSP recipiency. 
The combination of these chapters will provide a relatively complete picture of the 
dynamics of DSP recipients - inflows, outflows, duration and growth of the program. 
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1.3. The data used 
For the first part (Chapter 2 and 3) of this thesis, aggregate data (national or state 
level) were used and these data were collected by the author mainly from publications 
by the social security administrative authorities (the Department of Family and 
Community Services (FaCS) or the Department of Social Security (DSS)) and the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 
The second part of this thesis (Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7) is mainly based on the one 
percent sample LDS data at FaCS. The LDS data set contains fortnightly records of 
all income support payment recipients, including information such as the 
demographic details of recipients, payment type, payment amount, duration and 
private income. The one percent sample LDS data set currently covers the period 
between 6 January 1995 and 16 June 20003. This data set has the virtue of being 
longitudinal data, but suffers from the usual problems of administrative data. In 
Chapter 7, which identifies the reasons for DSP benefit terminations and disability 
types, two other FaCS data sets are used. These data contain termination reasons and 
disability types of DSP recipients. These two data sets can be matched with the one 
percent sample LDS data using the customer ID variable. 
3 For detailed descriptions of this data set, please refer to LDS 1 % Sample User Documentation, 
which is constructed by the Information Strategies Branch at FaCS . 
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Chapter 2 
Inflows, Outflows and the Growth of the DSP 
Program - An Overview 
2.l. Introduction 
Over the last three decades, the DSP program has grown rapidly. The number of DSP 
recipients increased from 134,000 in 1971 to 602,000 in 2000, with an average annual 
growth rate of 5.32 percent. This growth is much greater than that of the DSP age 
eligible population over the same period, which has increased from 7.8 million in 
1971 to 12.2 million in 2000, with an average annual growth rate of 1.55 percent. 
While the growth rates of the DSP age eligible population for males and females are 
almost the same (1.55 percent for males and 1.64 percent for females), the number of 
male DSP recipients has grown much faster (see Figure 2.1). For male DSP recipients 
the average annual growth rate is 5.81 percent, while for female recipients the rate is 
4.60 percent. Not surprisingly then, the difference in the number of male and female 
recipients has been rising since 1971. As discussed in Appendix 2B, there is a wider 
range of benefit types that can provide income support for females than for males and 
this may be one important reason for the different growth rates. It is also obvious from 
Figure 2.1 that the number of female recipients was quite stable during the 1970s and 
1980s, and it was only during the 1990s that the number of female recipients began to 
increase as quickly as their male counterparts. 
There may be several reasons for the faster growth of female DSP recipients during 
the 1990s. These include: (i) policy changes in 1991, which made accessibility to DSP 
easier and imposed a time limit on sickness benefit (this might disproportionately 
shift women from sickness benefit to DSP), (ii) phasing out of the Widow B pension 
from 1987, which also might move more women into DSP ( see Appendix 2B), and 
8 
(iii) the increase in the female Age Pension age from 1995 (this might have an inflow 
impact and a duration impact on the number of female DSP recipients). 
Figure 2.1: Number of DSP recipients by gender, 
1971 to 2000 
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Source: DSS Annual Report ( each year). DSS Customers ( each year from 1994 to 2000) compiled by 
DSS orFaCS. 
As a result of the much faster growth of DSP recipients relative to the DSP age 
eligible population, the ratio of DSP recipients to the DSP age eligible population, 
referred to as the incidence rate, has been rising strongly over the period 1971 to 2000 
(See Figure 2.2). In 1971, this ratio was 1.73 percent, but it increased to 4.93 percent 
in 2000. The incidence rate increased more for males (from 1.83 percent in 1971 to 
6.02 percent in 2000) than for females (from 1.63 percent to 3.75 percent). 
It is noticeable that the growth of DSP recipients is not smooth. Three periods 
corresponding to the last three decades stand out: (i) there was a gradual increasing 
trend during the 1970s, (ii) the first two years of the 1980s saw a slight decline in this 
trend followed by a growth rate similar to that of the 1970s, and (iii) the 1990s 
witnessed a faster growth rate than that of the previous two decades 1. The prominent 
1 The average annual growth rates for 1971-1981 , 1981-1999 and 1991-2000 are 5.1 7, 4.18, 6.76 
percent, respectively. 
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questions prompted by these figures are why this pattern appeared and why the 
number of DSP recipients has grown so fast, especially in the 1990s. 
Figure 2.2. Ratio of DSP recipients to DSP age eligible population by gender, 
1971 to 2000 
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Sources: The number ofDSP recipients as in Figure 2.1. 
The DSP age eligible population is derived from Australian Demographic Statistics, 
ABS 3101.0. 
This chapter provides some possible answers to these questions in the context of an 
analysis of inflows and outflows. It first uses aggregate data to show that the increase 
in the inflow rate has contributed more to the pro gram growth than the decrease in the 
outflow rate. It then discusses the determinants of the inflow rate and infers their 
relative contribution of these determinants over the last three decades. 
2. 2. Inflows, outflows and growth 
The number of DSP recipients at a point of time can be viewed as a pool with an 
inflow and an outflow, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. An increase in the number of DSP 
recipients can occur by, 
(a) an increase in inflows, if outflows remain constant; 
(b) a decrease in outflows, if inflows remain constant; or 
( c) an increase in inflows and a decrease in outflows at the same time. 
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This section looks at inflows and outflows of DSP recipients and assesses their 
impacts on the growth of the program. We begin with a special case, a steady state 
model, which is used to illustrate the relationship between inflows, outflows and 
growth. 
Figure 2.3: Inflows, outflows and stock 
Inflows 
• 
.· _,....._ ____ _ 
.. ·· .. ·· 
-----•• Outflows 
2.2.1. The steady state relationship between inflows, outflows and growth 
In the steady state, the number of persons entering into the DSP program each year 
and the continuation rate, as defined below, are assumed constant. Suppose each year 
a fixed number of persons F enter into DSP. Also suppose the continuation rate for 
. d . 2 peno x 1s : 
f(x+l,t) 
p x ,r = f (x, t) (2.1) 
where f(x,t) denotes the number of persons in the entry cohort of year t who stay for 
x years. The continuation rate lies between O and 1 and is assumed constant for all 
2 Note that 1- P x,r is the outflow rate for period x of the cohort. 
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cohorts, i.e. p x,t = p x . Then the number of DSP recipients in any given year, D , is 
given by: 
D = F + FpI + FP1P2 + FP1P2P3 + ... 
= F(l + P1 + P1P2 + P1P2P3 + ... ) · (2.2) 
Since F and p x are assumed to be constant over time, D is also constant over time. 
The average completed duration for the F people who begin DSP in the same year, S, 
is given by: 
That is, one year multiplied by the probability of staying one year, two years 
multiplied by the probability of staying two years, and so on. The above equation can 
be rewritten as: 
(2.3) 
Therefore, from (2.2) and (2.3): 
D=FS. (2.4) 
In the steady state the number of DSP recipients equals the product of the inflows 
each year and their average completed duration. The number of DSP recipients will 
increase if either the inflows For the average completed duration S increases. Since 
the completed duration is determined by the continuation rate or the outflow rate, 
changes in the outflow rate determine the number of DSP recipients by changing the 
average completed duration. 
Divide both sides of equation (2.4) by P, the DSP age eligible population, and denote 
this by Rd: 
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(2.5) 
This equation demonstrates the steady state relationship between the DSP incidence 
rate, the inflow rate and completed duration. The DSP incidence rate is equal to the 
inflow rate multiplied by the average completed duration. With a constant inflow rate, 
an increase in the average completed duration ( equivalent to a decrease in the outflow 
rate) will lead to an increase in the DSP incidence rate. Similarly, with a constant 
average completed duration, an increase in the inflow rate will increase the incidence 
rate. 
Thinking of the DSP incidence rate in this way makes clear a number of important 
points. First, it is useful to think of policy impact in this framework. Some policy 
changes impact on inflows and others on completed duration. 
Second, the duration of DSP recipients is normally long. Consequently, a permanent 
change in inflows from one level to another has an extended impact on the number of 
DSP recipients. Therefore, where inflow changes are important it is often not 
appropriate to analyze variations in the number of DSP recipients without a long lag 
structure. For example, consider a one off permanent increase in inflows. If the 
estimated completed duration of every DSP recipient is 9 years ( see Chapter 6), the 
impact of an increase in inflows will take 9 years to be fully effective. If there is a 
dispersion around the mean duration and some recipients experience a duration longer 
than 9 years, the impact of a change in inflows on the number of DSP recipients will 
take longer than 9 years to fully work out. For this reason it is probably better to work 
on inflows and duration separately rather than to work on the number of recipients 
alone to facilitate understanding of variations in the number ofDSP recipients. 
Third, any policy which impact directly on an across-the-board change in duration 
will have a quicker effect than a policy that focuses only on changing the rate of 
inflows. 
Although the above framework is very useful it can only be precisely applied in a 
steady state environment. In practice therefore, during periods of change, the 
13 
approach will need to be modified and the conceptual framework will not be quite as 
simple or as clear-cut. This modification is provided later in this chapter. 
In the next subsection the variations in inflows and outflows of DSP recipients for the 
last three decades are presented to see which of these had the most effect on past 
growth. 
2.2.2. Inflows and outflows of DSP recipients 
Figure 2.4 plots inflows and outflows of DSP recipients over the financial years 1966-
67 to 1998-99. Over this period, except for very few years (1968-69, 1980-81, and 
1981-82) inflows were greater than outflows and, therefore, the number of DSP 
recipients was increasing. Another interesting pattern is that the large changes in 
inflows in the early 1980s, 1987-88 and early 1990s, were accompanied by large 
policy changes as well as significant increases in unemployment in the first and last 
periods. 
From Figure 2.4 it is apparent that the variation of outflows was not as great as the 
variation of inflows. Outflows are determined by past inflows and the continuation 
rate and the data suggest stability in the continuation rate. The average duration of 
DSP recipients is about 9 years (Chapter 6). The effect of long duration acts as an 
application of a weighted average of past inflows to produce current outflows and, as 
a result, the outflows will be smoother than the inflows unless there are substantial 
shocks that influence all continuation rates in a similar fashion. 
It is the difference between inflows and outflows that leads to the change in the 
number of DSP recipients. From the financial year 1991-92 the difference between 
inflows and outflows ( or net inflows) became much larger than before and, as a result, 
the following decade saw the largest increase in the number of DSP recipients. 
Between 1966-67 and 1979-80 average net inflows were 8,800 persons per year and 
between 1980-81 and 1990-91 average net inflows increased to 10,200 persons per 
year. Between 1991-92 and 1998-99 average net inflows became more than 30,400 
persons per year. Since net inflows add directly to the number of DSP recipients, the 
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greater difference between inflows and outflows in the 1990s led to a substantially 
higher growth in the number of recipients as clearly indicated in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.4: Inflows and outflows of DSP recipients, 
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Regardless of the variations, absolute inflows and outflows showed a trend of 
increase. An increase in absolute inflows may be caused either by the rising DSP age 
eligible population or by increases in the inflow rate or both. An increase in outflows 
may be caused either by increases in the number of DSP recipients or increases in the 
outflow rate ( or reductions in the continuation rate). How do changes in the inflow 
and outflow rates affect the total number of DSP recipients? 
To address this question, Figure 2.5 moves the analysis from the absolute number of 
inflows and outflows to the inflow and outflow rates, where the inflow rate is defined 
as the ratio of inflows each financial year to the DSP age eligible population at the 
beginning of the financial year. The outflow rate is defined as the ratio of outflows in 
3The numbers of inflows before 1996 are taken from DSS publications, the numbers between 1996 and 
1999 are estimated by the author from the FaCS LDS data. Prior to 1982 inflows did not include those 
who transferred from other pensions. The numbers of outflows were derived from the inflows and the 
number of recipients, using the identity, the number of DSP recipients this year = the number of 
recipients last year + inflows this year - outflows this year. 
4 The year in this figure refers to the financial year ending in that year. For example 1999 stands for the 
financial year 1998-99. 
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each financial year to the number of DSP recipients at the beginning of the financial 
year5. 
Presentation of the data as the inflow and outflow rates yields a slightly different 
picture of past history. Policy changes in 1980 and 1991 were associated with large 
changes in the inflow rate. In 1980 the eligibility criteria for DSP was tightened by 
administrative change, although there was no legislative change to the criteria (Cass, 
Gibson and Tito, 1988). A commensurate fall in the inflow rate was clearly evident 
following the 1980 policy change, but within a few years the inflow rate had returned 
to its previous level. 
In 1987 the eligibility criteria was tightened again with the requirement that 50 
percent of the incapacity be caused by physical or mental impairment. There was a 
slight decline in inflows and the inflow rate, but it is not clear why the impact of the 
1987 policy change was not as substantially as that in 1980. There was considerable 
debate about changing the eligibility criteria to contain the rapid growth of the DSP 
program before the actual introduction of the new policy in 1987. Perhaps the 
eligibility criteria might have been tightened in practice before 1987 ( as shown in 
Figure 2.5, the inflow rate started to fall in 1985). In addition, the unemployment rate 
had been falling over the period and this might have contributed to the decrease in the 
inflow rate and masked the effect of the 1987 policy change. 
Another large policy change occurred in 1991 when the Disability Reform Package 
(DRP) was introduced, with large changes in the eligibility criteria, which effectively 
made access to DSP easier (see Section 2.3 for more details). As a result, the inflow 
rate increased. Between 1970-71 and 1979-80 the average inflow rate was 0.42 
percent. Between 1980-81 and 1990-91 the inflow rate fluctuated substantially and the 
average inflow rate was 0.41 percent. Between 1991-92 and 1998-99 the average 
inflow rate was 0.66 percent. Since the introduction of the DRP, the average inflow 
rate has been 0.16 percentage points higher than the highest rate before its 
introduction. 
5 Note here the definition of the outflow rate is slightly different from that defined in footnote 2. In 
footnote 2, the outflow rate is defined for an entry cohort. 
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Presentation of the data in terms of the inflow rate also makes clear that there was no 
a clear upward trend in the inflow rate before 1990 and that the main change appeared 
to be an increase in the inflow rate to a new plateau in the 1990s. 
Unlike the number of outflows, the outflow rate showed a trend of decrease over the 
last three decades. That is the duration on DSP has probably been slowly increasing. 
Furthermore, although the inflow rate change was large in response to policy changes, 
the outflow rate change was relatively unresponsive, reflecting the fact that the 
average duration is long and policy impacted directly on inflows rather than on the 
continuation rate. It is also noticeable that the outflow rate during 1990s continued to 
fall at much the same rate as previous decades and that there was no sudden change in 
behavior like that observed in the inflow rate. 
A decrease in the outflow rate will increase the duration of stay on the program and 
thus contribute to the increase in the number of recipients. Both the increase in the 
inflow rate and the decrease in the outflow rate, therefore, could have contributed to 
the past growth of the DSP program. 
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It is worth noting that the main chapters in this thesis address the key questions 
arising from Figures 2.4 and 2.5. 
(a) Is the inflow or outflow rate more important in determining the growth of the 
number of DSP recipients? This is the task of the next subsection in this 
chapter; 
(b) Why does the inflow rate vary so much and what determines the change in the 
inflow rate? Why was the inflow rate so high in the 1990s? (Chapter 3.) 
( c) What is the impact of policy changes on the increase in the inflow rate? 
( Chapter 3.) 
( d) What is the composition of inflows and what determines whether a person is 
to participate in the DSP program? (Chapter 4.) 
( e) As for outflows, who leaves quickly and who leaves slowly? How long will a 
recipient stay on DSP? If recipients leave DSP, where do they go? (Chapter 5, 
6 and 7.) 
2.2.3. The role of the inflow and outflow rate changes in program growth over 
the period 1971 to 1999 
The previously developed steady state model provides a framework to facilitate an 
understanding of the relationship between inflows, outflows and growth. As noted 
earlier, steady state conditions do not hold and to assess the relative contributions of 
the changes in the inflow and outflow rates in a dynamic context, we need a different 
approach which can build on the insights of the steady state model. 
First, note that the change in the number of DSP recipients in year t+ 1, tJJt+I, equals 
inflows in year t+l , I i+J, minus outflows in year t+l , O t+J, i.e. , 
(2.6) 
I r+r = R:+i x ~ +r , where R:+r is the inflow rate in year t+ 1 and P i+ 1 is the population at 
the beginning of year t+ 1, and Ot+1 = Rr~r x Dr, where R,~1 is the outflow rate in year 
t+ 1 and Dr is the number of DSP recipients at the beginning of year t . Then, 
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(2.7) 
where M:+1 is the change of the inflow rate from year t to year t+ 1, ~+i is the 
change in the population and tiR.1~ 1 is the change· in the outflow rate. Reorganize 
(2.7), 
wt+l = (R: X ~ -Rt0 X Dt) 
+ R: X ~+] + M:+1 X ~ -Mt~] X Dt + M:+1 X ~+] (2.8) 
Equation (2.8) decomposes the change in the number of DSP recipients into five 
parts. 
The first term in the right hand side of (2.8) shows that, even though the inflow rate, 
the outflow rate and the population are all fixed, there may still be a difference 
between inflows and outflows, which leads to a change in the number of DSP 
recipients. Denote this part of the change as Wr1+1 (i.e. Wr1+1 = R: x ~ -Rr0 x Dr). 
The second term in (2. 8) is the contribution of the change in population. The third and 
fourth terms measure contributions from changes in the inflow and outflow rates, 
respectively. The fifth term measures the interaction between changes in the inflow 
rate and population. 
This decomposition can be used to analyze the changes of the number of DSP 
recipients between two points of time, but is not directly applicable to a multi-period 
dynamic because, for multi-periods, the number of DSP recipients is endogenous. But 
the ideas behind equation (2.8) can be extended to a multi-period analysis to roughly 
assess the impacts of factors of interest, such as population growth and changes in the 
inflow and outflow rates, on the change in the number ofDSP recipients. 
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Note that, if both the inflow and outflow rates are fixed, but allowing the population 
to change, the change in the number of DSP recipients, denoted as t:JJt~i is: 
(2.9) 
then the difference (Wr~i - LiDr1+1 ) = R: x ~ +i , 1s the impact of the change 1n 
population as discussed above. 
If only the inflow rate is fixed, the change in the number of DSP recipients, denoted 
as b.IJ1
3
+1 lS 
w/3+1 = R: X (~ + ~+l )-(Rto + Mt~l) X Dt 
= Lli)t~I - M t~l X Dt. (2.10) 
The difference between t:JJ:+i and Wt2+1 is the impact of the change in the outflow 
rate. 
If the outflow rate is fixed, the change in number of DSP recipients, denoted as wt:1 
IS 
w t: l = (R: + M t~l) X (~ + ~+l)-Rt0 X Dt 
= R: x(~ +~+1)+M:+i x(~ +~+1)-Rt0 xDt 
= Mt~ I + M:+1 X ~ + M:+l ~ +l . (2 .11) 
The difference between t:JJt:1 and W r~i is the impact of the change in the outflow 
rate adjusted by a factor M :+i x ~ +i . 
Following this framework, four hypothetical numbers of DSP recipients are derived 
by: (i) fixing the inflow and outflow rates and population, (ii) fixing the inflow and 
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outflow rates, but allowing the population to change6, (iii) fixing the inflow rate only 
and allowing the outflow rate and the population to take their actual values each year, 
and (iv) fixing the outflow rate only. 
As noted earlier, even though the inflow and outflow rates and population are kept 
constant, the number of DSP recipients can still change due to the initial imbalance of 
the inflow and outflow rates 7. Thus the change in the number of DSP recipients from 
(i) is because of the initial imbalance. The difference of the change in the hypothetical 
numbers of DSP recipients between (ii) and (i) can be roughly attributed to the impact 
of the change in population. The difference of the change between (iii) and (ii) can be 
attributed to the impact of the change in the outflow rate. The difference of the change 
between (iv) and (ii) can be roughly attributed to impact of the change in the inflow 
rate8. 
Table 2.1 presents the results for each of the last three decades and the three decades 
as a whole. 
The number of DSP recipients increased in each decade, leading to an increase of 
443,400 recipients over the period 1971 to 1999. Most of the increase was 
concentrated in the 1990s (55 percent). The increase in the other two decades was 
relatively small, each accounting for 22 percent. 
The first row in Table 2.1 shows that the impact of the initial imbalance varied 
substantially across the three decades and is consistent with the results in Figure 2.4. 
6 Although changes in population structure may affect the inflow rate, this is not accounted for in these 
projections because the age specific inflow rate for the financial years before 1995-96 was not 
available. It will be shown later that changes in population structure are relatively unimportant. 
7 Initial balance means that, at the start of a period, the inflow and outflow rates are such that inflows 
equal outflows in the first year of the period. 
8 The hypothetical number of DSP recipients from (iv) does not consider the adjustment factor, 
6..R.:+i x ~+I . But even if this factor is adjusted in calculations, the final results are roughly the same. 
So in the reported results, the adjustment factor is not considered. 
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From Figure 2.4, in the financial year 1970-71, the difference between inflows and 
outflows was trivial and this resulted in a negligible impact of the initial imbalance on 
the change in the number of DSP recipients during the first decade and the three 
decades as a whole. In 1980-81, inflows were smaller than outflows and, therefore, 
during the second decade the impact of the initial imbalance was negative9• In 1990-
91, the difference between inflows and outflows was relatively large and net inflows 
were positive. This was translated into a substantial positive impact of the initial 
imbalance on the change in the number of DSP recipients in the 1990s. For this 
reason, the impact estimate may be sensitive to the choice of years for fixing ¢.e 
inflow and outflow rates. Different choices of starting and ending years were 
-'tested and they did not affect the relative importance between the inflow and 
outflow rate. 
Table 2.1: Impacts of changes in the inflow and outflow rates and population on 
the change in DSP recipients by period 
Impact from 
Initial imbalance* 
Population change 
1971-1980(a) 
1.10 
17.20 
Inflow rate change 33.04 
Outflow rate change 39.76 
Change in recipients (,1000) 
1981-1990(b) 1991-1999(c) 
-32.85 83.74 
14.96 18.10 
81.02 113.31 
Ac~;i m~t~~~;~---,c.·~~::,_;:_,.;_: = ,.:·.~t'":~i;i~& _.::\/;/,- __  
1971-1999(a) 
* This impact is due to the fact that even if the inflow and outflow rates and population were 
fixed, the number of recipients could still change (see equation (2.8)). 
(a) For periods 1971-1980 and 1971-1999, the inflow rate and/or the ouflow rate was fixed 
at the 1970-71 level. 
(b) For period 1981-1990, the inflow rate and/or the ouflow rate was fixed at the 1980-81 level. 
(c) For period 1991-1999, the inflow rate and/or the outflow rate was fixed at the 1990-91 level. 
The growth of population was steady and this produced a stable and relative small 
impact over the three periods. For the whole period 1971 to 1999, an increase of 
9 Mainly due to policy change in 1980 (see next section and Chapter 3), the inflow rate in the year 
1980-81 was very low. In contrast, in 1980-81 the outflow rate was relatively high compared with that 
in other years during this decade. The change in the number of DSP recipients when the inflow and 
outflow rates and population were fixed is therefore negative (-32,850) . 
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69,500 in the number of DSP recipients could be attributed to population growth, 
which was 16 percent of the actual increase in the number of DSP recipients over this 
period. 
The impact of changes in the inflow rate was positive and had increased substantially 
over the last three decades. The impact in the second decade was double that in the 
first decade and the impact in the third decade was 1.4 time that in the second decade. 
Over the period 1971 to 1999, an increase of 161,000 in the number ofDSP recipients 
could be attributed to the change in the inflow rate, which was 36 percent of the actual 
increase in the number of DSP recipients over this period. 
The impact of change in the outflow rate was steady during the 1980s and 1990s. But 
in the 1970s, the impact of the change in the outflow rate was relatively large. From 
Figure 2.5, the fall of the outflow rate in the 1970s was substantial, while the fall was 
small during the other two decades. For the whole period 1971 to 1999, an increase of 
146,200 in the number of DSP recipients could be attributed to the change in the 
outflow rate, which was 33 percent of the actual increase in the number of DSP 
recipients. 
During two of the last three decades and the three decades as a whole, the impact of 
the change in the inflow rate exceeded that of the outflow rate. During 1981-1990, the 
impact of the change in the inflow rate was 3 times that of the outflow rate change. 
During 1991 to 1999, the impact of the inflow rate change was 4.6 times that of the 
outflow rate change. Only during the first decade did the impact of the change in the 
outflow rate exceed that of the inflow rate. 
It is interesting that the variation of the inflow rate from decade to decade was larger 
than the variation of the outflow rate and that the impact of the inflow rate change was 
more important than duration change ( or the outflow rate change). It seems common 
across nations that changes in disability benefit policy are normally targeted at 
inflows rather than outflows. Over the last three decades in Australia, almost all 
policy changes were targeted at influencing inflows even though the full impact of a 
change in inflows on the number of DSP recipients takes a long time to complete. If 
the concern of the government were that there were too many DSP recipients, it 
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would seem that the most effective way to deal with this would be to cut off the 
recipients directly (i.e. by raising outflows) rather than to direct policy to inflow 
reduction only. This measure was probably not taken because, once a person is 
granted benefit, it is very hard to move them off the program unless the person would 
like to go. Once granted the benefit, few people are willing to leave, partially because 
of their effort to establish their eligibility, partially because of the depreciation of their 
human capital while on the DSP benefit and partially as a result of the level of their 
disability. 
There also may be political reasons why governments target inflows rather than 
outflows. Current DSP recipients are recognized as disadvantaged people by the 
community, while potential new applicants are not directly recognizable. So, 
tightening eligibility criteria for potential applicants may be more acceptable to the 
public than moving current recipients off the program by changing the eligibility 
criteria. The strong opposition by the public to the current government's proposal in 
the 2002-2003 Budget to apply tighter eligibility criteria to current DSP recipients is a 
good example in this regard. 
For these reasons, changes in the number of DSP recipients and variations in the level 
of inflows show a close association over the last three decades (see Figure 2.6). In the 
next section, the focus is on examining the reasons for the change in inflows and the 
inflow rate. 
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Figure 2.6: DSP inflows and changes in the number of DSP recipients, 
1970-71 to 1998-99 
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2.3. Determinants of inflows and the inflow rate 
It has been suggested that economic and non-economic factors contribute to the 
growth of the disability benefits program through the demand and supply sides 
(Stapleton, 1995). Economic factors may include the financial attractiveness of the 
value of the disability benefit, usually represented by the replacement rate defined as 
the ratio of the value of the benefit to potential labour market outcomes (i.e. earnings 
or wages). Labour market conditions (reflecting the business cycle as well as changes 
in economic structure) and the availability and values of other benefit programs are 
also likely to be important. Growth in population, changes in population structure, 
and changes in policy rules may be referred to as the main non-economic factors. 
To calibrate the impact of each of these factors within a general framework requires 
an econometric methodology which is left for the next chapter. Here, graphical 
techniques are used to explore the association between the changes in these factors 
and the change in the inflow rate. The factors are discussed one by one 10. 
2. 3.1. Financial attractiveness of DSP benefit 
High rates of benefit reduce the opportunity cost of participating in the program and 
raise an individual's incentive to apply for the benefit. Studies conducted for other 
countries, especially in the US , provide supporting empirical evidence in this regard. 
Table 2.2, from Bound and Burkhauser (1999), presents the estimated elasticity of 
disability benefit applications and awards with respect to benefit levels from different 
studies in the US. The elasticity ranges from 0.2 to 1.3, depending on study. But, 
most research estimates the elasticity to be less than 0.6. 
10 Possible impacts of changes in availability and values of other benefits are discussed in Appendix 
2B. 
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Table 2.2: Elasticity of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) applications 
and awards with respect to benefit levels 
Study 
Applications 
Aggregate time series data 
Halpern (1979) 
Lando et al (1979) 
Cross-sectional micro data 
Bound (1987) 
Halpern and Hausman (1986) 
Kreider (1986) 
Awards 
Data 
US quarterly 
US quarterly 
SDNA* 
SDNA* 
SDW** 
Aggregate cross-sectional time series data 
Black et al. (1998) County data 
Cross-sectional micro data 
Leonard ( 1979) SDNA* 
Elasticity Period/sample 
0.4 1964-1978 
0.4-0.6 1964-1978 
0.2 Men, aged 45-59, 1972 
1.3 Men, less than age 50, 1972 
0.8 Men, aged 45-59, 1978 
0.3-0.4 KY, OH, PA, WV counties, 
1970-1993 
0.35 Men, aged 45-54, 1972 
* 1972 Social Security Survey of Disabled and Non-disabled Adults. 
**1978 Social Security Survey of Disability and Work. 
Source: Bound and Burkhauser (1999) Table 13. 
The determination of the DSP benefit level in Australia is quite different from other 
industrialized countries in that the DSP benefit is a universal flat rate and not related 
to previous work experience or the individual's earning history. In addition, as shown 
in Figure 2. 7, the ratio of the maximum single pension rate to the average total weekly 
earnings 11 did not change much over the period 1971 to 1999. In fact, the ratio 
appeared to decrease marginally from 1992 when the inflow rate sharply increased. 
11 The pension rate in June each year is taken from the DSS (FaCS) Annual Report. Male average total 
weekly earnings (AWE) is taken from Average Weekly Earnings, Australia, ABS 6303.0. Up to 1981 
June quarter data is used for each year and after 1981 the May quarter is used. Up to 1983 female 
earnings was derived from the male rate using A WE figures at December each year, from Australian 
Historical Statistics , Vamplew (1987, pl57). From 1983 female AWE iss taken from ABS 6302.0. 
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Figure 2. 7: Ratio of the maximum single pension rate to the average total weekly 
earnings, 1971 to 1999 
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Source: see footnote 1 L 
Therefore, even if the effect of the benefit level was correctly estimated by the above 
studies, it is still doubtful whether we can expect the change in the value of the benefit 
to explain very much of the increase in the number of the DSP recipients in 
Australia 12 . From 1971 to 1999, the ratio of the single pension rate to the average total 
weekly earnings of males increased by 30 percent (this ratio increased less for 
females). Even if we take the biggest estimated elasticity, 1.3, we would only have 
expected the number of DSP grants to increase by 40 percent from 1971 to 1999, an 
increase of 11 ,000 recipients, but the grants actually increased by 213 percent, an 
increase of 58,300. Also note that the increase of the relative benefit mainly occurred 
before 1975, but the sharp increase of DSP inflows mainly took place during the early 
1980s and early 1990s. 
2.3.2. Labour market conditions 
It is often argued that an economic recession may lead to an increase in the number of 
new DSP recipients (i.e. inflows). The main reason is that during economic downturns 
12 Note that the benefit-earnings ratio would be different for different individuals. The benefit-earnings 
ratio would be larger for low paid workers and smaller for high paid workers. As suggested in the 
literature, wage dispersion has increased over the last two to three decades. This implies that the 
benefit-earnings ratio has risen for low paid workers. Since the disabled are more likely to hold 
positions with low wages, although the ratio of benefit to average weekly total earnings did not change 
much, the ratio of benefit to the earnings of the disabled workers might have increased. 
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the probability of application for DSP benefit increases. On the one hand the 
probability of becoming unemployed is higher for a disabled than for a healthy 
worker; on the other hand, it is more difficult for disabled people to find jobs. Both 
imply a lower opportunity cost of applying for DSP (Autor, 2001). Moreover, the 
effect of a recession can be accommodated by the administrative authority if the high 
unemployment rate is of political concern for the govemment13 . Unemployed people 
in a disability program attract less political attention. 
Studies conducted in the US have found marked effects of an adverse labour market 
shock on the number of applications and awards of disability benefits (Lando, Coate 
and Kraus, 1979; Stapleton, 1995). Disney and Webb (1991) and Piachaud (1986) 
also found significant effects of the unemployment rate on the increase in the 
incidence rate of disability benefit recipients in Britain. 
As for Australia, Figure 2.8 plots the inflow rate and the unemployment rate over the 
period 1971 to 1999. There was a close association between these two series at least 
before 1993. But whether there is a causal relationship is not clear because the close 
association between the two series in the 1970s and 1980s was accompanied by 
changes in policy, and the ease in labor market conditions ( as indicated by the fall in 
the unemployment rate from 1993) did not lead to a decrease in the inflow rate of 
DSP recipients. This may be because population ageing had starte~ to have an impact 
as shown in Figure 2.11. 
•, 
13 See Chapter 3 for detailed discussion on the impact of labour market conditions on DSP applications 
and grants. 
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Figure 2.8: DSP inflow rate and the unemployment rate14, 
1971 to 1999 
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An increase in the eligible population increases inflows of DSP recipients because the 
number of persons with disability may increase. Changes in population structure may 
change the inflow rate even if the population remains constant because the incidence 
rate of disability is increasing with age (see Figure 2.9) and the inflow rate for the 
older age population is higher (see Figure 2.10 and Figures 2.Al and 2.A2 in 
Appendix 2A). 
Figure 2.9: Population disability rate by age and gender, 1998 
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Source: Disability, Ageing and Carers Survey (1998), ABS 4430. 0. 
14 The unemployment rate was in February each year and taken from Labour Force, Australia, ABS 
6202.0. 
29 
3.0 
-. 2.5 
?f2. 
~ 2.0 
....... 
~ 1.5 
3 
0 1.0 
.:;= 
C 
0.5 
Figure 2.10: The inflow rate by age and gender, 
1998-99 
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Source: DSP inflows by age were estimated by the author from the FaCS full LDS data. 
It is often argued that population aging contributed to the growth in the DSP program 
in Australia. However, while both the number of DSP recipients and the ratio of the 
number of DSP recipients to the DSP age eligible population have been increasing 
from 1971 (except for the early 1980s), the proportion of the male population aged 50 
to 64 and the female population aged 50 to 59 to the DSP age eligible population 
decreased for about ten years prior to 1991 (Figure 2.11 15). 
....... 
Figure 2.11: Ratio of population aged 50-64/59 * to the DSP age eligible 
population 
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* 50-64/59 refers to population aged 50-64 for males and 50-59 for females . 
15 For more detailed population structure changes, see Figure 2.A5 and 2.A6 in Appendix 2A. 
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Therefore, if anything, the change in population structure should have pulled down 
the inflows of DSP recipients during the 1980s. Jackson (1999) showed that until 
1997, population ageing had a negative effect on the numbers of males receiving 
DSP. 
One way to assess the effect of changes in population structure on the inflow rate is to 
keep the age specific inflow rate fixed and allow the population structure to change to 
see what happens to the overall inflow rate. Figure 2.12 presents this calculation 
using 1995-96 age specific inflow rate16. The projected inflow rate is very smooth 
with little change. By 1991 the projected inflow rate was decreasing, implying 
population structure changes up to 1991 had a negative impact on the overall inflow 
rate. Only from 1992 did the population structure changes start to have a positive 
impact on the overall inflow rate. But, this impact is very small compared with the 
increase of the actual inflow rate. Over the period 1991 to 1999, the projected inflow 
rate increased by 0.037 percentage points, while the actual inflow rate increased by 
0.21 percentage points and from 1991 to 1992 it increased by 0.17 percentage points. 
Therefore, the impact of change in population structure on the inflow rate for the last 
three decades might be negligible. 
The actual inflow rate is also plotted in Figure 2.12 for companson. What is 
impressive in the comparison is the large difference between the projected inflow rate 
and the actual inflow rate before 1991. Although data are not available for direct 
derivation of the age specific inflow rate for the years before 1991 , the comparison 
suggests that the age specific inflow rate before 1991 must have been much smaller 
than that in 1996. This comparison also confirms the observation iIJ. section 2 that it 
was the change in the inflow rate that led to the dramatic increase 'in the number of 
DSP recipients. 
16 The age specific inflows for 1995-96 were derived by the author from the FaCS full LDS data. See 
Figure 2.Al and 2.A2 in Appendix 2A for the age specific inflow rate by gender and for the other three 
financial years. For comparison the outflow rate by age and gender is also presented in Figure 2.A3 and 
2.A4 in Appendix 2A. 
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Figure 2.12: Projected DSP inflow rate using 1995-96 age specific inflow rate 
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2. 3.4. Changes in policies 
Changes in policies include changes in the eligibility rules and the level of benefits. 
As benefit level changes have been discussed earlier, the focus here is on changes in 
eligibility criteria for DSP benefits. As noted earlier, over the last three decades there 
were three important occasions when changes in eligibility criteria took place: 
• 1980 - Tightening the eligibility rule. In response to concerns as to the liberalized 
interpretation of the criteria of 85 percent permanent incapacity, which was 
believed to have at least partly caused the rapid increase in the number of DSP 
recipients before 1980, the administrative authority tightened the eligibility rule 
by putting greater emphasis on medical factors. The legislative eligibility criteria 
did not change at this time, but the interpretation of the criteria and the focus of 
the assessment process were changed. However, the impact of this change might 
not be negligible since inflows and the inflow rate did experience a dramatic 
decrease from 1980. But this new policy did not last long. There was considerable 
criticism of this change and with the change of government in 1983 , socio-
economic factors were again allowed to play a considerable role in the 
assessment process (Cass, Gibson and Tito, 1988)17. Consequently, the inflow 
rate rebounded to the previous level by 1984-85. 
17 For detailed accounts of this change, see Cass, Gibson and Tito (1988) . 
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• 1987 - Introduction of the proportion of incapacity caused by impairment. This 
change was to ensure that payment of disability benefit was based on impairment 
as the cause of incapacity rather than the effect of one or more social-economic 
factors. In addition to the criteria of at least 85 percent of the permanent 
incapacity for work, the requirement was added that 50 percent of that incapacity 
be caused directly by a physical or mental impairment. As discussed earlier, the 
effect of this policy change was relatively small. 
• 1991 - Introduction of the Disability Reform Package (DRP) in November. With 
the introduction of the DRP the eligibility criteria were changed to: (i) 
introducing a minimum impairment threshold of 20 percent; (ii) replacing the 
concept of 85 percent permanently incapacitated for work by an inability to work 
for at least 30 hours a week at full award wages for at least the next two years, 
due to a physical, intellectual or psychiatric impairment18(DSS, 1992). 
These changes may be quite complicated in terms of their effect on DSP inflows. One 
objective of the DRP was to "reduce long-term total dependence on income support" 
(DSS, 1992). This can probably be interpreted as tightening the eligibility criteria for 
DSP. However, compared with 50 percent of impairment introduced in 1987, the 
adoption of the minimum impairment requirement of 20 percent in 1991 could be 
regarded as a relaxation of the eligibility criteria. As for the replacement of 85 percent 
of permanent incapacity for work by an inability to work for at least 30 hours a week, 
it is hard to make a judgment because there was no requirement like this before. But 
this can be compared with a similar requirement in the US disability benefit program. 
In the US , if a disabled person can engage in work that earns a substantial gainful 
activity (SGA) amount, the person automatically loses the Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) benefit. In [997, the SGA amount was US$500 per month (Hu, 
Lahiri, Vaughan and Wixon, 1997). If a person earns the minimum wage, US$5 .15 
per hour, the SGA amount is equivalent to about 24 hours of work per week. Thus the 
30 hours per week requirement may be generous. 
18 As before, permanently blind persons are automatically eligible for IP or DSP. 
,., ,., 
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It is evident that large inflows and the inflow rate responses were associated with 
these policy changes, especially for the 1980 and 1991 policy changes. However, 
while the policy changes in 1980 and 1987 helped reduce inflows and the inflow rate, 
the changes in 1991 were associated with a sharp increase. 
These discussions suggest that, while other factors such as the changes in other 
income support benefits may have had some marginal impact on the increase in the 
inflow rate, the most important factors seemed to be the changes in policies and labor 
market conditions. This is confirmed by the empirical tests in the next chapter, where 
it is shown that labor market conditions represented by the unemployment rate and the 
changes in policies had significant impacts on the applications and grants of DSP 
benefits. The impacts of changes in population structure and the ratio of the disability 
benefit rate to the average weekly earnings on the inflow rate were not significant. 
2.4. Conclusion 
The DSP program has grown rapidly over the last three decades both in terms of the 
number of DSP recipients and the ratio of DSP recipients to the DSP age eligible 
population. The increase in DSP recipients was much larger in the 1990s than in 
previous two decades. Analyzing this growth in an inflow-outflow framework showed 
that, while both the increase in the inflow rate and decrease in the outflow rate have 
contributed to the program growth, the data imply that increases in the inflow rate 
contributed more than decreases in the outflow rate over the period 1971 to 1999. 
Over the whole period, over 36 percent of the increase in the number of DSP 
recipients could be attributed to the change in the inflow rate, while 33 percent could 
be attributed to the change in the outflow rate and 16 percent could be attributed to the 
growth of population. 
When examined by decade, it appeared that the impact of population change on the 
increase in DSP recipients was relatively stable for the last three decades. The results 
also showed that the contribution of the change in the inflow rate to the increase in the 
number of DSP recipients was more important during 1980s and 1990s. During the 
1980s, the impact of the change in the inflow rate was 3 times the impact of the 
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change in the outflow rate. During the 1990s it v,,ras 4.6 times the impact ofthe change 
in the outflow rate and during the 1970s it was a little smaller than the impact of the 
change in the outflow rate. 
Because the variation of the inflow rate was much larger than the variation of the 
outflow rate and the change in the inflow rate contributed more to the increase in the 
number of DSP recipients than the change in the outflow over the period 1971 to 
1999, the factors that determine the inflow rate were further examined. Among the 
factors that determine DSP inflow rate, the time series data suggested that the changes 
in policy which altered the eligibility criteria for DSP benefits and changes in labour 
market conditions played the most important roles. The impact of the relative benefit 
level and changes in the population structure seemed not to be important. The impacts 
of these factors are formally examined in the next chapter. 
It is not clear how the 1991 policy change affected the composition of DSP inflows. If 
this change attracted more older people to the DSP, the impact of the new policy on 
the number of DSP recipients was smaller than if it attracted more young people, 
because as will be shown in Chapter 6, younger recipients stay on the program longer 
than older recipients. 
Another important point to note is that the impact of change in inflows on the number 
of DSP recipients is long lasting and is determined by the completed duration of the 
recipients. While the variation in the inflow rate reflected the policy changes over the 
last three decades, the outflow rate was relatively smooth (although with a decreasing 
trend) because the outflow rate is mainly determined by the duration composition of 
recipients and there have been few policy changes aimed directly at outflows. 
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Appendix 2A 
Figure 2.Al: DSP inflow rate by age, male 
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Figure 2.A2: DSP inflow rate by age, female 
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Figure 2.A3: DSP outflow rate by age, male 
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Figure 2.A4: DSP outflow rate by age, female 
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Figure 2.A5: Population structure changes 1971 to 1999, male 
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Figure 2.A6: Population structure changes 1971 to 1999, female 
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Appendix 2B 
Impacts of changes in other benefit programs on DSP inflows 
Other benefit programs can be classified as either "substitutes" or "complements" for 
DSP. Substitute programs are those for which an expansion in the value of benefits 
reduces applications and grants for DSP, while benefit expansions for complementary 
programs increase applications and grants for DSP (Stapleton, 1995). Pension 
Concession Card, Rent Assistance, and Family Payments are examples of 
complementary benefits. All the other social security benefits are substitutes in the 
sense that DSP recipients are not eligible for them while receiving DSP. Since the 
changes in complementary benefits are negligible, only the substitute benefits are 
discussed. 
Also note that, in Australia, the main income support payments available to working 
age men and women are quite different. For men the available benefits include 
unemployment ( or related) benefits, DSP, and sickness benefits/allowance. However, 
women have access to a wider range of income support payments. These include wife 
pension/partner allowance, widow pension ( different types), and sole parent 
pension 19. This difference in availability of income support payments between men 
and women may partly explain the gender imbalance amongst DSP recipients as 
shown in earlier figures. 
Changes in the availability of other benefits programs that may contribute to the 
growth in DSP include: 
• Sickness benefits/allowance. There were policy changes to contain the increase 
in the number of sickness benefit recipients prior to 199120. In 199 t dramatic 
changes in this benefit took place with the introduction of the Disability 
19 For a detailed description of the payments programs and their developments, see Bond and 
Whiteford (2000). 
20 See Cass, Gibson and Tito (1988) for the efforts before 1988. 
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Reform Package (DRP). This might have led to the increase in DSP inflows. 
With the introduction of DRP, Sickness Benefit was replaced by Sickness 
Allowance (SA) and importantly SA is generally limited to 12 months, with an 
extension to 24 months in special circumstances. As shown in Table 2.Al , 
both in the financial year 1990-91 in preparation for the introduction of DRP 
and in 1991-92 the year the DRP was introduced, a considerable number of 
sickness benefit recipients were transferred· to DSP. Most importantly, the 
long term effects of the imposition of a time limit on sickness benefit is that it 
prevents this benefit from becoming an alternative for DSP and increases the 
demand for the latter. 
Table 2.Al: Number of sickness benefit recipients who transferred to 
DSP, 1990-91 to 1993-94 
Year Persons 
1990-91 29082 
1991-92 25954 
1992-93 17990 
1993-94 16659 
Source: Disability Task Force (1991). 
• Widow B Pension. From June 1987 the Widow B Pension began to be phased 
out. It can be assumed that many women who formerly had been eligible for 
Widow B Pension took up DSP and increased the inflows ofDSP. 
• Eligible age for the Age Pension for women. From January 1995, the age 
pension age for women was increased and a six months increase in their Age 
Pension age for every two years scheduled until it reaches 65. This raised the 
female inflows of DSP recipients over 60 years old from 1995. See Table 
2.A2. 
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Table 2.A2: DSP inflows of females over 60 years of age21 , 1995-96 to 1998-99 
Year 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
Persons 
208 
348 
816 
999 
There are also changes in other benefit programs that may contribute to the decrease 
in inflows of DSP recipients, such as: 
• Mature Age Allowance (MAA). MAA was introduced in March 1994 and is 
payable to men over 60 years old who were unemployed and have received 
income support for 12 months or more22 . As it is easier to be granted this 
benefit than the DSP, it can be expected that the introduction of MAA would 
reduce the applications for DSP. 
In addition, it is often suggested that the Service Pensions have had an effect on the 
number of DSP recipients. The eligible age for a service pension is five years earlier 
than for the age pension. Between 1974 and 1984, many more World War Two 
servicemen entered their service pension age and became eligible for the Service 
Pension. Consequently, this might have contributed to containing the increase in the 
numbers of DSP recipients during the late 1970s and l 980s. However, this service 
pension should only have had an effect on the number of DSP recipients over 60 and 
not on those under 60. 
21 Derived by the author from the FaCS full LDS data. 
22 Before 1 July 1996, MAA was paid at the same rates and under the same income and assets test as 
the Age Pension and the DSP. Subsequently MAA was paid under the allowance income and assets test 
to people who had been on Newstart for 9 months or any other payment ( except Special Benefit or 
Austudy Payment) for any period, providing they had no recent workforce experience. 
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Chapter 3 
Labour Market Conditions, DSP Applications 
and Grants 
As economic growth faltered in the early 1970s, older workers with 
more or less serious impairments became targets for lay-offs and, if 
out of work, found obtaining a job increasingly difficult. Public officials 
responded by introducing relaxed eligibility criteria into disability 
programs, making access to them less difficult. They ( disability benefit 
programs) become a form of extended unemployment. 
- Halberstadt, Haveman and Wolfe (1981) 
3.1. Introduction 
Both increases in inflows and average duration on an income support payment can 
lead to an increase in . the number of benefit recipients. As shown in Chapter 2, the 
inflow rate, defined as the ratio of new grants of DSP benefits to the DSP age eligible 
population, dramatically increased over the last three decades. The outflow rate 
experienced a slight decrease, which might suggest that average completed duration 
had increased. The past increase in the number of DSP recipients might be therefore 
due to increases in both the inflow rate and average completed duration. 
However, as shown in the previous chapter, the increase in the inflow rate, rather than 
the increase in the average completed duration, had contributed more to the growth of 
DSP recipients, especially over the last decade. It was also shown that the change in 
the number ofDSP recipients was closely associated with inflow variations. 
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This chapter examines the reasons for the change in the inflow rate, focusing on the 
effect of labor market conditions on the applications for, and the grants of, disability 
benefit in the context of program growth. It also examines the impact of labour 
market conditions on the authority's implementation of the decision rule to grant an 
application. 
3.2. Theoretical issues 
Participation in the disability benefit program proceeds through two steps involving 
two decision-makers-the disabled individuals and the program administration or the 
watchdog of the program. The disabled individual decides whether to apply for the 
benefit, given their health condition, and the administrative authority decides whether 
to grant the benefit. Labour market conditions may play a role in both processes. 
Aarts and de Jong (1992) argue that disability behaviour is not only determined by 
clinical factors but is also determined by vocational factors, such as the demands of 
the workplace, the willingness of employers to adapt to the disabled worker's 
limitation and the supply of suitable jobs. Worsening labour market conditions induce 
a higher probability of disability benefit applications through reduced labour demand 
for the disabled workers and (then) discourage job seeking. Impairment of a disabled 
worker often reduces the worker's productivity and flexibility and makes them less 
competitive in the labour market. A surplus of labour supply, resulting from a 
recession, aggravates this competitive disadvantage. During a recession, the 
probability of being laid off is high for the disabled and the probability of finding a 
new job is low (Daly, 1994). 
Other research findings show that many disabled persons have other productivity 
characteristics which induce a high unemployment risk, such as old age, low 
education and unstable work experiences. Therefore, worsening labour conditions fall 
disproportionately on this group and make it more difficult for disabled workers to 
acquire earned income. They turn to other income sources, such as the disability 
benefit. Hogelund (2000) labels the impact of deteriorating labour market conditions 
on the disability benefit application as a "push perspective" . In addition, Au tor (2001 ) 
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argues that once the disabled workers become unemployed in the recession, their 
opportunity costs of applying for disability benefits become lower, a "pull 
perspective". 
While the demand for DSP benefits will go up during an economic recession, the 
response of the supply side will depend on the objectives of the administrative 
authority ( or the government). If the government wants to contain the growth of the 
program, it will counteract increasing applications by implementing more stringent 
eligibility rules. Alternatively, if measured unemployment is of great concern to the 
government, the administrative authority may increase benefit grants to accommodate 
the increasing demand. In this case the disability benefit program is used as a means 
to reduce the unemployment rate. The reason that the administrative authority can 
manipulate disability benefit program inflows in this way is that the eligibility criteria, 
set up by legislation, are not well defined and necessarily involve subjective 
interpretation. Although eligibility for a disability benefit grant often appears to be 
based only on medical conditions, the actual criteria allow socio-economic factors to 
come into the administration's decision process (Cass, Gibson and Tito, 1988). 
Of course government may respond to increasing unemployment differently at 
different times. As discussed in Chapter 2, the policy change in 1980 might be 
regarded as a counteracting response to an increase in program demand, while the 
change in 1991 might be regarded as an accommodating response. 
3.3. Modelling participation into the disability benefit program1 
As noted earlier participation in the disability benefit program involves two decision 
processes: the application decision by the disabled individual and the grant decision 
1 The modelling methodology is similar to that provided by Aarts and de Jong (1992), but here labour 
market conditions are explicitly considered and incorporated into the model. In the context of the US 
disability benefit program, Hu, Lahiri, Vaughan and Wixon (1997) and Dwyer, Hu, Vaughan and 
Wixon (2001) present a structural model for the social security's disability determination process . Also 
see Halpern and Hausman (1986), Haveman, de Jong and Wolfe (1991), Kreider (1998, 1999) and 
Benitez, Buchinsky, Chan, Rust and Scheidvasser (1999) for modelling disability benefit program 
participation or applications in different contexts. 
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by the administrative authority. The participation process can be illustrated using the 
diagram in Figure 3.1. Few benefit grants go through the appeal process and to make 
things simple, in the following modelling, the appeal procedure is ignored. 
Figure 3.1: Participation in the disability benefit program 
Whether to apply? 
Whether granted? 
Appeal? Participate 
Not participate 
No Win appeal? Yes 
If P{application} denotes the application probability of a disabled person for the 
disability benefit, and P{grantjapplication} the probability of the benefit being 
granted conditional upon the application, then the probability of participation in the 
program P{participation} can be written as 
P{participation} = P{application}* P{grant japplication} (3.1) 
Suppose, at a point of time, there are only two states over which a disabled person can 
make a choice: work or participation in the disability benefit program2. The choice of 
2 The implicit assumption here is that individuals are not working at the time of lodging their 
application. This assumption is reasonable because, given the nature of the benefit, it is unlikely that a 
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a disabled person between continued labour force participation and application for the 
disability benefit is based on the difference of expected utility from these two options, 
EU(app) and EU(labour). For a person with a given health status, utility 
maximization will lead the individual to leave the labour force for DSP if EU(app) is 
greater than EU(labour). Then: 
P{application} = P{EU(app) - EU(labour) > OJ (3.2) 
Suppose utility is a function of income and leisure, the expected utility of labour force 
participation will be determined by the following equation, 
EU(labour) = Pw*U(Y, V, Lw) + (1-Pw)*U(Bunem, V, LunemJ (3.3) 
Where Pw is the probability of being employed, and (1-Pw) is the probability of being 
unemployed when choosing to stay in the labour force. Y is the income from 
employment and Bunem is the unemployment benefit. Lw and Lunem is the leisure 
associated with employment and unemployment, respectively. V is non-labour 
. 3 income, 
Similarly, the expected utility of application is 
EU(app) = Pgrant *U(Bdsp,Ldsp, V) + (1-PgranJ*EU(labour) (3.4) 
Where Pgrant = P{grantlapplication} is the probability of an application being granted 
and (1-P granJ, the probability of it being rejected. Bdsp is the disability benefit and Ldsp 
is the leisure associated with participation in the disability benefit program 4 . 
disabled person with a job applies for the disability benefit. It is possible for a person with a job to 
decide to apply for the benefit, but before applying they must quit the job first. 
3 Non-labour income may include the labour income of other family member(s) if the disabled person 
is living with a family. 
4 It may also be argued that Y and P w should be smaller for the application-rejected persons than for the 
non-applicants. Aarts and de Jong (1992, p81) assert that the wage profiles of rejected applicants are 
"scarred" by the application process as the applicant becomes to be viewed as a productivity risk by 
prospective employers . Halpern and Hausman (1986) argue further that employers might view an 
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It is mainly through the probability of being employed when choosing to stay in the 
labour force, P w, that labour market conditions, represented by the unemployment 
rate, Runem, play a role in the individual decision to apply for disability benefit. 
Obviously, P w is a function of Runem and other individual characteristics IC, such as 
education, age and marriage status. 
P w = P w(Runem, IC) 
Obviously, apw < 0 . Then, the sign of 
3Runem 
8EU(labour) = ((U(Y V L )-U(B V L ) aPW aR , , w unem, , unem aR 
unem unem 
is determined by U(Y, V, Lw)-U(Bunem, V, LunerrJ5. 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
For a disabled person who chooses between work and participation in the disability 
benefit program, it is reasonable to assume that the utility from rece1v1ng 
unemployment benefit is less than that from work or disability benefit. With this 
assumption, 
3EU (labour) < 0 . 
8Runem 
(3.7) 
individual 's disruption in labour-force participation resulting from applying for disability benefit as a 
signal that the worker has only weak job attachment and that a health condition may hinder future 
productivity. They estimate that a rejected applicant to the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) 
can expect a wage rate 10 percent below the wag-e rate he would have received had he not applied. But 
here, for simplicity, we assume the application rejection has no impact on the potential earnings and 
probability of being employed. 
5 Here Y, V, L w , Lunem are assumed to be independent of the unemployment rate. To the extent that 
labor market conditions have an impact on the wage and hours of work, this assumption may be too 
strong. 
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That is, the expected utility of choosing not to apply for the disability benefit is lower, 
the higher the unemployment rate. 
Differentiate (3.4) with respect to Runm, 
oEU(app) 
_ oP grant U(B L V) + (l _ p ) oEU (labour) _ oP grant EU(labor) oR dsp ' dsp ' grant aR oR 
unem unem unem 
- oPgranr {U(B L V)- EU(! b )} (1- p ) oEU(labour) ('"' 8) oR dsp ' dsp ' a our + grant aR .) . 
unem unem 
apgrant From the administrative authority's point of view, the sign of -- is not 
8Runem 
deterministic (see later). But, from the applicant's point of view, it is reasonable to 
aP 
assume grant = 0 . In this case, equation (3. 8) reduces to 
8Runem 
oEU(app) = (l-P ) 8EU(labour) 
oR grant 8R 
unem unem 
(3.9) 
C b . . (3 ) ( ) d ( . oP{application} h . h om 1rung .7 , 3.9 an 3.2), we can infer ------ > 0. T at 1s, t e 
8Runem 
higher the unemployment rate the higher the probability of applying for disability 
benefit. 
Combining the above hypotheses and specification, we arrive at the following reduced 
form model of disability benefit application probability: 
P{applicatio•nJ = H(Runem, Y, Bdsp, Bunem, V, Lw, Lunem, IC} (3.10) 
The second factor that determines participation is the conditional grant probability, 
P{grant\application}. Although the purpose of the disability benefit program is to 
provide income support for those with a specified degree of disability (DIS'), other 
non-medical factors are taken into account by the administration, such as labour 
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market conditions that reflect the employment opportunities for the disabled, and 
individual characteristics (JC) reflecting the employability of the disabled person. 
Hence, the conditional probability of granting can be specified as: 
P{grant japplication} = Pgrani(DJS, Runem, IC) . (3 .11) 
apgrant As noted above the sign of --- 1s undetermined, depending on how the 
8Runem 
administration responds to the change in labour market conditions. For instance, 
~Mt 
~ t 
--- > 0 if the administration adopts an accommodation policy; 0 an < 0 if the 8Runem 8Runem 
apgrant goal of the administration is to contain grants during recessions ; and --- = 0 if 
8Runem 
there is no response at all to the change in labour market conditions. 
Combining equations (3 .10) and (3 .11 ), we derive the following reduced form model 
of DSP participation: 
P{participation}=P{DJS, Runem, Y, Bdsp, Bunem, V, Ldsp, Lunem, Lw, JC} (3.12) 
It is clear from the above model development that labour market conditions affect 
both processes. As the sign of apgrant . ---1s not determined, the sign of 
8Runem 
ap {participation} 
------- is not determined, either. 
8Runem 
However, at the aggregate level ( as opposed to individual choice), another aspect of 
the effect of labor market conditions should also be considered. Worsening labour 
market conditions may lead to a higher probability of disabled workers of being laid-
off relatively to non-disabled workers. And, once being laid-off, the disabled workers 
may apply for disability benefit rather than stay in the labour force. If the laid-off 
disabled workers are at least as disabled as those already being accepted into the 
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program, the number of participants increases at the aggregate level even if the 
administrative authority does not change the decision rule. 
The above model development, especially through equation (3.2) and (3.4), also 
shows that the level of the disability benefit relative to the wage has a positive effect 
on disability benefit program participation and hence on program growth. 
3.4. The literature6 
The earliest studies using econometric methods to explain the growth of the disability 
benefit program date back to 1974 and 1975 (Lando, 1974; Hambor, 1975). These two 
US studies were stimulated by the sharp increase in applications and grants in the 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) 7 before 1975. Both studies used national 
aggregate time series ( quarterly) data and focused on the effect of the business cycle 
represented by the unemployment rate. Using the quarterly data from 1962 to 1973, 
Lando (1974) found that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate 
raised the applications for SSDI by 2-4 percent depending on specifications. 
However, using a shorter data period from 1964 to 1971, Harnbor ( 197 5) estimated a 
larger impact of 7 percent. Using a slightly modified model to that utilised by Lando 
(1974) and quarterly data from 1964 to 1978, Lando, Coate, and Kraus (1979) 
confirmed the significant impact of the unemployment rate on applications. 
Recent studies on the impact of the unemployment rate on the SSDI program in the 
US have used cross-states and time series data8. Stapleton, Coleman and Dietrich 
(1995) used the period 1988 to 1992, and estimated that a 1 percentage point increase 
6 The brief review of the literature in this section focuses on the impact of labour market conditions on 
the growth of the disability benefit program. For a review of other factors on the program growth, see 
Bound and Burkhauser (1999). 
7 There are two programs in the US providing disability benefit: Social Security Disability Insurance 
(SSDI) and the Supplementary Security Income (SSI). SSDI is based on earnings and only covers those 
employed, while SSI is not employment related but subject to a means test. 
8 The impact of the unemployment rate on SSI was also examined in these studies. The estimated effect 
on SSI was lower than that on SSDI. See Rupp and Stapleton (1995) for a summary of these study 
results. 
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in the unemployment rate raised applications for SSDI by 4 percent. Their estimated 
effect on the final grants was 3 percent. Using a longer time period from 1980 to 
1993, Stapleton and Dietrich (1995) estimated that a 1 percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate was associated with a 2 percent increase in the initial 
determinations of SSDI during the year of the unemployment rate increase, a 3 
percent increase after one year and a 5 percent increase after two years. Also using 
data over the period 198 8 to 1992, but differentiating the applications and grants by 
gender, Rupp and Stapleton (1995) estimates an elasticity of SSDI applications per 
capita with respect to the unemployment rate of 0.27 for men and 0.13 for women, 
and an elasticity of SSDI grants of 0.18 for men and 0.06 for women. The estimated 
elasticity for women was not significant. 
British studies using time series data (HMSO, 1985; Creedy and Disney, 1989) also 
found a positive link between Invalidity Benefit (IVB) claimants and the 
unemployment rate over time. Disney and Webb (1991) also employed cross-sections 
(counties) and time series data to examine the effect of unemployment. Instead of 
using applications and/or grants as the dependent variables, they used the proportion 
of individuals in the eligible population of a particular region in receipt of IVB as the 
dependent variable (this is the incidence rate as defined in Chapter 2). After 
controlling for the replacement rate, the population over 55 years of age and regional 
dummies, they found a significant impact of the unemployment rate on the dependent 
variable9. They also estimated the effect of the unemployment rate on the individual 
probability of IVB receipt using Family Expenditure Survey data. By applying a 
Probit model respectively to the 1980, 1984 and 1988 data, they found that the 
unemployment rate significantly raised the individual probability of receiving IVB, 
although the estimated coefficients were different among the three years. Molho 
(1991) also found that the local (female) unemployment rate had a significant effect 
on a woman's probability of entering IVB, although this impact was not significant 
for men (Molho, 1989). 
9 Deviations from the regional mean over time of the variables are used in the regression, rather than 
the level of the variables, to avoid non-stationarity problem. 
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' 
Another related study by Piachaud (1986) examined the effect of unemployment on 
the proportion of older males (aged 55-59, and 60-64) who stated in the Censuses of 
England that they were disabled (permanently sick or disabled). Piachaud first used 
1981 cross-counties data and regressed the proportion of the disabled on the 
unemployment rate. Then, he regressed the change in the proportion of disabled from 
1971 to 1981 on the change in the unemployment rate over the same period and the 
unemployment rate in 1971, again using county variation of these variables. In both 
regressions, for both age groups, Piachaud found the coefficients on the 
unemployment rate and the change of the unemployment rate were significant and 
concluded that increases in unemployment had been significantly correlated with 
increases in the number of older males stating they were disabled. He attributed half 
of the increase in disability over the period from 1971 to 1981 to a worsening labour 
market. 
In Australia, the impact of labour market conditions on the usage of the Invalid 
Pension ( and other income support payments) was noted by Stricker and Sheehan 
(1981). When examining the hidden unemployment problem in the 1970s in Australia, 
Stricker and Sheehan found that the Invalid Pension was one avenue of hidden 
unemployment and that worsening labour market conditions were associated with a 
higher usage rate of this pension. The usage rate was defined as the percentage of the 
number of Invalid Pension recipients to the relevant population. The number of 
recipients is determined not only by current inflows, but also by inflows in the past 
and the continuation rate of inflows (see Chapter 2). The theory discussed earlier 
suggests that labour market conditions have a direct impact on inflows. Therefore, the 
usage rate may not be a good measure to analyse the impact of labour market 
conditions on income support recipients. A focus on inflows and outflows may 
provide a better analysis. 
Stricker and Sheehan's finding was based on time series data. Carter and Gregory 
(1981) provided supportive results using cross sectional (regions) data10. Specifically, 
they found that regions with a higher unemployment rate also had a higher usage rate 
of the Invalid Pension ( and other income support payments, such as the sickness 
1
° Carter and Gregory 's (1981) study is in Appendix 1 in Stricker and Sheehan 's (1981) book. 
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benefit) among males aged 15 and over. One problem with using the usage rate in this 
cross-region study is that the higher usage rate of income support payments may not 
be caused directly by higher unemployment. It is highly likely that regions with 
higher unemployment have lower living costs and are more attractive for people 
living on income support payments (Morrow, 2000). Once again a focus on inflows 
into a region and the duration of a spell in a region may provide a better analysis. This 
chapter uses inflows rather than the number of recipients to overcome problems just 
noted above. 
3.5. Empirical evidence from Australian data 
3.5.1. The data 
Two data sets are used for the empirical analysis: the aggregate time series data and 
the cross-states-time-series data. The following variables are derived using the two 
data sets: the application rate (app_rate) defined as the number of applications per 
1000 DSP age eligible population, the grant rate (grant_rate) defined as the number of 
grants per 1000 DSP age eligible population and the population ratio (p50 _pop), 
defined as the ratio of the population aged 50 to the Age Pension age to the DSP age 
eligible population. The variable p50 _pop is used to control for changes in population 
structure (population ageing). The ratio of the maximum single pension rate to the 
average weekly earnings (replacement_rate) 11is also included to control for the impact 
of the financial attractiveness of DSP benefits. 
The basic data are from different sources. Applications, grants, and pension rate come 
from a variety of publications by the social security administrative authority12. Other 
data, such as the DSP age eligible population, the average weekly earnings and the 
unemployment rate are taken from relevant ABS publications 13. 
11 Here male total earnings are used because before 1981 only Average of Weekly Earnings (A WE) of 
a Male Unit was available. 
12 Applications and grants at state level between 1970 and 1987 come from William Nichol (1 988). 
Applications and grants at the national level come from DSS (July 1997). The pension rate comes from 
the annul DSS (FaCS) reports. 
13 Refer to sources of Figures 2.2, 2.9 and 2.10 in Chapter 2. 
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The time periods covered by these two data sets are different because of data 
availability on the number of DSP applications and grants. The cross-states-time-
series data set covers 1971 to 1987. The aggregate time series data set covers a longer 
period. Similarly, the number of DSP applications is only available for the period 
1970 to 1995, while the number ofDSP grants is available from 1967 to 1999. 
To get a flavor of the relationships between the application rate, the grant rate and the 
unemployment rate, Figure 3 .2 presents these three rates using the aggregate time 
series data 14. The application and the grant rates match each other very closely. Both 
increased steadily to the end of the 1970s, experienced a drop in the early 1980s and 
then increased very quickly. The application rate appeared very stable between 1984 
and 1990, while the grant rate showed a slight decline. Between 1991 and 1992 both 
increased sharply. 
The close association between the application and grant rates might suggest one of 
two things. Either most of the incremental applications over the period met the 
unchanged eligibility criteria, if the decision rule did not change in response to an 
increase in the applications; or, if the incremental applicants possessed a different 
level of disability, the decision rules must have varied in response to applications. 
Figure 3.2: The application, grant and unemployment rates 
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14 The relationship between the unemployment rate and the grant rate was presented before in Figure 
2.8 in Chapter 2. 
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Another striking point derived from Figure 3.2 is the variation of the applicatjon rate 
at the time when policy ( or eligibility criteria) changes took place. The coincidence of 
application variation and policy changes suggests that the applications of those with 
disability responded to the tightness of screening and the relaxation of the eligibility 
criteria. As noted earlier, the policy change in 1980 did not alter the legislative 
eligibility criteria and only tightened the implementation of the rules. It is interesting 
to note that a change in implementation not only reduced the grant rate but also 
decreased the application rate, suggesting a close relationship between applications 
and screening stringency15. It is not clear why this occurs. One explanation may be 
that the potential applicants are fully aware of the eligibility requirements, form their 
own probabilities of being successful if they apply and then adjust their application 
decision. Another possibility however, is that potential applicants may not have 
enough information about the eligibility requirements for DSP. But, as they apply for 
other income support payments, such as unemployment benefit, government officials 
may suggest they apply for DSP if eligible. Since government officials normally 
know the eligibility criteria better than applicants, the applications may then vary with 
the change in the eligibility criteria. Given that most people are unlikely to be fully 
aware of the income support system, this seems the more likely explanation for the 
relationship between applications and screening stringency. 
The relationship between the change in the application rate ( and the grant rate), the 
change in the unemployment rate and policy changes is the focus of this chapter. The 
increase in the unemployment rate during the 1970s was clearly associated with the 
increase in the application and grant rates. The increases in the unemployment rate 
15 This is also noted from the US experience. Over the 1976-1978 period, the application rate fell more 
steeply in states that had tightened their screening (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). Using the variations 
in the screening stringency among states, Parson (1991a) estimated an elasticity of applications with 
respect to the screening stringency instrumented by yhe initial award rate to be 0.45 . Stapleton, Kevin, 
Coleman, Dietrich and Livermore (1998) re-estimated Parsons ' s equation, including demographic and 
business cycle controls, and found that doing so reduced the magnitude of the estimated coefficient by 
50 percent. However, Bound and Burkhauser (1999) believe that these elasticities underestimate the 
long-run effect of the eligibility standard on the application rate. 
55 
between 1981 and 1983 and between 1990 and 1992 were also followed by increases 
in the application and grant rates, but, as noted earlier, policy changes also occurred 
during these two periods. However, the decrease in the unemployment rate since 1993 
was not associated with a decrease in the grant rate. This may be because population 
ageing had started to have an impact, as shown in Figure 2.11 in Chapter 2. 
As for the cross-states-time-series data16, Table 3.1 presents the state mean values of 
all th~ variables over the period 1971 to 198717. Even from these mean values, some 
. 
association appears between the application rate and the unemployment rate. The two 
states with the highest mean application rate (SA and QLD) also have the highest 
unemployment rate, while the state with the lowest application rate (VIC) has the 
lowest unemployment rate. For the grant rate and the unemployment rate the 
association is not so close. While the state with the lowest grant rate has the highest 
unemployment rate, the state with the highest grant rate is not the state with the 
highest unemployment rate. 
The changes in population age structure are often assumed to significantly influence 
the growth of the DSP program, but in Table 3.1, the application and grant rates have 
no clear relationship with the ratio of population aged 50 to the Age Pension age to 
the DSP age eligible population (p50 _pop). 
Table 3.1: Means and standard deviations of cross-states-time-series data, 
1971 to 1987 
NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS 
Mean 5.57 5.38 5.63 5.52 6.01 5.52 app_rate 
Std.Dev. 1.02 0.89 0.96 0.96 0.85 0.56 
Mean 3.98 3.92 3.96 4.09 4.30 4.07 grant_rate 
Std.Dev. 1.08 0.89 0.97 0.83 0.67 0.53 
Mean 6.75 5.60 7.01 6.45 6.99 6.81 unem rate 
Std.Dev. - 3.63 2.51 3.18 2.84 3.50 3.10 
p50_pop Mean 19.49 19.23 18.90 17.09 19.21 19.33 
Std.Dev. 0.59 0.55 1.05 0.35 0.69 0.81 
Mean 21.39 23.04 22.78 21.86 23.79 24.17 replace_ rate 
Std.Dev. 1.80 1.79 1.87 1.60 1. 70 1.81 
16 Data for NSW and ACT, and SA and NT are combined because before 1976 the unemployment rate 
data for each state are not available. The rates reported here are calculated using the registered 
unemployed persons taken from Employment and Unemployment, ABS 6213.0. The registered 
unemployed persons are not separable between NSW and ACT and SA and NT. 
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3.5.2. Model specification 
Disney and Webb (1991) noted, for the British studies using time series only data, that 
the time series data were heavily time-trended and Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) 
test for the presence of co-integration was rejected. Early US time series studies did 
not provide test statistics on variable stationarity. From Chart 1 in Lando, Coate and 
Kraus (1979), it appears likely that the dependent variable is non-stationary. Using 
cross-sectional and time series data cannot get around the non-stationarity problen:i. 
But, if the time period is short, and the variation of the cross sectional observations is 
large, as in the Stapleton, Coleman and Dietrich's (1995) studies, the non-stationarity 
problem may not be as serious as in the pure time series analysis. 
The Australian time series are non-stationary. The ADF test shows that, except for the 
variable p50_pop, all variables are integrated of order one, i.e. I(l) (see Table 3.Al in 
Appendix 3B). However, as shown in Table 3.A2 in Appendix 3B, the residuals from 
the model estimation (to be discussed shortly) are stationary, implying that there exist 
cointegration relationships between the I( 1) dependent variables and the I( 1) 
explanatory variables, and non-stationarity may not be a problem. However, to test 
the robustness of the relationships between the application and grant rates and the 
unemployment rate, regression results using the first differences of the variables are 
also reported. 
The basic model is as follows 
Yr =a+ /31 unem _ rater + f32unem _ rater-I 
+ 8p50 _popr + yreplace _rater+ mime _tr 
+ (f)1year _ 80 + cp 2 year _ 87 + cp 3 year _ 9 l + µ r (3.13) 
where Yr, is either the application rate (app_rate) or the grant rate (grant_rate). Note 
that not only the current unemployment rate, but also the one year lagged 
unemployment rate is included as a regressor to capture the dynamic impact of the 
unemployment rate. A time trend variable (time_ tr) is also included. Year dummies 
17 Appendix 3A presents figures illustrating all the relevant variables by state. 
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are included to reflect the policy changes as discussed earlier. For the cross-states-
time-series data, only one year dummy, year_ 80, is included because the data ended in 
1987. 
µ 1 is the disturbance term. For the aggregate time series only data, the disturbance 
assumptions follow the standard linear regression model specifications. But for the 
cross-states-time-series data, the assumptions on µr are that the variances are 
different across states and, although there is no autocorrelation within a state ( as in the 
aggregate time series only case), there are cross-state correlations 18 . In the cross-
states-time-series model, 
var(µit) -:t= var(µ Jt) for i -:t= j ; 
(3.14) 
3.5.3. Estimation results 
The application rate equation 
Table 3.2 presents the time series only and cross-states-time-series results for the 
application rate equation. Both data sets produce a significant impact of the 
unemployment rate on the application rate. This is also confirmed by the regressions 
using the first difference forms of the variables. However, it is the one-year-lagged 
unemployment rate that matters rather than the current year unemployment rate. This 
may lend support to the speculation that the disabled might search around for a job for 
a while before turning to the disability benefit (see Chapter 4). 
18 These specifications are based on the test of the residuals from a pooled regression. Means of the 
residuals by state, and the correlation coefficients across states, are reported in Tabl~ 3.A3 and 3.A4 in 
Appendix 3B. DSP is a federal income support program; any change impacting on this program will 
exert the same impact across states. This may justify the cross-state correlation assumption. Other 
specifications on the error term are also tried. However, the reported specifications produce the highest 
log likelihood. 
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Table 3.2: Estimation results of the application rate equation 
Aggregate time series only 
Variable in level In 1st difference 
unem rate 0.0853 0.1943** 
-
(0.1109) (0.0747) 
lag unem _rate 0.3202** 0.1800** 
(0.1135) (0.0755) 
p50_pop . 0.0922 - 0.0123 
(0.3925) (0.5286) 
replacement rate 0.0275 0.0687 
(0.1131) (0.1107) 
time trend - 0.0674 
(0.1036) 
year_80 - 1.2855** - 1.5179*** 
(0.5473) (0.4325) 
year_87 0.8551 - 0.0205 
(0.6296) (0.4411) 
year_91 2.0849*** 1.4500*** 
(0.5099) (0.4711) 
constant 2.2391 - 0.0139 
(7.3040) (0.1049) 
Summary statistics of model specification 
No. of obs. 
F(,) 
Prob>F 
R- square 
Ad j-R-square 
D-W test 
Log likelihood 
Wald chi2 ( 6) 
Prob>chi2 
26 
24.86 
0.0000 
0.92 
0.88 
2.98** 
Note: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
25 
8.72 
0.0001 
0.78 
0.69 
2.00 
2: *** Significant at 1 %; ** at 5%; * at 10%. 
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Cross-states-time-series 
Variable in level 
0.0149 
(0.0549) 
0.2105*** 
(0.0568) 
0.1450*** 
(0.0357) 
- 0.0183 
(0.0327) 
0.0581 
(0.0465) 
- 1.2682*** 
(0.3366) 
1.7503** 
(0. 7715) 
102 
- 65.3510 
60.68 
0.0000 
In 1st difference 
0.1037** 
(0.0456) 
0.1812*** 
(0.0459) 
0.9488*** 
(0.3703) 
-0.1191 
(0.0776) 
- 1.5889*** 
(0.3931) 
0.2292* 
(0.1223) 
96 
- 53.23 
56.85 
0.0000 
The coefficients of the unemployment rate in the regression, using variable levels, 
imply that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate will raise the 
application rate by 22.5 percent ( cross-states-time-series results) to 40.6 percent 
(aggregate time series only results) over two years. Using the averages of the 
application and unemployment rates over the period between 1970 and 1995, this 
implies an elasticity of 0.15 to 0.29, which is similar to the estimated elasticity found 
by Rupp and Stapleton (1995). 
The control variable, replacement rate, is not significant in any regression. While the 
variable, p50 _pop, is not significant in the aggregate time series only data regression, 
it is significant in the cross-states-time-series data regression and the sign is also as 
expected - population aging raises the application rate for the disability benefit. This 
may be because the cross-states-time-series data produce more variation in this 
variable, which makes its impact identifiable. 
The significance of the coefficient of year_ 80 implies that the change in the 
administration's rules in 1980 did have a significant negative effect on applications, 
even though the legislative eligibility criteria did not change. This suggests that 
tightening the qualification requirements for DSP may not need legislative changes in 
the eligibility criteria. Tightening the administration's rules will work in terms of 
reducing DSP applications. As discussed earlier, the explanation may be that 
individuals do have their own subjective conceptions of the probability of being 
granted the benefit when they make application decisions, and then the tightened 
decision rule discourages applications; or that potential applicants seek advice from 
the government agencies before making applications. The advice reflects the varying 
implementation rules. 
Change in the legislative eligibility criteria in 1987 put more emphasis on medical 
requirements and was to tighten the eligibility criteria. This tightening occurred at the 
time when the unemployment rate was falling. In the regression when the impact of 
the unemployment rate is controlled the impact of the 1987 policy change become 
insignificant. As discussed in Chapter 2, the reason for the insignificance of the 1987 
policy change may be that the eligibility criteria might have been tightened in practice 
before 1987. 
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The aggregate time series only results also show that the policy change in 1991 had a 
significant positive impact on the application rate. This confirms the suggestion in 
Chapter 2 that the 1991 policy change implied a relaxation of the eligibility criteria 
for DSP. Also note that the magnitude of the coefficient of the 1991-year dummy is 
very big compared with that of the unemployment rate. 
The grant rate equation 
Table 3.3 presents the results for the grant rate equation. It appears that an increase in 
the unemployment rate will significantly raise the grant rate, at least for the following 
year. The magnitude of the coefficients on the level regression implies that a one 
percentage increase in the unemployment rate would raise the grant rate by 15 to 23 
percent. Comparing the coefficients on the unemployment rate in Table 3.3 with 
those in Table 3.2, it appears the (total) impact of the unemployment rate on the grant 
rate is smaller than its impact on the application rate19. This may suggest that the 
incremental applicants as a consequence of a recession might not on average have a 
disability as serious as those who would apply irrespective labour market conditions. 
Again the replacement rate is not significant in all regressions. While the variable, 
p50 _pop, is significant in the level regression using cross-states-time-series data, 
implying population ageing significantly raises the grant rate as expected, but this is 
not confirmed in other regressions. 
As in the application rate equation, the change in the eligibility criteria in 1980 and 
1991 significantly reduced and increased the grant rate respectively. In the first 
difference regression, using the time series only data, the 1987 year dummy produces 
a negative, weak significant coefficient, but it is not confirmed in the level regression. 
-19 Note that the time series only data regression of the grant rate equation in Table 3.3 covers a longer 
period than the regression of the application rate equation in Table 3 .2. The regression results of the 
grant rate equation using the same period as the application rate equation are different in terms of the 
magnitude of the coefficients on variables of interest, but not in terms of statistical significance. Also 
the difference between the coefficients on the variable of interest is smaller in the first difference 
regression than in the level regression. See Table 3.5A in Appendix 3B. 
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Table 3.3: Estimation results of the grant rate equation 
Aggregate time series only 
Variable in level In 1st difference 
unem rate 0.0069 0.0628 
-
(0.1002) (0.0744) 
lag unem_rate 0.2241 ** 0.1540** 
(0.0852) (0.0714) 
p50_pop 0.2314 0.1066 
(0.1780) (0.3175) 
replacement rate -0.0710 0.0515 
(0.0835) (0.0976) 
time trend 0.0993** 
(0.0446) 
year_80 -1.9511*** - 1.6860*** 
(0.4369) (0.4430) 
year_87 0.0240 - 0.8096* 
(0.4927) (0.4507) 
year 91 1.1373*** 1.0572** 
(0.3868) (0.4815) 
constant - 0.7547 0.1197 
(3.7620) (0.0833) 
Summary statistics of model specification 
No. of obs. 
F(,) 
Prob>F 
R- square 
Adj-R-square 
D-W test 
Log likelihood 
Wald chi2 (6) 
Prob>chi2 
33 
28.83 
0.0000 
0.9057 
0.8743 
2.2720** 
Note: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
32 
6.30 
0.0009 
0.6294 
0.5213 
2.1587** 
2: *** Significant at 1 %; ** at 5%; *' 1t 10%. 
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Cross-states-time-series 
Variable in level 
-0.0336 
(0.0456) 
0.1791 *** 
(0.0468) 
0.0885*** 
(0.0319) 
- 0.0024 
(0.0293) 
0.0823** 
(0.0378) 
- 1.3770*** 
(0.2563) 
1.2913** 
(0.6053) 
102 
- 55.2015 
64.18 
0.0000 
In 1st difference 
0.1195** 
(0.0418) 
0.1682*** 
(0.0424) 
0.3477 
(0.3236) 
- 0.0671 
(0.0629) 
- 1.2409*** 
(0.2879) 
0.0733 
0.1025 
96 
- 45 .7160 
56.67 
0.0000 
Comparing the estimates for the year dummies in the application and grant rate 
equations in the level regressions, for the 1980 year dummy, the coefficient in the 
grant rate equation is always less than that in the application rate equation. Although 
the tightened eligibility criteria in 1980 deterred applications as noted earlier, it was 
more effective in reducing grants, which was the purpose of tightening the 
administrative rule at that time. 
The policy change in 1991 had a bigger impact on the application rate than on the 
grant rate. This may reflect the inconsistency of the meaning literally conveyed by the 
changed eligibility criteria and the intention of this policy change. One of the 
objectives of the introduction of the Disability Reform Package (DRP) in 1991 was to 
contain the rapid growth of the DSP program (DSS, 1992). However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, the new eligibility criteria might well be a relaxation of the eligibility 
requirements. On the one hand, the relaxed eligibility criteria attracted more 
applicants; on the other hand, with the intention of reducing the number of DSP 
recipients, the administrative authority might have to implement the changed rules 
more restrictively. These then resulted in a larger impact on applications and a smaller 
impact on grants. 
Selected model specification test statistics are also reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.320. 
The F-statistics for the time series only model and the Wald chi2-statistics for the 
cross-states-time-series model test the hypothesis that all the explanatory variables 
( except for the constant) have zero coefficients. Clearly, this hypothesis is rejected at 
any significant level for both equations. Coefficients of determination are also 
reported for the time series only results. As the statistics show, the explanatory power 
of the models is quite high. Durbin-Watson (D-W) test statistics are also provided for 
the time series only models. In level regression, for both the application rate and the 
grant rate equations, the hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation is not rejected at 
the 5 percent significant level. In the first difference regression, autocorrelation is 
rejected at the 5 percent level for the grant rate equation, but the D-W test statistics 
fall in the uncertain region for the application rate equation. 
20 The test statistics for heteroscedasticity in the time series only regressions are not reported, but in 
both equations heteroscedasticity is rejected. 
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3.6. The response of the administrative authority to labour market 
conditions 
It was noted earlier that it is not possible to predict a priori the response of the 
administrative authority to labour market conditions. The actual response is an 
empirical question. This section briefly examines this issue. To do this we must 
measure the restrictiveness of the administrative authority in implementing the 
eligibility criteria. Given the available data, one measure might be the application 
acceptance rate (accept_rate) defined as the number of grants per 100 applications for 
DSP21 . The basic assumption when using the accept_rate as the measure of the policy 
administration is that, if the legislative eligibility criteria remain unchanged and the 
health conditions of the population do not worsen over time, any variation in the 
accept_rate should only reflect the change of the restrictiveness in implementing the 
eligibility criteria. 
Figure 3.3 plots the acceptance and unemployment rates over the period 1970 to 
199522. There is no obvious close association between these two rates. 
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21 Essentially, the acceptance rate equals the grant rate divided by the application rate multiplied by 
100. 
22 Numbers of applications after 1995 are not available. 
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To assess the impact of the unemployment rate on the acceptance rate, a model 
similar to that specified in equation (3.13) is employed. But here the dependent 
variable is the acceptance rate. The independent variables include, the current and one 
year lagged unemployment rates, the population ratio (p50 _pop) and year dummies to 
reflect policy changes. The replacement rate variable is excluded, as there is no reason 
to believe that the value of the benefit has any impact on the restrictiveness of 
implementing the eligibility rule. 
The estimated results are reported in Table 3.4, including both the level regression 
and the first difference regression23 . 
Looking at the level regression only, the results show that an increase in the current 
year unemployment rate tends to reduce the acceptance rate in the current year but 
increases it in the next year. The total impact, accounting for both years, is to increase 
the acceptance rate. The current year decrease in the acceptance rate may occur 
because of the lag between applications and grant decisions; or, it could be that the 
incremental applicants in response to the increase in the unemployment rate are less 
eligible for the benefit. Similarly, the second year increase in the acceptance rate may 
also be a result of the lag between applications and grant decisions; or it could arise 
because the administrative authority relaxes the decision rule to accommodate the 
increase in applications. 
The results from the first difference regression also confirm the positive total impact 
of the unemployment rate on the acceptance rate, although the significance of the time 
series only regression is weak. 
23 As shown in Table 3.Al in Appendix 3B, the acceptance rate is also in I( l ). But as in the application 
and grant rate equations, the residuals from the level regression are also stationary ( see Table 3 .A2 in 
Appendix 3B). Again the model is applied to both the time series only and the cross-states-time-series 
data and the assumptions on the disturbance terms are the same as in the application and the grant rate 
equations. 
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Table 3.4: Estimation results of the acceptance rate equation 
Aggregate time series only 
Variable in level1' In 1st difference 
unem rate - 1.4152* 
- 0.5439 
-
(0.7675) (0.7794) 
lag unem_rate 1.9703*** 1.7084* 
(0.6737) (0.8252) 
p50_pop 
- 5.7381 
- 3.3672 
(3.6391) (5.7746) 
year_80 - 15.8941 ** - 10.3413** 
(5.8343) (4.7725) 
year_87 
- 7.8271 - 12.0778** 
(5.3281) (4.8786) 
year_91 2.5616 
- 1.3089 
(4.2163) (5.1567) 
constant 185.99 
- 0.0081 
(71.1359) 1.0933 
Summary statistics of model specification 
No. of obs. 
F(,) 
Prob>F 
R- square 
Adj-R-square 
D-W test 
Log liklihood 
Wald chi2 ( 6) 
Prob>chi2 
26 
5.20 
0.0026 
0.5986 
2.1769** 
Note: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
25 
2.51 
0.0603 
0.4560 
0.2747 
2.2178** 
2: *** Significant at 1 %; ** at 5%; * at 10%. 
Cross-states-time-series 
Variable in level 
- 0.6057** 
(0.2801) 
1.3021 *** 
(0.2929) 
- 0.6235* 
(0.3195) 
- 7.9788*** 
(1.2389) 
83.7089*** 
6.2918 
102 
- 281.02 
52.22 
0.0000 
In 1st difference 
0.5978* 
(0.3383) 
1.2412*** 
(0.3384) 
- 5.2196** 
(2.5627) 
-3.7531* 
(2.1910) 
- 1.4560** 
(0.6923) 
96 
- 284.13 
25.14 
0.0000 
3. /\ Standard errors in the level time series only data regression are estimated with robust 
regression to account for heteroscedasticity. 
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The results from the cross-states-time-series data indicate that population ageing tends 
to reduce the acceptance rate, but this is not confirmed by the time series only data 
results. The tightening of the decision rule in 1980 was strongly supported by the 
estimation results as all regressions produce significantly negative coefficients. 
Interestingly, while the change in the eligibility criteria in 1991 can be regarded as a 
relaxation in terms of increasing applications and grants of DSP benefit, it does not 
represent a relaxation in the decision rule implemented by the administrative 
authority, because the 1991 year dummy is not significant and the level regression and 
the first difference regression produce an opposite sign. 
3. 7. Simulations of the impacts of the unemployment rate and policy 
changes 
This section simulates the impact of the unemployment rate and policy changes on 
grants and on the number of DSP recipients. The simulation results for the application 
rate and the number of applications are presented in Appendix 3D. The focus here is 
on the simulated grant results because from the simulated grant rate it is possible to 
estimate the subsequent impact on the number of recipients. Specifically, this section 
estimates what the grant rate and the number of DSP recipients would be between 
1971 and 1999 if the unemployment rate were kept at the 1970 and 1971 levels and 
what the grant rate and the number of recipients would be if there were no policy 
change in 1991. The impact of the policy change in 1991 is simulated because this 
change had led to a dramatic increase in the grant rate. The simulation results, 
assuming the unemployment rate is fixed at 1970 and 1971 levels and there is no 
policy change in 1991, are presented in Appendix 3C 
The approach here is very simple. Note that the inflow rate defined in Chapter 2 
approximately equals the grant rate defined in this chapter divided by 1024 . Using the 
24 The inflow rate defined in Chapter 2 - the ratio of inflows in a financial year to the DSP age eligible 
population at the beginning of the financial year. The grant rate in this chapter is defined as the number 
of grants ( equal to inflows) per 1000 DSP age eligible population. There is a difference in the 
denominator. For the inflow rate defined in Chapter 2 the denominator is the population at the 
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model in the first column in Table 3.3 and the actual values of the other variables , the 
hypothetical grant rate can be estimated if the unemployment rate is fixed at the 
values in 1970 and 1971 or if there was no policy change in 1991. Once the simulated 
grant rate is obtained, an estimation of the hypothetical number of recipients can be 
calculated as is done in Chapter 2. 
3.7.1. Simulated impact of the unemployment rate over the period 1971 to 1999 
First, Figure 3 .4 presents the actual grant rate, the predicted grant rate from the model, 
and the hypothetical grant rate by fixing the unemployment rate at 1970 and 1971 
levels (1.6 and 1.7 percent, respectively). Comparing the actual and the predicted 
grant rates indicates that the model fits the data quite well. The difference of the 
model predicted grant rate and the calculated hypothetical rate could be attributed 
solely to the impact of the unemployment rate, which is shown by the bottom line in 
Figure 3.4. From 1970 to 1999 the predicted grant rate increased by 3.41 , from 3.45 to 
6.86; the hypothetical grant rate increased by 1.76, from 3.40 to 5.16. Thus, about one 
half (1.65) of the increase in the predicted grant rate can be attributed to the impact of 
the unemployment rate, and another one half (1.76) to other factors. 
From Figure 3.2, there were three periods when the unemployment rate showed 
dramatic increase, 1974-1978, 1981-1983 and 1990-1993. As a result, over the 
periods 1975-79, 1982-1984 and 1991-1994 (note that the unemployment rate has a 
one year lagged impact on the grant rate), the impacts of the unemployment rate on 
the grant rate increased as shown by the bottom line in Figure 3 .4. 
beginning of the year, while for the grant rate defined in this chapter the denominator is the population 
of current year. 
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Figure 3.4: Actual, model predicted and hypothetical grant rate by fixing the 
unemployment rate at 1970 and 1971 levels, 1971 to 1999 
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To assess the subsequent effect of the grant rate on the number of DSP recipients, 
Figure 3.5 presents the actual, model predicted and the hypothetical numbers of DSP 
recipients. When calculating these projections, the actual outflow rate in each 
financial year as presented in Figure 2.5 in Chapter 2 is used. The difference between 
the model predicted and the hypothetical numbers of recipients reflects the impact of 
the unemployment rate. But note that the difference in each year reflects the 
accumulated effect of the impact of the unemployment rate on previous years' DSP 
inflows, since, as noted earlier, the impact of inflows on the number of DSP recipients 
takes long time to complete. This explains why the difference between the model 
predicted and the hypothetical numbers of DSP recipients is not big over the period 
197 4 to 1979 when the impact of the unemployment rate on the grant rate was very 
large. 
The total impact of the unemployment rate over the period 1970 to 1999 can be 
assessed by comparing the increases in the number of DSP recipients over this period 
between the model predicted and the hypothetical recipients. From 1970 to 1999, the 
model predicted number of recipients (with the unemployment rate change) increases 
by 431,000, while the hypothetical number of recipients (without the unemployment 
rate change) increases by 254,000. The difference 177,200 can be attributed to the 
change in the unemployment rate, and it is about 30 percent of the number of 
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recipients in 1999 and 40 percent of the increase in the actual number of recipients 
from 1970 to 1999. 
Figure 3.5: Actual, model predicted and hypothetical number of recipients by 
fixing the unemployment rate at 1970 and 1971 levels, 1971 to 1999 
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Note that the growth rate of the hypothetical grant rate was faster in the 1990s than 
before. This may be because the population ratio variable (p50 _pop) increased faster 
from early 1990s (see Figure 2.11 in Chapter 2) and as shown in Table 3.3 the 
magnitude of the coefficient on this variable is very big with a positive sign. The 
higher hypothetical grant rate and its faster increase from 1991 make the growth rate 
of the hypothetical number of recipients even faster as shown in Figure 3 .5 . 
3.7.2. Simulated impact of the 1991 policy change 
It is useful to simulate the impact of the 1991 policy change because, as noted earlier, 
it is one important factor which significantly increased the inflow rate and then 
contributed to the increase in the number of DSP recipients. The same approach as 
above is adopted to assess this impact. First, Figure 3 .6 presents the actual, model 
predicted grant rates and the hypothetical grant rate. Over the period 1991 to 1999 the 
difference between the model predicted and the hypothetical grant rates is 1.13 7, 
which is the coefficient of the 1991 year dummy variable in the grant rate equation 
using time series level data (see Table 3.3). 
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Figure 3.6: Actual, model predicted and hypothetical grant rates without 1991 
policy change, 1991 to 1999 
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Figure 3.7 presents the actual, model predicted and hypothetical numbers of DSP 
recipients. From 1990 to 1999, the model predicted increase of the number of 
recipients is 254,600, while the increase in the hypothetical number of recipients 
without the 1991 policy change is 173,900. The difference is 80,700, which is the 
impact of the 1991 policy change on the number of recipients over the period 1991 to 
1999. This is about 31 percent of the actual increase over the same period and 14 
percent of the number of recipients in 1999. 
Figure 3.7: Actual, model predicted and hypothetical numbers of recipients 
without 1991 policy change, 1991 to 1999 
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As noted earlier, the growth in the number of DSP recipients can be divided into three 
periods and the two significant policy changes (in 1980 and 1991) corresponded to 
these periods. Therefore, it is worthwhile to do the same exercise as above for the 
earlier two periods. Table 3.5 summarises the results. The results for the 1990 to 1999 
period are also presented in Table 3 .5 for comparison convenience. 
Table 3.5: Changes in the number of DSP recipients attributed to policy and the 
unemployment rate impacts by period 
Change in DSP recipients (,1000) 
1970 to 1979 1979 to 1990 1990 to 1999 
No of As%of No of As%of No of As %of 
rec1p- actual actual rec1p- actual 
ients change recip-ients change ients change 
Policy impact 
-126.78 80.72 30.96 
Unemployment impact 29.63 34.50 13.83 14.25 43.77 16.79 
Actual 85.88 97.06 260.75 
Note: ( 1 ).1987 policy change is ignored because its impact is not significant as shown earlier. (2). Impact of 1980 policy change is accounted for in the 1979-1990 period. 
(3). For period 1970-79, the unemployment rate is fixed at 1970 and 1971; for 1979-1990, 
fixed at 1978 and 1979; for 1990-99, fixed at 1989 and 1990. 
In all three periods, the changes in the unemployment rate had positive impacts on the 
number of DSP recipients. The biggest impact took place in the 1990-99 period, with 
an increase of 43,770 persons. As shown earlier, during 1990-99, the impact of the 
policy change was to increase the number of DSP recipients by 80,700. The impact of 
the 1980 policy change was very big, reducing the number of DSP recipients by 
126,800 over the period 1979 to 1990. 
3.8. ·Conclusion 
The theories suggest that worsening labour market conditions can lead to an increase 
in the number of applications for disability benefits. If the administrative authority has 
an accommodating policy, then the number of grants will further increase in response 
to an economic recession. This chapter tests these arguments using Australian data. 
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From the estimation results it is confirmed that worsening labour market conditions, 
represented by an increase in the unemployment rate, increases the application and 
grant rates of DSP benefits, which then leads to an increase in the number of DSP 
recipients. Simulated results show that changes in the unemployment rate over the 
period 1970 to 1999 could explain 40 percent of the increase in the number of DSP 
recipients over this period and its impact varies in different periods. 
The impact of the unemployment rate on the application rate is larger than on the 
grant rate. It is also found that the total impact of the unemployment rate on the 
acceptance rate is positive. If there is no big lag between applications and grants, 
these findings together suggest that the economic recession could have drawn less 
eligible people to apply for DSP benefits. 
In addition, the considerable lagged effect of the unemployment rate on applications 
may suggest that many individuals who are induced to apply for the benefit because 
of a recession may only do so after an extensive search for other sources of income, 
such as looking for a job. 
Another important factor in determining application and grant rates over the last three 
decades is policy changes. The policy changes in 1980 and 1991 had a significant 
impact (in opposite directions) on both applications and grants. However, controlling 
for the impact of the unemployment rate, the 1987 policy change seemed to have had 
no expected impact. Policy changes in 1991 could explain 31 percent of the increase 
in the number of DSP recipients over the period 1990 to 1999. This is almost twice of 
the impact of the change in the unemployment rate over this period. No matter what 
the intentions were of the government at that time, the policy change in 1991 was a 
relaxation of the eligibility criteria. This is supported not only by a comparison of the 
new policy with the old one, but also by application response. As discussed earlier, 
applications respond to the tightness of screening. No matter what the reason is for 
this relationship, the dramatic increase in applications after the new policy in 1991 
suggests that the eligibility criteria were relaxed. It is puzzling that, given the 
government's objective of containing the growth of the number of DSP recipients, it 
actually relaxed the eligibility criteria with the 1991 policy change. 
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Policy change in 1980 played a very important role in reducing the application and 
grant rates and containing the growth after that time. In contrast to the 1991 policy 
change, there was no legislative change in the eligibility criteria in 1980, yet it still 
effectively reduced applications and grants. 
The cross-states-time-series data produce a significant coefficient with an expected 
sign on the variable that measures population structure change. This implies that 
population ageing will increase applications and grants. This result, however, is not 
confirmed with the aggregate time series only data. This is an important result 
because it contradicts considerable casual comment in the press and elsewhere which 
links population ageing to the growth of the DSP program. To date the impact of 
population ageing seems to be negligible. 
All regression results show that the relative level of DSP benefit represented by the 
replacement rate has no impact on the application and grant rates. This does not mean 
that economic incentives are unimportant. It is just that over the period considered 
there had been little change in the replacement rate. There may be considerable 
incentive effects across programs in respect to benefit level, which makes DSP benefit 
more attractive than other income support payments . 
Therefore, unemployment and policy changes are important in accounting for the 
growth of the DSP program over the last three decade. The level of DSP benefit and 
population structure change are not important. 
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Appendix 3A: Variations of variables by state 
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Figure 3.Al: The application rate by state 
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Figure 3.A2 : The grant rate by state 
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Figure 3.A3: The acceptance rate by state 
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Figure 3.A4 : The population ratio (p50 _pop) by state 
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Figure 3.AS: The unemployment rate by state 
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Figure 3.A6: The replacement rate by state 
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Appendix 3B 
Table 3.Al: ADF test statistics for variable stationarity (time series only data) 
Test statistics 
app_rate grant_rate accept_rate unem rate replace_rate 
-
level - 0.70. - 1.034 - 2.495 - 1.476 - 1.002 
first 
- 4.173*** - 4.776*** - 5.277 - 4.407*** -5.150*** difference 
Note: 1: *** Significant at 1 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; * at 10 percent level. 
2: " With time trend and 3 lagged differences. 
pSO_pop 
-3.6111 /\ 
Table 3.A2: ADF test statistics for level regression residuals stationarity (time 
series only data) 
application equation grant equation acceptance equation 
Test statistics - 8.649*** - 6.489*** - 5.277*** 
Note: *** Significant at I percent level; ** at 5 percent level; * at IO percent level. 
Table 3.A3: Residual means and standard deviations by state, from polled 
regression of the cross-states-time-series data 
NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS 
application Mean -0.1329 -0.1006 -0.0555 0.1584 0.2708 -0.1403 
rate eguation Std.Dev. 0. 7087 0.5772 0. 7799 0.6636 0.6715 0.4443 
grant rate Mean -0.0969 -0.0177 -0.1441 0.1285 0.1470 -0.0168 
egu~tion Std.Dev. 0. 7415 0.5994 0. 7295 0.61 70 0.6210 0.3532 
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Table 3.A4: Cross-states correlation coefficients of residuals, from polled 
regression of the cross-states-time-series data 
NSW VIC 
(a). The application rate equation 
NSW 
VIC 
QLD 
WA 
SA 
TAS 
0.0064 
0.8396 
0.3094 
0.014 
-0 .1327 
(b ). The grant rate equation 
NSW 
VIC -0.0654 
0.4347 
0.7219 
-0.2089 
-0.356$" 
QLD 0.8355 0.6389 
QLD 
-0.1512 
-0.1779 
0.6047 
WA 0.1255 0.8099 -0.255 
WA 
0.7113 
-0.0231 
SA 0.0847 -0.5642 -0.0034 0.6178 
SA 
0.0945 
TAS 0.0378 -0.1015 0.2074 -0.307$ 0.2046 
TAS 
rJ ot',e ·, Bo Lei, ~ b eA"":>- (rrd ~ CA,:to..- -b-lv2 ovb 5> o k-fu ti tUM e.. G f ~ 
CeYre ~o X\. CO e ~\ (;~  C s. zrr~-f:4--~ () , 3 . 
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Table 3.AS: The grant rate equation using time series only data covering 1971-
1995 
Time series only 
Variable in level In 1st difference 
unem rate 
-0.0277 0.0867 
(0.1028) (0.0771) 
lag unem _rate 0.3865*** 0.2122** 
(0.1053) (0.0779) 
p50_pop 
- 0.3358 
- 0.1279 
(0.3638) (0.5454) 
replacement rate 0.0866 0.0778 
(0.1048) (0.1142) 
time trend 
- 0.1273 
(0.0960) 
year_80 
- 1.4425** 
- 1.5518*** 
(0.5074) (0.4463) 
year_87 0.3424 
- 0.7162 
(0.5837) (0.4552) 
year_91 1.7800*** 1.0157* 
(0.4727) (0.4861) 
constant 8.8048 
- 0.0103 
(6.7716) (0.1082) 
Summary statistics of model specification 
No. of obs. 26 25 
F(,) 13.72 6.30 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0009 
R - square 0.8659 0.7219 
Adj-R-square 0.8028 0.6074 
D-W test 2.7557** 2.0032 
Note: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
2: *** Significant at 1 %; ** at 5%; *. at 10%. 
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Appendix 3C: 
Simulated grant rate, and number of DSP recipients if the unemployment rate is 
fixed at 1970 and 1971 levels and without 1991 policy change 
Figure 3.A 7: Actual, model predicted and hypothetical grant rates by fixing the 
unemployment rate at 1970 and 1971 levels and without 1991 policy change 
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Figure 3.A8: Actual, model predicted and hypothetical numbers of DSP 
recipients by fixing the unemployment rate at 1970 and 1971 levels 
and without 1991 policy change 
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Appendix 3D: 
Simulated application rate and number of applications 
(1). Fixing the unemployment rate at 1970 and 1971 levels 
Figure 3.A9: Actual, model predicted and hypothetical application rates by 
fixing the unemployment rate at 1970 and 1971 levels 
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Figure 3.Al 0: Actual, model predicted and hypothetical numbers of applications 
by fixing the unemployment rate at 1970 and 1971 levels 
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(2). Without 1980 policy change 
Figure 3.Al 1: Actual, model predicted and hypothetical application rates 
without 1980 policy change 
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Figure 3.A12: Actual, model predicted and hypothetical numbers of applications 
without 1980 policy change 
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(3). Without 1991 policy change 
Figure 3.A13: Actual, model predicted and hypothetical application rates 
without 1980 policy change 
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Figure 3.A14: Actual, model predicted and hypothetical numbers of applications 
without 1991 policy change 
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Chapter 4 
Transition From Unemployment To DSP 
4.1. Introduction 
The number of DSP recipients at any given point in time is determined by recipient 
inflows and outflows. Earlier chapters used aggregate data to discover the 
determinants of inflows, such as labor market conditions, changes in policy, changes 
in benefit value and changes in population structure (population ageing). It appears 
that changes in policy and labor market conditions matter most as determinants of the 
growth of applications and grants of DSP benefits over the last three decades. 
This chapter utilizes the administrative longitudinal data (LDS) at the Department of 
Family and Community Services (FaCS) to look more closely at the relationship 
between unemployment and DSP inflows. 
For each financial year between 1995-96 and 1999-2000, the FaCS LDS data enable 
us to divide DSP inflows into former income support recipients and non-former 
income support recipients 1• 60 to 65 percent of the DSP inflows each year were 
former income support recipients and of these, most were former unemployment 
benefit recipients (Table 4.1 ). Between 1995-96 and 1998-99, the proportion of DSP 
recipients who transferred from unemployment benefit increased from 23 percent to 
almost 50 percent. Up to September 1996, recipients of unemployment benefit who 
were temporarily incapacitated were transferred to sickness allowance. After some 
time on sickness benefits many transferred to DSP. After September 1996, this 
practice was terminated and temporarily incapacitated recipients on unemployment 
1 Here, the former income support recipients refer to those who transferred from other income support 
payments to DSP benefit. Thus the non-former income support recipient defined here might have 
income support recipiency experience before. But if they were not receiving income support payments 
the fortnight prior to entering DSP, they are not regarded as former income support recipients. 
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benefit remained there rather than transferring to sickness benefit. The sharp increase 
in the transition from unemployment to DSP from 1995-96, to 1996-97 reflects this 
change. It suggests that most of the transitions from sickness benefit to DSP in 1995-
96 subsequently became transitions from unemployment to DSP. 
Table 4.1: Composition of DSP inflows2, 1995-96 to 1999-2000 
Year 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
Former income support recipients (%) 
. 
. . ., 
:·;. -,·_ ,~.·-~;1Jn~m~iQY4n:~11t< .... ,·;.·, ,; Others 
- .i :2iii <'.'.>•·::,·:,::,•<-·< -. ,, . 
• . 
-- 'e:i • 
·~. :f~::~:ti- ,;fr_;~;; "./,;, . . ( . ' 
36.2 
23.4 
16.4 
14.3 
12.9 
Non former income 
support recipients (%) 
40.7 
35.0 
40.4 
36.6 
41.3 
Looking at outflows from unemployment benefit is another way of illustrating the 
importance of the relationship between unemployment and DSP. Table 4.2 presents 
the proportions of transitions of unemployment benefit recipients to different income 
support payments and shows that among those who transferred from unemployment 
benefit to all other income support payments, transition to DSP consists of over one 
quarter for the most recent three financial years. This proportion was lower for the 
1995-96 and 1996-97 financial years, perhaps because incapacitated unemployment 
benefit recipients were allowed to transfer to sickness benefits before September 1996 
as noted above. The transition proportions to DSP are different for different age 
groups as shown in Table 4.A2 in Appendix 4A. For those under age 60 the 
proportion of transitions to DSP from unemployment increases with age. For the age 
group 51-60, one half or more of those who transferred to other income support 
payments from unemployment benefit recipiency transferred to DSP. 
2 See Table 4.Al in Appendix 4A for a detailed by age group composition. 
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Table 4.2: Composition of transitions from unemployment benefit to other 
income support payments 
Year DSP SK SPP AGE Others 
1995-96 13.7 25.0 14.0 8.6 38.7 
1996-97 22.9 10.5 13.1 9.2 44.3 
1997-98 29.0 7.5 16.2 10.0 37.3 
1998-99 27.5 6.4 16.5 8.6 41.0 
1999-00 27.3 2.5 18.8 8.2 43.3 
Note: (1) DSP - Disability Support Pension; SK- Sickness Benefits; SPP - Sole Parent Pension; 
AGE - Age Pension. 
(2) Transition from unemployment benefit recipiency to Age Pension only took place for 
persons aged 60 and over. See Table 4.A2 in Appendix 4A. 
To gain a better understanding of this unemployment to DSP transition, Table 4.3 
presents the proportion of the unemployment benefit recipients who transferred to 
DSP by age for the last five financial years. The number of unemployment benefit 
recipients was as in June of each financial year. Overall those who transferred from 
unemployment benefit to DSP consisted of 3-4 percent of the unemployment benefit 
recipients. But, for the older age group 51-60, it was over 10 percent. Also note that 
for age under 61, the proportion of transitions increased between 1995-96 and 1998-
99. 
The implication of Table 4.3 is that the older the unemployed the higher the 
probability of transition to DSP from unemployment. To further confirm this point, 
Table 4.4 presents the age distribution of those who transferred to DSP from 
unemployment over the last five financial years. This type of transition was 
proportionally much higher among the older age groups. The proportion in the 41-50 
age group was one quarter, while for the 51 to 60 age group the proportion was one 
third or more. 
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Table 4.3: Proportion of unemployment benefit recipients who transferred to 
DSP, 1995-96 to 1999-2000 
Year 
1995-96 
Age 
<=30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
61 & over 
DSP 
• ".'•. • - : ... ~;. • -,. -. • • • ~-::~ < 
0.5 
1.7 
3.5 
8.4 
1.2 
2.1 ·· · :.; sub-4ota1 . . i· : ,..._ :---~ · ... , 
1996-97 <=30 
31-40 
1.3 
2.3 
41-50 5.8 
51-60 10.5 
61 & over 5.3 
. , ~· . _ ,: .. ;;,.. . •·2;::•··::·'.: , ..J.•l~ f ;iE:•!j;,;Ii•Ii··1i:••~:::i~tl'~ij~~1~:~•)~i:'L. :·.'.:-IIf; ~:••·i::J: :•i;I::; •. ,1:t ,:.'.·· .. ;, ... , •fjBsr:. il:\I,.·.t;!.•:I.'.•·,;:•t•.:I ... ·· 
1997-98 <=30 1.8 
31-40 3.5 
41-50 6.7 
51-60 12.0 
61 & over 3.5 
1998-99 <=30 1.0 
31-40 4.4 
41-50 
51-60 
61 & over 
. . -·'.!i:·i ·!:_.~•··: ·:<'~:'.••:'.:;~-1:iit1i:ti.~:· •,:::::;·::•, '\,.,,:· :·l•::·•::·;: ... ·· ·. 
1999-2000 <=30 
.-_, ... , .. ~ ··:· -
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8.5 
13.7 
4.1 
J,:7 ·.· . 
1.0 
4.2 
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''3!'6: 
... • .. ,·. (' .. 
. \:: ~ _.• "·>. 
Table 4.4: Age distribution of the former unemployed who transferred to DSP 
Age 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 
<=30 10.9 17.1 19.9 16.0 17.2 
31-40 15.8 12.7 16.6 17.6 16.7 
41-50 25.0 25.4 25.3 28.2 26.2 
51-60 45.1 35.9 33.5 33.3 32.8 
61 & over 3.3 8.9 4.6 4.9 7.1 
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Transition to DSP from unemployment is very important and worth detailed 
examination to enhance our understanding of DSP inflows. This chapter examines this 
aspect of DSP inflows and is set out as follows: section 2 explores the pre-transition 
experiences of those who transferred to DSP from unemployment; section 3 applies a 
multinomial logit model to the 1995-96 unemployment cohort to identify the factors 
that determine the transition from unemployment benefit recipiency to DSP; and 
section 4 sets out the conclusions. 
4.2. Pre-transition experiences of those who transferred to DSP from 
unemployment 
The fact that a large proportion of DSP recipients come from unemployment benefit 
recipients raises questions about the relationship between individuals' labor market 
experiences and their health conditions. One possibility is that unemployment benefit 
is merely a 'hold-on' benefit for DSP in the sense that people receive unemployment 
benefit while waiting for the grant decision on their applications for DSP. Under these 
circumstances the transition from unemployment to DSP is an administrative practice 
' and not of special economic interest. To see whether the unemployment benefit is 
simply a 'hold-on' benefit for those who transferred to DSP from unemployment, two 
approaches are used to examine the pre-transition experiences of those who 
transferred to DSP from unemployment benefit: (i) following the 1995-96 
unemployment cohort to document the experiences of this cohort who subsequently 
transferred to DSP; (ii) tracing back the 1999-2000 transition cohort (from 
unemployment to DSP) to examine their pre-transition experiences. 
The basic underlying hypothesis is as follows: if the unemployment benefit is a 'hold-
on' benefit, the pre-transition unemployment duration should approximately equal the 
time needed by the program administrative authority (i.e., Centrelink) to process a 
DSP application3. In addition, we might expect that the DSP transferees would have 
only one income support recipiency spell prior to transition. 
3 The implicit assumption is that the transferring persons lodge their DSP benefit applications when 
they start to receive unemployment benefits. 
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The 1995-96 unemployment cohort is defined as those people who entered the 
unemployment benefit program (and also entered the LDS data set) between 1 July 
1995 and 30 June 1996. If there were multi-entries during this financial year, the first 
entry is used. If left-censored persons on 1 July 1995 restarted their unemployment 
benefit recipiency during the 1995-96 financial year, they are included in the cohort. 
Other left-censored unemployment benefit recipients are excluded. Restarting an 
unemployment benefit spell is defined as returning to unemployment benefit after 
more than one fortnight's interruption in benefit recipiency. This cohort is followed to 
16 June 2000 when the data set ends. 
First, Table 4.5 presents the observed destinations of the 1995-96 unemployment 
cohort. Four destinations are differentiated: transition to DSP, transition to other 
income support payments, exit from unemployment benefit without transition to other 
income support payments (referred to as 'exit all payments' later) and still on the 
unemployment benefit program at the end of the data set window (i.e. 16 June 2000). 
The four destinations are the most recent status of the cohort which can be observed 
within the data set window. Changes in payment types and in benefit recipiency status 
might occur over the period between entry into the unemployment benefit program 
and the latest observed destination. For instance, for a person whose latest destination 
was still on the unemployment benefit, over the observable period the person might 
have received other income support payments and/or might exit the income support 
system due to work or other reasons for a while, but on the last date of the data set the 
person was still receiving unemployment benefit4. 
4 In this definition of the observed destination, transition to DSP from unemployment is not a direct 
transition in the sense that the person is on unemployment benefit just before being granted DSP 
benefit, since an individual may transfer to other income support payments from unemployment and 
then transfer to DSP. While for the 1995-96 unemployment cohort whose observed destinations were 
DSP recipiencies, most of them had transferred to DSP directly from unemployment, but there were 
some persons who entered into DSP from other income support payments. 
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Table 4.5: Distribution of observed destinations of the 1995-96 unemployment 
cohort 
Age grouEs <=30 31-40 41-50 51-60 60 & over Total 
ToDSP 2.2 5.9 10.9 20.2 1.9 5.5 
To other payments** 13.7 12.5 10.4 12.6 0.6 12.8 
Still on unem benefit 22.5 23.8 25.1 35.9 91.3 25.1 
Exit all payments 61.6 57.8 53.6 31.3 6.3 56.7 
** To other payments does not include those who transferred to the Age Pension. 
Over the observable period of the 1995-96 unemployment cohort, 5 percent had 
transferred to DSP, 13 percent had transferred to other income support payments, 57 
percent had exited all payments and 25 percent were still receiving unemployment 
benefits on 16 June 2000 (the end of the data set). For different age groups the 
observed destinations differ. For the four age groups under 61, the proportion of 
transition to DSP and still on unemployment benefit increases with age and the 
proportion exiting all payments decreases with age. For the 51-60 age group, more 
than 20 percent had transferred to DSP and only one-third exited all payments. 
The 1999-2000 transition cohort includes those whose transitions from unemployment 
benefit recipiency to DSP took place between 1 July 1999 and 30 June 2000. Here all 
transitions were direct transitions in the sense that individuals were on unemployment 
benefit just before entering into the DSP program. This cohort was traced back as far 
as the data permitted, which is 6 January 1995. 
From the FaCS one percent sample LDS data, 344 persons had transferred to DSP 
benefit from unemployment benefit during the financial year 1999-20005, of which 76 
percent started with unemployment benefit, ended with DSP with no payment type 
change between; 7 percent started with unemployment benefit, changed to other 
payment types, then returned to unemployment benefit again before transition to DSP; 
5 The number of transitions was greater than the number of persons who transferred (344) since a few 
people had transferred more than once during the year. In this case only the first transition is 
considered. 
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17 percent started with other payment types, moved to unemployment benefit and 
then transferred to DSP. 
For the two cohorts, over the observable period, it would be useful to know how may 
spells they had on the income support payment system? What was the duration of the 
last unemployment benefit spell prior to the transition and the duration distribution 
and what was the total time spent on the income support payment system prior to the 
transition6? 
Table 4.6 presents the distribution of the number of spells on all income support 
payments prior to transition to DSP. Of the 1995-96 unemployment cohort who 
transferred to DSP half of them had more than one income support spell7 and 28 
percent had 3 or more spells. The proportion of those having one spell increased with 
age for persons under 61 years of age. For the 1999-2000 transition cohort, those 
having more than one spell were 67 percent and more than 40 percent had 3 or more 
spells. A large proportion of the 51-60 age group had one spell and for the younger 
age groups this proportion decreased with age. The interruption of the spells might be 
caused by many things, such as the activity test requirements, or returning to work. 
6 For the 1995-96 unemployment cohort, only the experiences of those who directly transferred to DSP 
from unemployment are examined. 
7 Obviously, for those who had only one spell, this spell was an unemployment spell. 
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Table 4.6: Distribution of the number of income support spells prior to transition 
toDSP 
Number of spells 
Age* 1 spell 2 spells 3 spells 4 spells 5 & over 
(a) 1995-96 unemployment cohort who transferred to DSP 
<=30 31 25 19 15 10 
31-40 45 27 12 6 10 
41-50 55 26 9 9 1 
51-60 63 20 10 4 3 
61 & over 33 · 67 0 0 0 
'~. . . , --
. •, . . ... 
, . · Ml . 50 ?- : J5fr? 13 _ ,· '.9' 0 . ·.. ~- ~-
(b) 1999-2000 transition cohort 
<=30 26 20 11 18 25 
31-40 24 29 17 17 13 
41-50 19 34 26 8 12 
51-60 44 21 14 12 9 
61 & over 70 19 7 0 4 
* The definition of age for the 1995-96 unemployment cohort is different from that for the 1999-2000 
transition cohort. For the former it refers to the age on entering into unemployment in 1995-1996, but 
for the latter it refers to the age at the time of transition from unemployment to DSP. 
Table 4. 7 presents the duration distribution of the last unemployment spell prior to 
transition to DSP8•9. For the 1995-96 unemployment cohort who transferred to DSP, 
only 19 percent had a last unemployment spell duration of less than three months (6 
fortnights); 66 percent had a last unemployment spell duration for more than half a 
year (more than 14 fortnights); and 42 percent experienced durations of more than one 
year (26 fortnights). 
8 Unlike in Table 4.6, in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 only those who had directly transferred to DSP from 
unemployment are included. 
9 In the LDS data set, if unemployment benefit recipients changed the unemployment payment type, 
say from Youth Allowance to Newstart Allowance, their current unemployment duration was 
recounted. But in this Chapter, changes in payment type within the unemployment benefit do not lead 
to a recounting of the duration if there is not more than one fortnight interruption in benefit recipiency. 
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Table 4.7: Duration distribution of the last unemployment spell prior to 
transition to DSP 
Duration interval (fortnights) 
Age <=6 7-14 14-20 21-26 
( a) 1995-1996 unemployment cohort who transferred to DSP 
<=30 19 15 15 
31-40 19 19 12 
41-50 19 14 10 
51-60 16 
c:.A-:ll 
.,,.1'7U . < }t, :'. '" 
(b) 1999-2000 transition cohort 
13 
· ·-;: :n:rt~t.>-; · · 
14 
'12 . .,_ :·.: ,· ; , 
12 
9 
10 
15 
'E~ 
>26 
39 
42 
46 
41 
.42 ;: 
<=30 29 12 15 9 34 
31-40 32 13 10 5 44 
41-50 28 19 11 7 34 
51-60 26 14 9 6 46 
For the 1999-2000 transition cohort, a larger proportion (28 percent) had a last 
unemployment spell duration of less than three months ( 6 fortnights), but still more 
than half of this cohort had a duration of more than six months and 39 percent a 
duration of more than one year. 
For the 15-month period before October 1998, Centrelink was able to process 83 
· percent of applications within 49 days (three and a half fortnights) 10. Table 4.7 
therefore indicates that most people who transferred to DSP from unemployment 
benefit cannot be regarded as individuals subject to a 'hold on' benefit. 
Table 4.8 presents the average duration of the last unemployment spell. For the 1995-
96 unemployment cohort who transferred to DSP from unemployment benefit, on 
average the duration of the last unemployment spell was about 30 fortnights, more 
than one year. The difference between age groups is small. The average duration for 
the 1999-2000 transition cohort was 36 fortnights, longer than that of the 1995-96 
unemployment cohort. 
1
° Centrelink Performance Report, September-October, 1998. 
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Table 4.8: Average duration of the last unemployment spell 
Age 
Average duration (fortnights) 
1995-96 unemployment cohort 1999-2000 transition cohort 
<=30 
31-40 
41-50 
29 
28 
32 
30 
3,0 .•···. 
> :<., 
-.,·.,-.:, _., ~-,. " . 
24 
42 
30 
47 
36 . . ..~ ... 
Table 4.9 presents the average duration of the last unemployment spell of the 1999-
2000 transition cohort by breaking the cohort into those who changed or did not 
change payment types between the first observable date and the transition date. For 
those who did not change payment types, the average pre-transition duration was very 
long, half a year longer than those who changed payment types. 
Table 4.9: Average duration of the last unemployment spell prior to transition by 
whether having changed payment type, 1999-2000 transition cohort 
Age 
<=30 
31-40 
Without changed 
payment type 
22 
49 
41-50 42 
51-60 48 
61 over 28 
_'.:~l--Ei-L-. · ::_,·- ... · >:40? _.:_ :: 
With changed payment type 
Start with unemployment Start with other payment types 
33 27 
36 26 
16 
25 
~ ,. . :" ., 
18 
47 
19 
:j;'+f .· 
. ·,,:·,, .. (! . - : . -:: .. ,-·_;.~ .·· '•:...· 
Table 4.10 presents the total time on the income support system before transition to 
DSP. The 1995-96 unemployment cohort who transferred to DSP, over the 
observable period, on average spent 4 7 fortnights ( about 1.8 years) on the income 
support system prior to transition to DSP, a period of 18 fortnights longer than the 
average duration of the last unemployment spell. 
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Table 4.10: Total time on income support over the observable period 
Age 
<=30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
' All 
Total time on income s-qpport (fortnights) 
1995-96 unemployment cohort 1999-2000 transition cohort* 
55 48 
51 63 
47 61 
39 
-4J 
38 
47 
* For the 1999-2000 transition cohort, only recipients who were not left censored are included in this 
calculation. 
The implication of the above description should be clear: for the majority of those 
who had transferred to DSP from unemployment, the unemployment benefit is 
unlikely to be a 'hold-on' benefit. This then implies that there is a link between 
unemployment and DSP participation. This link is not simply that being unemployed 
reduces the opportunity cost of participation in DSP. The fact that 40 percent of those 
who transferred from unemployment to DSP had more than one year unemployment 
benefit duration just prior to the transition and on average spent more than one year 
on unemployment benefit suggests a relationship between duration of unemployment 
and DSP participation. This is explored in the next section. 
4.3. Determinants of transition from unemployment to DSP 
This section employs a multinomial lo git (1\1LG) model 11 to identify the factors that 
\ 
determine the transition from unemployment to DSP, using the sample of the 1995-96 
unemployment cohort. The model can be regarded as being based on individual 
choices. Suppose an unemployed person is faced with three choices12: transfer to 
DSP, transfer to other income support payments, or exit from unemployment benefit 
without transition to other payments (referred to as 'exit all payments') (probably 
11 See Appendix 4C for a brief description of the MLG model. For a detailed discussion, see Agresti 
(1990), Greene (1993), and Hoffman and Duncan (1988). 
12 When applying the model, those still on unemployment benefit were excluded. There are two reasons 
for this. First, their final destination is not clear, e.g. some may transfer to DSP later than the end of the 
data set. Second, duration on unemployment benefit is an explanatory variable in the model estimation, 
but duration of this group was incompleted. 
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return to work) 13 . Each choice has a choice specific expected value ( option value), 
which is determined by the income associated with the choice, leisure and other 
individual characteristics. Use VDsP, Vath , V Exit to denote values associated with 
choice of transition to DSP, choice of transition to other income support payments, 
and choice of exiting all payments, respectively. An individual makes a choice by 
maximizing utility. Or equivalently, an individual chooses the option which provides 
the highest expected option value. For example, a person will choose to transfer to 
DSP if U (VnsP) > max {U (Voth), U (VExit)} , or equivalently if VDsP > max { Voth , VExir } . 
In the multinomial logit model, the probability of a person choosing one option 
follows a logit distribution. In the context of this chapter, the model estimates the 
impact of the explanatory variables on the probability of transition to one destination 
relative to the probability of another destination. 
4.3.1. Summary statistics of the sample 
The summary statistics for the 1995-96 unemployment cohort by destination are 
presented in Table 4.11 14. Of the 1995-96 unemployment cohort, 8582 persons had 
left unemployment benefits. Of these 7.27 percent transferred to DSP, 17.04 percent 
transferred to other income support payments and 75.69 percent exited unemployment 
benefit without transition to other income support payments. 
13 The assumption is that the unemployed cannot stay on unemployment benefit forever. This is not 
true in practice of the Australian income support system. Ideally, individuals having transferred to DSP 
should not only be compared with those who transferred to other income support payments and those 
having exited the income support system, they should also be compared with those who chose to stay 
on unemployment benefit. But as noted in footnote 12, those who chose to stay on unemployment 
cannot be clearly defined. In theory, for an unemployed person who is eligible for DSP, their decision 
is really between applying for DSP and returning to work, since not only is the unemployment benefit 
lower than the DSP benefit, also there are activity test requirement for receiving unemployment 
benefit. 
14 Although those of the 1995-96 unemployment cohort who was still on unemployment benefit is 
omitted in the model estimation, summary statistics for this group are presented in Table 4.A4 in 
Appendix 4A for comparison. 
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Table 4.11: Summary statistics by exit destination of the 1995-96 unemployment 
cohort who left unemployment benefits 
Transition Transition Exit all 
All toDSP to other payments 
Number of persons in sample 8582 624 1462 6496 
As percent of total 7.00 17.00 76.00 
Duration on lillemployrrent* 
(fortnights) 34(28)~ 44 (29) 34 (28) 33 (28) 
Demographic characteristics 
Male(%) 63 71 32 69 
Age at entry into llllernployrrent 30 (112) 41 (12) 30 (11) 29 (10) 
Male 31 (11) 41 (13) 32 (10) 30 (10) 
Female 29 (11) 41 (11) 29 (12) 27 (10) 
Marital status_couple (%) 27 31 32 25 
Australian born (%) 78 72 76 78 
Proportion having children(%) 15 12 17 14 
Nmnber of children 2 (1) 2 (1) 2 (1) 2 (1) 
Age of the yolillgest child 5 (4) 7 (5) 5 (4) 5 (4) 
Home ownership and rent type 
Ho:rre uwner (%) 17 29 16 17 
Governrrent rent (%) 3 8 5 2 
Private rent (%) 35 34 39 34 
Free rent (%) 19 10 15 21 
Other rent (%) 43 48 40 43 
Financial variables 
Earned incorre>O (%) 57 32 47 62 
Averao-e earned inco:rre*** b 157 (517) 92 (133) 126 (171) 166 (565) 
Unearned incorre>O (%) 12 21 11 12 
Average lilleamed inco:rre*** 59 (135) 68 (164) 60 (88) 57 (138) 
Activity test requirement at entry 
Incapacity or rehabilitation****(%: 2 12 2 1 
Job search(%) 97 86 96 98 
Others(%) 1 1 2 1 
Note: * Duration on unemployrrent benefit over the observable peri~ not duration of the last 
llllemployrrent spell. 
** Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
*** Average earned and unearned incorre per fortnight for those who have them 
**** Activity test requirerrent at the tirre on entering into llllemployrrent benefit. 
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Except for the duration and financial variables, the values of all other variables are as 
at entry into unemployment benefits. For the financial variables, the average over an 
individual's unemployment period is used. 
On average the 1995-96 unemployment cohort had an unemployment experience of 
34 fortnights (1.3 year) before leaving, and those who transferred to DSP had an 
unemployment experience that was 10 fortnights longer (43.9 fortnights) than the 
cohort average. Those who exited all payments (i.e. who exited unemployment benefit 
without transition to other income support payments) had the shortest unemployment 
experience (33 fortnights) over the observable period. Of those who transferred to 
DSP, a large proportion was male; while among those who transferred to other 
income support payments a greater proportion was female 15. The average age at entry 
into unemployment benefit of this cohort was 30 years old. Although those who 
transferred to DSP were older on average than those who transferred to other income 
support payments, a slightly higher proportion of the latter (32 percent) was married 
than the former (31 percent). A slightly higher proportion of those who transferred to 
DSP were immigrants and a slightly lower proportion of this group had a dependent 
child. However, for those who had children, the average age of the youngest child of 
those transferred to DSP was relatively older than that of those who transferred to 
other income support payments and who exited all payments. This is consistent with 
the fact that the group who transferred to DSP was older at entry into unemployment 
benefit. 
As for home ownership, 17 .34 percent of this cohort were homeowners. The 
proportion of homeowner of those who transferred to DSP was higher than the 
proportion of homeowner among those who transferred to other income support 
payments and who exited all payments. A higher proportion of those who transferred 
to DSP rented government accommodation, while the proportion living in free 
accommodation was lower among this group. 
15 Most of those who transferred to other income payments transferred to the Sole Parent Pension. 
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The financial variables were evaluated as the average (per fortnight) over the period 
on unemployment benefit. On average 57 percent of this cohort had earned income16 
while receiving unemployment benefit and for those who had earned income the 
average earned income was $157 per fortnight. Not surprisingly, a greater proportion 
of those who exited all payments had earned income (62 percent) and they also earned 
the most ( average $166 per fortnight), while those who transferred to DSP had the 
lowest proportion with earned income (32 percent) and they earned the least ($92 per 
fortnight). In contrast, those who transferred to DSP had a higher proportion with 
unearned income (21 percent) than the other two groups. The amount of uneame~ 
income was similar for the three groups. 
The data set provides information on activity test requirements for this cohort when 
entering into unemployment benefit recipiency. With the presumption that those who 
were subject to the incapacity or rehabilitation related activity test might indicate the 
existence of some kind of disabilities, the activity tests were divided into three groups: 
incapacity or rehabilitation (including all the incapacity and rehabilitation related 
activity tests 17), job search (the most frequent activity test requirement), and the 
others. Appendix 4B presents a detailed list of the activity test requirements for 
unemployment benefit recipients. An individual may experience activity test type 
change over the time of receiving unemployment benefit, but the reported activity test 
types in Table 4.11 were those at the beginning of unemployment benefit recipiency. 
As shown in the table, for this cohort, most recipients (97 percent) were subject the 
job search activity test when entering unemployment benefit program, while less than 
2 percent was subject to the incapacity or rehabilitation activity test18. Nevertheless, a 
16 The indicator variable, having earned income (earned income>O), is actually defined as whether an 
individual's earned income is greater than or equal to $5 per fortnight. This definition avoids 
irregularity of reported earned income. The variable, unearned income>O, is defined in the same way. 
17 This activity test group includes four activity test codes in the FaCS LDS data set: Claiming DSP 
(DS/DSP) , Incapacitated (IN/INP), Rehabilitation-incapacitated (Rl/RHI), and Rehabilitation-
nonincapacitated (RN/RHN). Persons with these codes are assumed to have some health problems. In 
this sample, no one was coded as Claiming DSP or Rehabilitation - incapacitated at the entry of 
unemployment, 163 were coded as Incapacitated and 2 as Rehabilitation-nonincapacitated. For detailed 
activity tests codes and definitions, see Appendix 4B. 
18 No one was subject to a DS/DSP activity test at entry into unemployment. This implies that at entry 
no one had submitted an application for DSP. 
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much higher proportion of those transferred to DSP were subject to the incapacity or 
rehabilitation activity test than the other two groups. 
4.3.2. Model estimation results 
The estimation results are presented in Table 4.12. 
Due to the high degree of non-linearity of the MLG model, the interpretation of the 
coefficients is not straightforward, but the sign of a coefficient indicates the direction 
of change of the odds ratio (defined as the ratio of the probability of ending in one 
destination relative to another), given a small change in the explanatory variable when 
all other explanatory variables are kept constant19 . The estimated results show the 
following variables are important in determining the probability of transition to DSP 
relative to the probability of other destinations: age at entry into unemployment 
benefit, marital status, whether or not having earned income, the amount of earned 
income, activity test types, and the duration on unemployment benefit. 
The entry age variable enters the model estimation at the 5-year interval. The sign on 
the entry age variable is negative in both equations, implying that an increase in the 
age on entering into unemployment benefit raises the probability of transition to DSP 
relative to another destination, when all other variables are constant20. The nonlinear 
impact of entry age on the log odds ratio is not confirmed, however, because the 
square of the entry age variable is insignificant in both equations. 
19 See Appendix 4C for the interpretation of the coefficients of the multinomial lo git model. 
20 The marginal effects on the odds ratio can also be calculated for specific values of the explanatory 
variables (See Table 4.A3 in Appendix 4A). The magnitude and significance of the marginal effect for 
each variable are sensitive to different choices of the values of explanatory variables. 
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Table 4.12: MLG model estimation results for transition from unemployment to 
DSP 
(1) (2) p In( p Exit - all ) 1n ( Other-payments ) 
PDSP PDSP 
Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err 
Demographic variables 
Age at entry into unemployment /5 /\ 
-0.6918*** 0.1626 -0.5194*** 0.1428 
Age at entry /5--squared 0.0172 0.0114 0.0058 0.0098 
Sex (male=l) 
-1.7331*** 0.1180 0.1703 0.1073 
Marital status (single=l) 
-0.8087*** 0.1484 -0.2988** 0.1349 
Country of birth (foreign=l) 0.1425 0.1228 0.2098* 0.1092 
No. of children 0.2486*** 0.0883 -0.0267 0.0833 
Age of youngest child 0.0358 0.0248 0.0271 0.0225 
Home ownership and rental arrangement 
Home owner (non-homeowner=l) 0.1084 0.1808 -0.0294 0.1567 
Rent type (free rent=l) 
-0.0919 0.1886 0.2406 0.1715 
Rent type (Gov't rent=l) 
-0.3970 0.2449 -0.9679*** 0.2275 
Rent type (private rent=l) 0.0729 0.1435 -0.0618 0.1288 
Financial variables 
Earned income>0 0.3192** 0.1372 1.0155*** 0.1240 
Amountofeamedincome/100 0.2691 *** 0.0783 0.3801 *** 0.0742 
Unearned income>0 
-0.1539 0.1657 0.0245 0.1440 
Amount of unearned income/100 -0.0010 0.0951 -0.0240 0.0828 
Activity test types 
Incapacity and rehabilitation -1.3811 *** 0.4993 -2.0888*** 0.4466 
Job search 
-0.0230 0.4414 0.0300 0.3992 
Duration on unemployment -0.0271 *** 0.0067 -0.0470*** 0.0060 
Square of duration 0.0001 ** 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0001 
Age 50 and over*duration 0.0057 0.0117 -0.0202** 0.0096 
Age 50 and over*duration squared 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002** 0.0001 
Constant 6.5635*** 0.7344 6.2450*** 0.6573 
Summary statistics of model specification 
Number of observations 8582 
LR test 2239.10 
Log likelihood 
-4912.67 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1856 
Note: /\Age entered the model at 5 year interval. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level. 
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To illustrate the impact of unemployment entry age on the probability of a particular 
exit route on leaving unemployment benefit, Figure 4.1 presents the predicted 
probability of exiting to different destinations by entry age. The values of all the other 
variables are kept at the sample means. The noticeable break in the curves from age 
49 to 50 is because of the inclusion of an interaction variable (between the older age 
indicator variable, defined as aged 50 and over, and the unemployment duration 
variable). 
The probability of transition to DSP increases with entry age and becomes higher for 
older ages. For unemployed persons aged over 50 years the probability of transition to 
DSP is 20 percent or more. For the unemployed younger than 50 years of age the 
probability of exiting unemployment without transition to other income support 
payments is dominant, but after 50 years of age the probability of transition to DSP 
and other income support payments become dominant. 
Figure 4.1: Predicted probability of exiting unemployment to different 
destinations by entry age 
1.00 
0.80 
>.. 
....., 
.0 0.60 
ro 
.0 0.40 0 
I.... 
0.. 
0.20 
0.00 
Entry age 
-+-To DSP ~ To other income support --+- Exit all payments 
The gender variable is significant in equation (1) with a negative sign, implying that, 
being male increases the probability of transition to DSP relative to transfer to other 
income support payments. This is understandable, given that there are more income 
support payments available to females than to males and that transition to sole parent 
benefits is particularly important for females. Although the gender variable has the 
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expected sign in equation (2) (i.e. being male increases the probability of exit all 
payments relative to transition to DSP), it is not significant. 
The marital status variable is significant in both equations with a negative sign, 
implying that, being single increases the probability of transition to DSP relative to 
another destination, keeping all other variables constant. The reason that single 
persons tend to transfer to DSP, relative to other income support payments, may be 
that they are less likely to be eligible for family related income support payments than 
married couples. The reason that single persons are less likely to leave all payments 
relative to transition to DSP may be that single persons have less incentive to earn 
more income because they do not need to support a family. In addition, given the 
relative older age of those who transferred to DSP, being single may be an indicator 
of lack of success in the labor market which may result from some kind of disability. 
That is marriage market outcomes and labour market outcomes could be related. 
For the home ownership and rental arrangement variables, only the government rental 
variable is strongly significant in equation (2) but not significant in equation (1 ), 
indicating that government rental increases the probability of transition to DSP 
relative to transfer to other income support payments or exiting all payments. 
As expected, having earned income, and the amount of earned income, are significant 
and have the expected sign in both equations. The amount of earned income enters the 
model estimation in the unit of $100. The signs of these two variables imply that 
having earned income and an increase in the amount of earned income reduce the 
probability of transition to DSP, relative to another destination. Having earned income 
and increases in earned income indicate that the person has an ability to work for 
earned income, which must reduce the probability of obtaining DSP benefit given the 
nature of this benefit. In addition, for those who have ability to work the opportunity 
costs of transition to DSP are high. This reduces the willingness of this kind of person 
to transfer to DSP. 
To give a better sense of the impact of having earned income on the probability of 
transition to DSP, Figure 4.2 compares the predicted probability of transition to DSP 
between those with and without earned income, keeping all other variables ( except for 
103 
entry age) at their means. For the very young unemployed, the probability of 
transition to DSP is low and the difference of the probability of transition between 
those having earned income and those not having earned income is small. However, 
this difference increases with the entry age of the unemployed . 
. Having or not having unearned income and the amount of unearned income are not 
significant in any equation. 
The variable, incapacity or rehabilitation activity test, is strongly significant in both 
equations. The sign of this variable indicates that being subject to the incapacity or 
rehabilitation activity test increases the probability of transition to DSP, relative to 
other exit routes. This is not surprising given the presumption, when constructing this 
variable, that this activity test type probably indicates some kind of incapacity or 
health problem. 
Figure 4.2: Predicted probability of transition to DSP from unemployment, 
with and without earned income 
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Age at entry into unemploment 
Unemployment duration and its square are included to capture the nonlinear impact of 
this variable. The unemployment duration variable is strongly significant in both 
equations, as is its square (but with opposite sign), confirming the correctness of 
including the square of this variable. An increase in the duration on unemployment 
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benefit itself increases the probability of transition to DSP relative to another 
destination. 
Figure 4.3 presents the predicted probabilities of transition to each destination by 
unemployment duration21 . The predicted probability of transition to DSP increases 
with unemployment duration up to 91 fortnights (3 .5 years) and then decreases. The 
concavity of the probability of transition to DSP with respect to unemployment 
duration may imply that, although existing disability may become worse with 
increases in unemployment duration, if the unemployed person has no disability at all, 
he/she has little chance to be eligible for DSP and for this person the longer on 
unemployment the less likely a transfer to DSP. 
Also note that the average duration on unemployment benefit of this sample is 34 
fortnights. This is 37 percent of 91, the duration where the impact of unemployment 
duration turns around. Therefore, for most of the unemployed, the unemployment 
duration variable might have only a positive impact on the transition to DSP. 
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Figure 4.3: Predicted probability of exiting unemployment to different 
destinations by unemployment duration 
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2 1 In the prediction, for all variables except duration on unemployment benefit, the means of the group 
who transferred to DSP are used. 
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The significance of the unemployment duration variable on the probability of 
transition to DSP provides further support for the relationship between unemployment 
and DSP as noted in Chapter 3. It also indirectly rejects the argument that the 
unemployment benefit is a 'hold-on' benefit for those who transferred to DSP from 
unemployment, since if it were true, we should expect that the unemployment 
duration would have no impact on the probability of leaving unemployment to a 
particular destination relative to another. 
An interaction variable between the older age indicator variable, defined as 50 years 
and over, and the unemployment duration is included to test the assumption that 
duration on unemployment has a significant impact on the transition to DSP for the 
older unemployed. Because the impact of the duration variable is not linear, an 
interaction between the older age indicator variable and the square of unemployment 
duration is also included. Both variables are only significant in equation (2). The 
significance and the negative sign of the first interaction variable confirm the 
assumption, but again the impact of duration is not linear for the older unemployed. 
4.4. Conclusion 
Examinations of the FaCS administrative LDS data show that a majority of DSP 
inflows were from other income support payment recipients and most of them were 
former unemployment benefit recipients. Over the period between 1995-96 and' 1999-
2000, among those who transferred from unemployment to DSP, about 40 percent 
were over 50 years of age and about one third were aged 51-60. For the 1995-96 
unemployment cohort, 20 percent of those aged 51-60 transferred to DSP before 16 
June 2000. 
Descriptive analysis of the pre-transition experiences of those who transferred from 
unemployment to DSP shows that for a large proportion of those who transferred 
from unemployment to DSP, it is unlikely the unemployment benefit is a 'hold on' 
benefit in the sense that it is only used for the time when their applications for DSP 
are being processed. 
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For those who made a transition from unemployment to DSP, not only did 50 to 70 
percent have more than one income support recipiency spell prior to the transition, but 
they also spent more than one year on unemployment benefit. This duration is very 
long relative to the normal time needed for application processing. Multi-spells and 
long duration on unemployment benefit prior to the transition may suggest that for 
these persons either their disabilities were not so bad at the time of becoming 
unemployed and hence they were not be eligible for DSP or, if they were eligible, 
they tended not to go to DSP immediately following unemployment. 
A multinomial logit model is applied to the 1995-96 unemployment cohort to identify 
the factors that determine the probability of transition to DSP relative to another 
destination on leaving unemployment benefit. The estimated results show the 
following factors are important: age at entry into unemployment benefit, marital 
status, having earned income, the amount of earned income, activity test types, and 
duration on unemployment benefit. The entry age variable shows that other things 
being equal, the older the person at the time of becoming unemployed the higher the 
probability of transition to DSP relative another exit destination. For an individual, 
older age means smaller opportunity costs of going to DSP compared with work and 
then a higher probability of applying for DSP, but whether the application is granted 
depends on the administrative authority. The significance of the entry age variable 
here may imply that older age also indicates something to the administrative 
authority, such as disability or an individual's inability to work. 
The significance of unemployment duration on the transition probability lends further 
support to the proposal that there is a close relationship between unemployment and 
DSP inflows. The following possibilities may provide an explanation for the link 
between unemployment and DSP inflows: 
(a) Individual health conditions deteriorate with unemployment duration. This 
eventually makes the individual more likely to be eligible for DSP22 . There is 
22 Theory suggests that, even though individual health conditions do not deteriorate with 
unemployment, it is more likely for a person to apply for DSP during unemployment than when the 
person is employed since the opportunity cost of applying is low when unemployed (Autor, 2001, 
Autor and Duggan, 2001). 
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some suggestive evidence for this from the data. Among the 1995-96 
unemployment cohort who left unemployment, the proportion subject to 
incapacity or rehabilitation activity tests was greater at the time of exit from 
unemployment benefit than at entry into unemployment, especially for those 
who transferred to DSP, as shown in Table 4.13. 
(b) Long-term unemployment indicates an individual's inability to work, which 
leads to the program administrator believing that the individual is eligible for 
DSP, or 
( c) Both ( a) and (b) are true. 
Table 4.13: Proportion of 1995-96 unemployment cohort subject to different 
activity tests - only those who left unemployment 
At entry into unemployment At exit from unemployment 
Transition Transition Exit Transition Transition Exit 
to DSP(%) to others(%) all(%) to DSP(%) to others(%) all(%) 
Incapacity/rehabilitation 12.2 2.3 0.9 52.2 9.6 1.6 
Job search 86.4 96.1 98.0 41.7 81.5 90.8 
Others 1.4 1.6 1.2 6.1 9.0 7.6 
In addition, for the unemployed persons the longer the duration on unemployment the 
lower the probability of leaving unemployment to take up work, even without health 
deterioration, because their human capital depreciates with unemployment duration. 
This again reduces the opportunity costs of transition to DSP for the unemployed and 
increases their willingness to go on the DSP. Whatever the reason, it is clear that 
unemployment increases the likelihood that people will end up on the DSP. Therefore, 
to prevent this transition the best option might be to provide these people with 
employment opportunities. 
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Appendix 4A 
Table 4.Al: Composition of DSP inflows by year and age23 
Former inome SUEEort recipients Non former 
Year SKA SPP Others reci ients 
1995-96 31.25 0.89 7.14 42.86 
31-40 30.43 3.48 17.39 23.48 
41-50 24.18 2.20 10.99 37.36 
51-60 17.89 0.64 14.38 40.58 
61 & over 14.86 0.00 4.05 72.97 
sub total 22.74 1.38 12.06 40.70 
1996-97 <=30 9.48 1.72 2.59 39.66 
31-40 15.00 9.00 10.00 26.00 
41-50 13.10 4.76 10.71 23.81 
51-60 9.72 1.04 13.54 36.46 
C 61 & over 4.71 1.18 4.71 56.47 
sub total 10.57 3.04 9.78 35.01 
1997-98 <=30 2.40 0.00 7.19 43.71 
31-40 4.07 2.44 11.38 29.27 
41-50 6.19 4.64 12.37 25.77 
51-60 4.08 0.87 11.95 44.90 
61 & over 2.53 0.00 7.59 67.09 
sub total 4.08 1.66 10.71 40.40 
1998-99 <=30 2.78 0.69 2.78 46.53 
31-40 5.74 5.74 9.02 18.03 
41-50 7.46 1.99 6.47 24.38 
51-60 2.81 0.31 12.19 40.31 
61 & over 9.88 0.00 1.23 62.96 
sub total 4.95 1.50 7.83 36.64 
1999-00 <=30 0.76 0.00 4.55 45.45 
31-40 3.10 3.88 12.40 31.78 
41-50 3.33 1.67 !0.56 29.44 
51-60 4.28 0.33 10.20 44.41 
61 & over 0.00 0.00 1.27 64.56 
sub total 2.91 1.09 8.86 41.26 
23 In the table, UB stands for unemployment benefit, SKA sickness benefit, SPP sole parent benefit, 
and Other, all other income support payments. 
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Table 4.A2: Transition from unemployment to other income support payments 
Year Age DSP SKA SPP 'AGE Others ¥ 
1995-96 <=30 3.49 30.54 19.37 46.60 
31-40 9.86 21.77 20.75 47.62 
41-50 23.83 32.12 6.22 37.82 
51-60 52.20 19.50 1.89 3.77 22.64 
61 & over 5.00 2.50 0.00 90.83 1.67 
sub total 13.74 25.02 13.97 8.59 38.69 
1996-97 <=30 10.02 17.25 19.48 53.25 
31-40 15.09 8.68 17.74 58.49 
41-50 39.02 9.27 12.20 39.51 
51-60 49.56 3.95 1.75 7.02 37.72 
61 & over 20.00 0.00 0.00 79.29 0.71 
sub total 22.88 10.46 13.14 9.22 44.30 
1997-98 <=30 15.26 13.11 27.01 44.62 
31-40 25.90 5.98 23.11 45.02 
41-50 43.42 4.82 9.65 42.11 
51-60 64.85 3.47 0.00 0.99 30.69 
61 & over 11.46 0.64 0.64 84.71 2.55 
subtotal 28.98 7.49 16.23 10.01 37.29 
1998-99 <=30 11.72 10.00 29.31 48.97 
31-40 24.19 6.13 20.00 49.68 -
41-50 46.51 4.65 8.91 39.92 
51-60 58.20 3.69 0.41 37.70 
61 & over 13.29 0.63 0.00 84.81 1.27 
sub total 27.48 6.39 16.52 8.65 40.97 
1999-00 <=30 12.38 3.05 32.76 51.81 
31-40 21.14 2.68 17.79 58.39 
41-50 47.14 3.33 13.81 35.71 
51-60 60.49 1.46 2.44 35.61 
61 & over 18.24 0.00 0.68 77.03 4.05 
sub total 27.27 2.45 18.76 8.23 43.29 
~ ALL Ot~er 11\~e· s~ro-n. rc1~~ t;;~ DS.f / st-:--A , ~rr 
~ AGG- . 
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Table 4.A3: Marginal effect estimates of the MLG model 
(1) (2) 
p 
In( P Exir -all ) In( Other - payments ) 
PDSP P DSP 
Coef. Std.err Coef. 
Demographic variables 
Age at entry into unemployment -0.0086** 0.0038 -0.0152*** 
Age at entry --squared 0.0001 * 0.0000 0.0000 
Sex(male=l) 
-0.1322** 0.0577 0.0846* 
Marital status (single=l) -0.0517** 0.0210 -0.0443 
Country of birth (foreign= 1) 0.0047 0.0074 0.0435* 
No. of children 0.0189* 0.0103 -0.0129 
Age of youngest child 0.0016 0.0015 0.0057 
Home ownership and rental arrangement 
Home owner(non-homeowner=l) 0.0096 0.0106 -0.0110 
Rent type (free rent=l) -0.0133 0.0099 0.0578 
Rent type (Gov't rent=l) -0.0033 0.0182 -0.2092*** 
Rent type (private rent=l) 0.0068 0.0095 -0.0173 
Financial variables 
Earned income>0 
-0.0046 0.0136 0.2202*** 
Amount of earned income/ I 00 0.0092* 0.0054 0.0777*** 
Unearned income>0 
-0.0114 0.0099 0.0088 
Amount of unearned income/100 0.0007 0.0055 -0.0048 
Activity test types 
Incapacity and rehabilitation -0.0440 0.0288 -0.4341 *** 
Job search 
-0.0013 0.0239 0.0060 
Duration on unemployment -0.0007 0.0006 -0.0104*** 
Square of duration 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 *** 
Constant 0.3239*** 0.1105 1.1745*** 
Note: 1. *** significant at 1 percent level;** 5 percent level; * 10 percent level. 
2. The marginal effect are calculated at the following variable values: 
Age(at entry)=45, gender=male, marital status=single, homeowner=non-homeowner, 
country of birth=foreign, government rent= 1, private rent= 1, free rent= 1, 
other rent=0, number ofkids=2, age of the youngest kid=l , earned mcome(>0)=l, 
amount of earned mcome=l57, unearned income(>0)=l , 
amount of unearned income=59, duration on unemployment=34.02 (fortnights), 
incapacity or rehabilitation activity test type= 1, 
job search activity test type=l. 
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Std.err 
0.0058 
0.0001 
0.0463 
0.0293 
0.0237 
0.0167 
0.0045 
0.0326 
0.0399 
0.0434 
0.0249 
0.0427 
0.0187 
0.0300 
0.0170 
0.0624 
0.0810 
0.0019 
0.0000 
0.1575 
Table 4.A4: Summary statistics of the still on (unemployment) group of the 1995-
96 unemployment cohort 
Number of persons 
Duration on lillemployrrent(fortnights)* 
Demograpluc characteristics 
Male(%) 
Age at entry into llllemployrrent 
Male 
Female 
Marital status_couple(¾) 
Australian born (%) 
Proportion having children (%) 
Nmnber of children 
Age of the yollllgest child 
Home owners/up and rent type 
Hoire owner (%) 
Govermrent rent (%) 
Private rent(%) 
Free rent (%) 
Other rent (%) 
Financial, variables 
Earned inconvO (%) 
Average earned incoire/100*** 
Unearned inconvO 
Average lllleamed income/I 00* 
Activity test type at entry 
2871 
85.12 (31.33) 
75.55 
33.46 (14.15) 
34.25 (14.38) 
31.03 (13.13) 
26.26 
77.6 
11.18 
2.12 (1.13) 
5.40 (4.24) 
17.55 
4.56 
35.42 
17.14 
42.88 
53.61 
0.89 (1.22) 
14.7 
0.66 (1.60) 
Incapacity or rehabilitation****(%) 1.57 
Job search(%) 95.68 
Others (%) 2. 75 
Note: * Duration on unemployrrent over the observable period, not duration on the last unemployrrent 
spell. 
** Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
*** Average earned and unearned income for those who have them 
**** Activity test requirement at the tirre of entering into unemployrrent benefit. 
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Appendix 4B 
Activity test status - code and definition in the LDS data* 
Code 
Blank/"-" 
AM 
ED 
BP 
EC 
cs 
DS 
EM 
FT 
GO 
IN 
RI 
JS 
JD 
AL 
EP 
EH 
RN 
PW 
ER 
RA 
RL 
SE 
SC 
VA 
VE 
vw 
WC 
WN 
YA 
ALC 
AME 
ARM 
AUS 
BVP 
CAR 
CRS 
cso 
CSP 
DOE 
DSE 
DSP 
EXM 
EXP 
FL2 
FL3 
FTA 
FTS 
GRO 
INA 
INP 
Definition 
unknown 
Adult migrant education. 
Approved full-time education. 
Bereavement payment. 
Caring responsibilities. 
Community service order. 
Disability support claim pending. 
Expentant mother. 
Formal training. 
Group co-operative. 
Incapacitated. 
Incapacitated, rehabilitation. 
Job search. 
Jury duty. 
Literacy course. 
Maj or personal crisis . 
Maj or personal discruption. 
Rehabilitation, nonincapacitated. 
Part-time work. 
Refugee, first 6 months. 
Remote activity. 
Remote location. 
Self-employment. 
Short course. 
Voluntary work activity agreement. 
Voluntary work plus employment. 
Voluntary work. 
Compulsory work for the dole. 
Non-compulsory work for the dole. 
Youth activities. 
Adult literacy course. 
Adult migrant education. 
Armed services training camp ( oversea only). 
AUSTUDY/ABSTUDY (first 3 wks). 
Bereavement period. 
Caring responsibilities. 
Commonwealth Rehab Services. 
Community Service Order. 
Community support program. 
Disability Open Employment. 
Disability Supported Employment. 
Claiming DSP. 
Expectant Mother 
Expectant Mother (replaced by EXM - March 2000) 
Flex 2. 
Flex 3. 
Formal training. 
Full time student. 
Group/community cooperative exercise. 
Intensive Assistance. 
Incapacitated. 
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Code Definition 
JFT 
JSE 
JST 
JUR 
MCU 
MET 
MFV 
MJP 
MLN 
ML2 
MPC 
MPD 
MPT 
MPV 
MRE 
MVW 
NEI 
PTW 
REF 
RHI 
RHN 
RLC 
R6M 
SED 
SEP 
SHC 
VPE 
VWA 
VWK 
WCP 
WVP 
YAC 
LIT 
NAA 
AEM 
JPP 
CDP 
DBS 
JPE 
MDF 
PEA 
PHR 
REM 
WFD 
zzz 
JET Funded Training. 
JOB Search. 
JOB Search Training. 
Jury Duty. 
MO -Combination of Part-time work, Voluntary Work and Education & Training. 
MO - Education and Training (6 hours cours contact per week). 
Approved full-time voluntary work. 
Job placement, education and training. 
Literacy/Numeracy. 
Mutual Obligation(MO) - Job Search Training. 
Major personal crisis. 
Major personal discruption at home. 
MO-part-time work (at least 12 hours per fortnight). 
MO-combined part-time and voluntary work (must be at least 12 hours per fortnight). 
MO-relocation to improve employment prospects. 
MO voluntary work (must be at least 12 hours per fortnight). 
N ewstart Enterprise Incentive Scheme. 
Part-time work. 
Refugee - first 13 weeks in Australia. 
Rehabilitation - incapacitated. 
Rehabilitation - non-incapacitated. 
Remote location. 
Refugee-first 6 months in Australia. 
Pre NEIS training. 
Development of self-employment. 
Short course. 
Voluntary and paid work ( combined). 
Voluntary work (activity agreement). 
Voluntary work. 
Work for the Dole-compulsory participant. 
Work for the Dole-voluntary participant (replace by new code WED-March 2000) 
Youth activities. 
Literacy & Numeracy Training-Non-Mutual Obligation customer 
New Apprenticeship Access program. 
Advanced English fro migrants. 
Jobs Pathway Program. 
CDEP Participant. 
Disability Biusiness Services. 
JPET. 
Army Reserve. 
Precluding earnings from employment. 
Precluding hours from employment. 
Remote activity. 
Work for the Dole-voluntary participant (replaces old code WVP) 
No activity recorded. 
Note: (1). Two character codes were used prior to May 1998; and three character codes were used post 
May 1998. 
(2). This appendix is drawn from "LDS 1 % Sample User Documentation", Information 
Strategies Branch at FaCS, Version 1.5 , April 2001. 
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Appendix 4C 
The multinomial logit model (MLG) and interpretation of the 
coefficients 
The empirical model24'25 
Suppose for an unemployed person i, the probability of exiting to a specific 
destination}, Pu, is a function of the individual characteristics and other factors , X i, 
( 4.al) 
Where /3j is a vector of parameters. 
In the MLG model, P{.} takes the form of a logit probability function. Then, for a 
particular exit destination, in terms of the probability, the generalized logit model is 
defined by 
P .. = exp(f3~Xi) 
lj J for j = l, .. , J (4.a2) L exp(/3;xi) 
l=l 
Where Pu is the probability of individual i exiting unemployment by going to 
destination j. J is the number of unordered alternative exit destinations; /3 j is a 
vector of unknown parameters associated with the probability of exiting to the } th 
alternative. 
24 This section is drawn from Greene (1993), Agresti (1990), Hoffman and Duncan (1988), Long 
(1987) and Robins and Dickinson (1985). 
25 There is a distinction between the multinomial logit (MLG) model and the conditional logit (CLG) 
model in the literature. The MLG model focuses on the individual as the unit of analysis and uses the 
individual ' s characteristics as explanatory variables; the CLG model (some times called McFadden' s 
CLG model) focuses on the set of alternatives for each individual and the explanatory variables are 
characteristics of those alternatives. According to Hoffman and Duncan ( 1988), the MLG model 
provides better direct and useful information about which individuals make which choices, whereas the 
CLG model is more suitable for testing hypotheses about why those choices are made. 
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The parameters of this model ( /3 j ) are not uniquely identified in the sense that there 
is more than one solution to the set of the parameters that lead to the same 
probabilities for the alternatives. This can be seen by multiplying equation ( 4.al) by 
exp(q ·x i )/ ( ·x ) where q is an arbitrary non-zero vector as / exp q i , 
\ 
exp(j3~Xi) exp[(/Jj + q)' Xi] 
Pij = 1 --------- for j=l, .. ,J L exp(J3;xi) L exp[(/31 + q)' x i J 
l=l 
( 4.a3) 
As a consequence, the resulting value of the probability ( ~J) is unchanged, but the 
lo git parameters are changed. In other words, the sets of parameters, /3 j and 
(/3 j + q), are equally solutions to the model; that is, the vector of the parameters 
defined by equation ( 4.al) is not uniquely identified. For identifiability, an additional 
constraint is imposed on the parameter vector j3 j in the form of a normalization rule. 
One convenient normalization is to assume that all parameters associated with one 
alternative destination are equal to zero. Suppose /31 is equal to zero, the MLG 
specification can be rewritten as 
1 
~ 1 = - 1----- for j = I (4.a4) L exp(/3;xi ) 
l=l 
and 
exp(/J~Xi) 
P .. =----- for 1·=2, ... ,J. lJ J (4.a5) L exp(j3;xi) 
l=l 
The model, then, implies that (J -1) log-odds ratios can be computed as 
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~j ' ln(-p ) = [J1 X i for j = 2, ... , J 
il 
( 4.a6) 
Where fJ 1 is understood as the difference between the two sets of lo git coefficients, 
fJ 1 and [J1 , in which one of the two sets of the coefficients, /31 is normalized to be 
zero. It is worth noting that the choice of normalization is completely arbitrary and 
has no impact on the empirical results in the sense that the choice does not affect the 
predicted probabilities for the alternatives, although the coefficients would differ 
because they have different interpretations. 
The method of maximum likelihood is applied to estimate the (J -1) non-redundant 
logit equations defined by equation (4.a6) to obtain a set of (J -1) coefficients, /31 , 
for each explanatory variable. As a result of the estimation method, the parameter 
estimates are consistent and have large-sample normal distributions with asymptotic 
standard errors obtained from the inverse of the information matrix. 
Interpretation of the coefficients in the MLG model 
Because of the highly non-linear functional form of the generalised lo git model, the 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients is not straightforward. The first-order 
partial derivative of the logit equation (4.a6) for variable X k gives 
a1ncP1 I ) / Fi . 
---=/3kJ for ;=2, ... ,J 
axk (4.a7) 
For variables in quadratic form such as the square of entry age in the estimated model, 
the first-order partial derivative of the lo git equation ( 4.a6) not only depends on its 
coefficient but also depends on the values of the variables at which the derivative is 
computed as seen by 
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(4.a8) 
where /J kIJ and /J k 2J are the coefficients of the linear and squared term of the 
variable xk. 
The first-order derivative is then interpreted as a change in the logarithm of the odds-
ratio, not in the odds-ratio itself and, of course, not linearly related to the probability, 
given a one unit change in variable X k controlling for all other predictors in the 
model. The signs of the coefficients, hence, are not sufficient to determine the 
direction of change of the corresponding probabilities as the exogenous variable 
changes, given all other variable being constant. To see how the corresponding 
probability of the outcome ( j) changes given one unit change in variable 
X k controlling for all other variables in the model, we take the first-order partial 
derivative of PJ from equations ( 4.a4) and ( 4.a5) with respect to variable X k . For 
variables in linear forms, that is 
(4.a9) 
all notations are the same and []01 was normalized to be zero as before. Obviously, 
given one unit change in the variable X k , the change in the probability of the 
outcome ( j) not only depends on the coefficient of the variable X k in the lo git 
equation ( j ), but also depends on the rest of the coefficients of the variables in the 
model as well as the probabilities of all outcomes. Those, in turn, depend on the 
coefficients of all variables in the model and certain values of these variables 
according to equation ( 4.a4) and ( 4.a5), and a further effect of the values of the 
variable X k (in the case of quadratic form) at which the derivative is computed. 
Fortunately, a function in logarithmic form, ln(.), is an increasing function of its 
arguments. Thus the signs of the coefficients in the lo git equation ( 5 .a6) could be used 
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to determine the direction of the change in the odds ratio for a small change in the 
exogenous variable, holding the other variables constant. (The odds ratio is defined as 
the ratio of the probability of one alternative to another). For example, a negative sign 
of the coefficient for entry age variable in the estimation equation (1) in Table 4.15 
implies that an five-year increase in entry age will decrease relatively the probability 
of observing someone transferring to other income support payments rather than 
transition to DSP, controlling for other variables. This happen despite the fact that 
both probabilities may rise, as long as probability of transferring to other income 
support payments rises by less than the probability of transition to DSP, or both may 
fall, as long as the former falls by more than the latter. 
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Chapter 5 
Deterlllinants of Duration on DSP-
An Application of the Duration Model 
5.1. Introductio-ri 
Duration on social welfare benefits is of great interest to both academia and policy 
makers because the number of recipients is determined by duration as well as inflows. 
For an individual recipient, the longer the person stays on a benefit, the larger the cost 
to the program. Therefore, an understanding of the determination of completed DSP 
duration is important. 
In addition, there is concern that welfare recipients may experience duration 
dependence. For most welfare programs the longer a person is on a benefit the lower 
the probability that they will leave. Duration dependence is the term used when this 
relationship is causal. The concern about duration dependence has led many OECD 
countries to put considerable effort into developing programs to encourage transition 
from welfare to work. 
Duration models have a history of extensive implementation in economics and related 
areas 
1
. The most thoroughly studied area using these models in economics is perhaps 
the duration of unemployment, where factors that may impact on the transition from 
unemployment to work ( or other states) have been examined, including the duration 
of unemployment itself since it may play a critical role in individual reservation wage 
formation (Devine and Kiefer, 1991). As for the application of duration models to 
welfare benefit recipiency, one area, which has been subject to scrutiny, is the AFDC 
1 Duration studies include length of marriage (Lillard, 1993 ), length of time until return migration 
(Lindstrom, 1996), length of time in employment (Keane and Wolpin, 1995), length of time until 
childbirth (Heckman and Walker, 1990), length of strike (Kennan, 1985), length of time until a 
purchase (Jain and Vilcassim, 1997) and length of business cycles (Diebold and Rudebush, 1990). 
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(Aid to Families with Dependent Children) benefit in the US, where the determinants 
of length of stay on the program and duration dependency have been extensively 
examined (Blank, 1989; O'Neill, Bassi and Wolf, 1987). 
The application of duration models to disability benefit programs is very limited. 
There appear to be only two known studies: Hennessey and Dykacz (1989) and 
Holmes and Lynch (1990). Hennessey and Dykacz applied a competing risk duration 
model to a random sample of Social Security disability beneficiaries in the US who 
were first entitled to disabled-worker benefits in 1972. Their study estimated the 
coefficients of the factors that determined the probability of leaving the benefit and 
used these coefficients to project the expected outcomes and expected length of stay 
of program recipients. The Holmes and Lynch's study examined the factors that 
impacted on duration of Invalid Benefit (NB) recipiency for males in Britain. 
The main reason for the few studies in this area may be the lack of available data. 
Duration on a disability benefit program is normally very long compared with other 
benefit programs, such as unemployment or sickness benefits. Consequently, not only 
is longitudinal data required, but also the required period of data is generally very 
long. 
The FaCS LDS data is most suitable for the study of disability benefit duration, 
although a longer data period would of course be better. Barrett (2000) used this data 
set to examine the dynamics of sole parent pension recipients in Australia, employing 
duration analysis techniques and it is a natural extension to apply these techniques to 
DSP recipients. Dawkins, Harris and Loundes (2000) also used this data set to 
examine the distribution of spells of DSP recipients, but they did not look at the 
determinants of the duration of DSP spells. This chapter attempts to fill this gap and 
provide estimates of the expected completed duration on DSP, which is the main 
theme of the next chapter. 
The application of the duration model in labour economics, such as the studies on the 
duration of unemployment and other benefit payments, is often motivated by a model 
of individual choice in the context of utility maximization. A stylized model for 
duration on welfare program is as follows. Assume, at a point of time, for a person 
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already on the program, that there are two options ( or states): continue to stay on the 
program, or leave the program to work. Both options are associated with state specific 
utilities or option values and the individual makes a decision by comparing the two 
state specific utilities. If the expected utility associated with continuing to stay on the 
program is greater than that of leaving (to work), the individual will continue to stay, 
otherwise the person will leave to work2. The utility or option value of staying on the 
program will be a function of personal characteristics, the level of the program 
payment and the length of the current duration on the program3. Similarly, the utility 
of leaving for work will be a function of the availability of jobs and the value of the 
wage and personal characteristics. Therefore, all the factors that tend to enhance the 
expected utility of working ( e.g. an increase in the wage rate) and to reduce the 
expected utility of staying ( e.g. a decrease in the benefit level) will encourage the 
person to leave and increase the hazard rate from receiving the benefit. 
Although the analysis of the duration on DSP can be put in the same framework as 
described above, it is difficult to derive a theoretical model to directly apply to the 
data currently available. The reason is that some of the options or states outside of 
benefit recipiency may not be based on individual choice. They cannot be modelled as 
an individual option. For example, death is an exit that is not normally chosen. In this 
chapter these complications are set aside and the assumption is that there are only two 
states for a DSP recipient to choose from, stay on DSP benefit or exit ( due to 
whatever reason4). 
2 The framework of analysis is similar to the stylized search model in the unemployment duration 
literature. 
3 The length of the current duration may directly affect an individual 's utility if participation in the 
program alters an individual ' s income-leisure trade-off or changes the non.monetary ' stigma' costs of 
participation. These effects may be further sources of state dependence in the program participation. 
4 An attempt has been made to model terminations due to death and cancellation separately using a 
competing risk duration model. This needs to combine the LDS data with a data set containing 
termination reasons . As will be described in Chapter 7, using the termination reason information will 
reduce the sample to a very limited period window. In this case, if only fresh spells are used as is a 
common practice in the literature, then the longest duration of the fresh spells will be only about one 
year. This is obviously not appropriate given that the duration of DSP recipiency is normally very 
long. Using all the spells rather than only the fresh spells (this means to include the left-censored 
spells) to compensate for this problem has been tried. However, the empirical survival function of the 
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This chapter is organized as follows: in the next section the empirical model is briefly 
discussed to provide some background knowledge of the duration model. Section 3 
describes the data. The estimation strategy and the empirical results are presented and 
discussed in section 4. Section 5 sets out the conclusions. 
5.2. The empirical model5 
The starting point in modelling duration data is the estimation of a hazard function, 
which measures the instantaneous tendency of a given event (termination of DSP 
recipiency in the context of this chapter) to occur at each point in time. Let F(t,X(t)) 
represent the (cumulative) distribution function of duration spent on the program, the 
probability of staying on the program for no longer than time t. X(t) is a vector of 
explanatory variables, some of which may be time-dependent (such as the 
unemployment rate variable included in the later model estimation). Let 
S(t,X(t)) = l-F(t,X(t)) be the survival function, the probability of staying on the 
program for at least time t, or the percent surviving (still on the program) at time t. 
The hazard function, h(t,X(t)), is defined as the instantaneous rate of leaving the 
program at T = t, conditional upon surviving up to time t, 
h(t,X(t)) = lim P(t ~ T < t + 5t \ T 2: t,X(t)). 
&• O & . (5.1) 
Note that the hazard function provides no more information than the distribution 
function or the density function. Since 
sample selected in this way is very different from the one consisting of only the fresh spells within the 
five-year period covered by the LDS data. Specifically, the survival function of the former is 
significantly biased up due to the left-censored spells. As a result, the attempt to apply a competing risk 
model is given up. However, when more data become available, it will be better to treat death and 
cancellation ( or even recovery) as separate exit destination in modelling since it should be expected 
that death and cancellation would follow quite different processes. 
5 This section draws on Blank (1989) and Hennessey and Dykacz (1 989). For a detailed description on 
the application of the duration model in the economics duration data, see Kiefer (1988) and Heckman 
and Singer (1985). 
123 
h(t, X(t)) = lim P(t ~ T < t + 5t IT~ t, X(t)) 
ot• O 6{ 
Iim{[P(t < T < t + 5t I X(t)] I 5t} 
_ St• O 
S(t, X(t)) 
f (t, X(t)) 
S(t, X(t)) 
= -d ln(S(t,X(t))/ dt (5.2) 
where f(t,X(t)) is the density function associated with F(t,X(t)). 
Integrating the last equation of (5.2), we get: 
S ( t, X ( t)) = exp( - £ h ( s , X ( s ) ) ds ) (5.3) 
Then, 
F(t,X(t)) = 1-S(t,X(t)) 
= 1 - exp( - f: h ( s , X ( s ) ) ds ) (5.4) 
and 
f(t,X(t)) = dF(t,X(t))/ dt 
= h ( t, X ( t)) exp( - .b h ( s , X ( s ) ) ds ) (5.5) 
Thus, choosing a hazard function, h , is equivalent to choosing a distribution function 
for t , and vice versa. 
If a spell i is observed to terminate ( or be completed) with duration t, it contributes to 
the likelihood function by f (t, X i (t)) . If it is observed as right-censored, its 
contribution to the likelihood function is S(t, X/t)) since it survives to t. Then the 
likelihood function for a sample is: 
(5.6) 
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where m1 are the completed spells, m2 the right-censored spells, and m1+m2=N the 
total number of spells in the sample. 
Taking the logarithm of the likelihood of equation (5.6), and replacing the density and 
survival functions with their formulas in terms of the hazard function, as shown in 
equation (5.3) and (5.5), results in: 
N N 
I = I di ln_h (ti , X /t)) - I f h ( s, Xi ( s)) ds 
i i 
(5.7) 
It is left to specify the hazard function to incorporate the impacts of covariates X(t) 
and this will be done later. 
5.3. The data 
The sample is selected from the FaCS one percent sample LDS data set and consists 
of all the fresh spells6 which start between 3 March 1995 and 30 December 1999 
(inclusive) 7. 
6 If multi-spells occurred for a recipient only the first spell is selected. If the second and subsequent 
spells were to be included in selection, an assumption that these spells behave in the same way as the 
first spells would need to be made. However, this may not be the case. Another reason for including 
only the first spells is that the next chapter will estimate the expected completed duration of the first 
spells of DSP recipients using the estimated parameters in this chapter. Because the focus is on the 
first spells, left-censored recipients even with reentry spells after the beginning of the data window are 
excluded. However, the first spells defined here are not the same as those that occurred in the data set. 
If a person had multi-spells, only the first-at-least two-fortnight spell is treated as the first spell. This is 
to avoid irregular records. Multi-spells are defined to have at least two fortnights break in benefit 
rec1p1ency. 
7 The maximum time window of the data is from 6 January 1995 to 16 June 2000. The analysis uses 
spells that began from 3 March 1995 (inclusive) rather than from 6 January 1995 because this makes it 
possible to identify where the new recipients come from (i.e. transition from unemployment, transition 
from other income support payments, or from outside the income support payment system). 
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Although the durations of the left-censored spells falling into the data period are 
known, they are excluded from the sample. The reason for this is that including the 
left-censored spells may lead to sample selection bias (Lancaster, 1990). The left-
censored spells are a special subset of spells that are typically long as shown by 
Heckman and Singer (1984) and their inclusion would form a 'length biased sample' 8. 
As right-censored spells can be easily handled in the duration model estimation as 
shown in equations (5.6) and (5.7), they are included in the sample. However, right-
censored spells include two types in this analysis: (i) those spells still continuing at 
the end of the data set (i.e., 16 June 2000); and (ii) those spells which end because of 
a transfer to the Age Pension. For the latter, if recipients did not transfer to the Age 
Pension they would have still continued their DSP spells at the time of the transition. 
They are treated therefore as right-censored at the time of transition. 
5.3.1. Summary statistics of the data 
In total 3 65 8 fresh and first spells appeared in the time period defined above. Of 
these, 655 were completed spells, i.e. the individual left DSP without transferring to 
the Age Pension, and there were 3003 right-censored spells 9 . Table 5.1 presents 
summary statistics of this sample. The values of all variables, except for financial 
variables, are as at the beginning of the spell. The financial variables, especially the 
amount of earned and unearned income, are included as individual averages over the 
DSP recipiency period 10. 
8 In essence, of all the spells that started on a particular day prior to the start of the data period, only 
those spells that are sufficiently long make it into the data period window. Also see footnote 4, where it 
is noted that left-censored spells biases upwards the empirical survival function as expected. 
9 The right-censored spells include spells for recipients who transferred to the Age Pension. Summary 
statistics for these spells are presented in Table 5 .A 1 in Appendix 5 .A. 
10 The reason for using average over individual DSP recipiency period rather than the values at entry or 
as time-varying variables is that for DSP recipients the records of earned and unearned income appear 
irregularity because earned and unearned income may not be reported and recorded fortnightly. 
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of the sample used for duration model estimation 
Completed Right-censored 
All spells spells spells 
Number of persons/spells 3658 655 3003 
Average duration (fortnights) 64.86 35.72 71.19 
(39.20)** (31.34) (37.85) 
Demographic characteristics 
Male(%) 63.15 68.40 62.00 
Age at entry 46.51 44.88 46.87 
' 
(13.23) (12.47) (13.36) 
Male 47.43 45.04 48.01 
(13.67) (13.21) (13.72) 
Female 44.93 44.51 45.01 
(12.28) (10.71) (12.55) 
Marital status _couple(%) 46.77 47.33 46.65 
Australian born (%) 69.87 74.50 68.86 
Proportion having children (%) 14.11 18.47 13.15 
Number of children*** 1.90 1.88 1.91 
(1.09) (0.94) (1.14) 
Age of the youngest child*** 8.70 8.30 8.82 
(5.25) (4.95) (5.33) 
Home ownership and rent type 
Home owner (%) 44.67 42.75 45.09 
Government rent (%) 8.39 7.33 8.62 
Private rent (%) 23.95 27.94 23.08 
Free rent (%) 6.72 7.02 6.66 
Other rent (%) 60.93 57.71 61.64 
Financial variables 
Earned income>0 (%) 11.67 17.86 10.32 
Average earned income**** 133.16 195.23 109.73 
(166.37) (216.26) (136.35) 
Unearned income>0 (%) 37.70 31.91 38.96 
Average unearned income**** 95.55 111. 79 92.65 
(149.89) (179.91) (143.76) 
(Continue) 
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of the sample used for duration model estimation 
( continued) 
All spells 
Where coming from 
Transition from 
unemployment benefit (%) 
other income support payments (%) 
Outside income support system (%) 
Proportion by state 
NSW&ACT 
NT 
QLD 
SA 
TAS 
VIC 
WA 
Proportion by entry year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
* Including those who transferred to the Age Pension. 
** Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
*** For those who have children. 
**** For those who have earned or unearned income. 
41.63 
23 .26 
35.10 
34.58 
0.68 
19.49 
9.19 
3.31 
24.19 
8.56 
20.86 
19.33 
19.35 
19.33 
21.13 
Completed Right-censored 
spells spells* 
30.99 43 .96 
27.48 22.34 
41.53 33.70 
35.27 34.43 
0.92 0.63 
20.46 19.28 
8.85 9.26 
2.44 3.50 
21.98 24.68 
10.08 8.23 
27.18 19.48 
24.58 18.18 
20.31 19.15 
17.25 19.78 
10.69 23.41 
Males made up of a higher proportion of the sample than females. Among completed 
spells, their proportion was even higher. The average entry age of the whole sample 
was 46.5 years, males being slightly older than females, although the age gap was not 
statistically significant. Those who completed a spell had younger entry ages on 
average than right-censored individuals. However, among those who complete a spell 
there is no significant difference in average age between males and females . 
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Less than half of the recipients were married and about 70 percent were Australian 
born. Among completed spells a slightly higher proportion than in the sample as a 
whole were born in Australia. The proportion of the sample with a child was 14 
percent. For the completed spells, this proportion was relatively larger (18 percent). 
The average number of children for those who had a child (or children) was about 2 
and on average the age of the youngest child was about 9 years. 
Turning to the home ownership and rental arrangement variables, the proportion of 
home owners in the whole sample was about 45 percent. Private and other rental 
accommodations made up most of the sample. About 8 percent lived in 
accommodation rented from government and another 7 percent lived in free 
accommodation. 
For the financial variables, about 12 percent of the whole sample had earned income. 
For those who had earned income, the average amount was $13 3 per fortnight. The 
completed spells had a higher proportion of recipients (18 percent) who had earned 
income and they also earned more on average. The proportion having unearned 
income in the sample was 38 percent and for those who had unearned income the 
average amount was about $100 per fortnight. 
For the whole sample about 42 percent had a previous unemployment experience, 23 
percent were from other income support payment programs, and 35 percent were from 
outside the income support system11 ' 12• 
Table 5 .1 also presents the distribution of recipients by state and entry year. The state 
variables are included in the model to pick up any state fixed effect. The entry year 
variables are to control for cohort specific effect over the five entry years. 
11 The composition of recipient sources is slightly different from those shown in -Chapter 4 because 
here a person with multiple entries is only counted as one new recipient, but in Chapter 4 a person 
could be counted several times according to his/her number of entries. 
12 To compare the differences of recipients from different sources, Table 5 .A4 in Appendix SA presents 
summary statistics by recipient source. 
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5.3.2. Empirical survival and hazard functions 
Figure 5 .1 a plots the empirical survival function of the whole sample. The survival 
function shows the proportion of spells that are at least x fortnights long13 . 
From the figure, after a half year (13 fortnights) 94 percent of the spells are still 
continuing. After one year 91 percent are still continuing, at the two-year point 86 
percent are continuing and at the five-year point 73 percent. In other words, within a 
half year less than 6 percent of an entry cohort of DSP recipients left DSP, within one 
year 9 percent, within two years, 14 percent, and within five years, 27 percent. 
Figure 5 .1 b plots the empirical hazard function for the whole sample. For duration 
less than two years ( 52 fortnights), the empirical hazard rate appears to decline. But at 
about two-year point the hazard rate starts to increase. This may be because after two 
years of DSP recipiency there is a review on recipient eligibility and this review 
moves out those who are no longer eligible. Also note that the variation of the hazard 
rate after two years duration increases dramatically. The hazard rate for very long 
durations behaves erratically because only a few spells have such long durations in 
the sample. 
Figure 5.la: Empirical survival function, the whole sample 
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13 The empirical survival function is estimated using the Kaplan-Meier product-limit method (Kaplan 
and Meier, 1958). For a detailed discussion on this method, see Cox and Oakes (1984) or Pagano and 
Gauvreau (2000). 
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Figure 5.lb: Empirical hazard function, the whole sample 
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The spell sample can be stratified according to one set of characteristics at a time, to 
obtain a better sense of the relationship between that characteristic and spell duration. 
The empirical survival and hazard functions for various dimensions of the sample can 
then be plotted. 
Figures 5 .2a and 5 .2b plot the empirical SUfVival and hazard functions by gender. It is 
clear that the survival rate for males is lower than for females, implying females stay 
longer on DSP. The male empirical hazard function is much like the hazard function 
of the whole sample (remember, males were more than 60 percent in the sample). It 
also appears that the main difference of the hazard rate between males and females 
takes place at duration intervals of less than one year and after two and a half years. 
Figure 5.2a: Empirical survival function by gender 
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Figure 5.2b: Empirical hazard function by gender 
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Figures 5 .3a and 5 .3b plot the empirical survival and hazard functions by marital 
status. The survival rate of married recipients is a little lower than that of single 
persons. But the difference is not significant. 
Figure 5.3a: Empirical survival function by marital status 
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Figure 5.3b: Empirical hazard function by marital status 
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Figures 5 .4a and 5 .4b plot the empirical survival and hazard functions by whether or 
not individuals have earned income. The survival rate of recipients having earned 
income is slightly higher than that of those with no earned incomes for durations of 
less than a half year, but thereafter the survival rate becomes lower and this difference 
becomes larger with duration. 
Figure 5.4a: Empirical survival function by whether having earned income 
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Figure 5.4b: Empirical hazard function by whether having earned income 
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The series of figures in Appendix 5.B plot these two functions for other variables. 
5.4. Duration model estimation 
The empirical hazard ( and the survival) function treats all spells (individuals) as 
homogeneous, and the duration dependency shown in the empirical function may be a 
reflection of differences in individual characteristics rather than true state or duration 
dependency. The results from the duration model estimation, which controls for 
observable characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity, are presented in this section. 
To control for covariates the proportional hazard duration model is used whereby 
hi (t) = h0 (t) exp {Xi (t)' /3} (5.8) 
where hi (t) is the hazar~ for person i , h0 (t) is the baseline hazard common to all 
individuals and X lt) is a vector of observable characteristics, some of which may 
vary with t as will become clear shortly. f3 is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
For different values of Xi (t)' f3 , the hazard function for individual i is shifted 
proportionally up or down relative to the baseline hazard. 
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A nonparametric baseline hazard estimation approach is implemented here, which is 
an extension of Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and is detailed in Meyer (1990), 
Lancaster (1990), and Barrett (2000). The baseline hazard is estimated 
nonparametrically as a piece-wise constant function. The time axis is divided into a 
finite number of intervals and a separate baseline hazard parameter is estimated for 
each interval. This approach provides a very flexible method for a parametric 
functional form for the baseline. This is an important advantage of the specification 
for it has been shown that misspecification of the baseline hazard is a major source of 
error in drawing inferences concerning both the presence of duration dependence 
(Blank, 1989; Manton, Stallard and Vaupel, 1986) and the impact of covariates 
(Dolton and van der Klaauw, 1995; Heckman and Singer, 1985). 
The log likelihood function for this specification with a sample of N spells is given 
by: 
N ki -1 
l(/3,r) = L <Si log(l- exp( exp[y(ki) + xi (ki )' /JD)- L exp[y(t) + xi (t)' /3] (5.9) 
i=l t=l 
where ki is the observed length of the /h welfare spell, <Si equals one if the spell 
terminates before becoming right-censored and Ji is zero if the spell is right-censored. 
In maximizing the log likelihood the y(t) = log[ f h0 (u )du] are treated as parameters 
to be estimated 14. 
As in the general linear model, unobserved heterogeneity is also a concern in the 
duration model. Heckman and Singer (1984a, 1984b) show that the presence of 
population heterogeneity induces a negative bias in the hazard function, potentially 
producing estimates of a decreasing hazard when the true underlying hazard is flat or 
increasing. The heterogeneity may be accounted for by incorporating the 
unobservable variable, say Bi for individual i, into the hazard function as 
hi (t, Xi (t), Bi) . The piecewise proportional hazard model may be extended to allow 
14 See Table 5 .4 for the time intervals for the baseline hazard parameters. 
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for the unobserved heterogeneity by assuming that the unobserved variable takes a 
multiplicative form, 
(5.10) 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter vector and baseline hazard are then 
obtained by conditioning on the likelihood function on 0i and then integrating over 
the distribution of Bi. This approach requires specifying an explicit functional form 
for the distribution of Bi. One popular distribution is the gamma, which gives a closed 
form expression for the likelihood function 15 • This is the approach taken here. 
However, for the whole sample when unit gamma heterogeneity is assumed, the 
estimate of the variance term always converged toward zero and the model collapsed 
to that without unobserved heterogeneity. Consequently, model estimates without 
heterogeneity are reported below. 
At first glance the rejection of model estimation with unobserved heterogeneity is 
strange. Presumably DSP benefit is based on individual medical condition and leaving 
this program then reflects a recovery from the disability which makes the recipient 
eligible for the benefit. Because the model does not include a health condition 
variable (because it is not available), we would expect there must be unobserved 
heterogeneity which at least reflects the health condition of a recipient. That this does 
not happen implies that the observable variables included in the model can explain the 
exit behaviour of DSP recipients, or that these variables also reflect the health 
conditions of DSP recipients. The impact of health condition on the exit behaviour is 
then absorbed into these included covariates. If this is true, it supports the argument 
that the disability behaviour is not only determined by medical factors, but individual 
characteristics (e.g., age) and socio-economic factors (e.g., labour market conditions) 
may also play important roles (Aarts and de Jone, 1992). 
For convenience of interpretation, Table 5.2 presents the hazard ratio estimates for the 
covariates. For category ( or dummy) variables, the hazard ratio estimate for a 
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category (for example, being single) shows the ratio of the hazard rate of a recipient 
belonging to that category ( e.g., being single) to the hazard rate of a recipient who 
belongs to the omitted category in the model specification ( e.g., being married). For a 
continuous variable, the hazard ratio estimate shows the ratio of the hazard rate of a 
recipient with one more unit of that variable to the hazard rate of a recipient without 
the one more unit. Table 5.5 reports the baseline hazard rate estimates. Tables 5.A2 
and 5.A3 in Appendix 5A report the parameter estimates for the covariates and the 
baseline hazard respectively. 
From Table 5 .2 the following covariates are statistically significant in determining the 
hazard rate of exiting DSP: entry age between 16 and 20, entry age 56 and over, 
gender, country of birth, amount of earned income, having or not having unearned 
income, and the source of recipients. 
Since the omitted entry age group is 41-50, the hazard ratio estimates for all other 
entry age groups are relative to the 41-50 group. The results show that the impact of 
entry age on the hazard rate is a kind of inverse U shape. Other things being equal, 
persons who enter into DSP between age 21 and 40 have the highest hazard rate. 
Although the results imply that the hazard rate of the three age groups 21-30, 31-40 
and 41-50 are different, the differences are not statistically significant. The youngest 
age group has the lowest hazard rate. For persons entering into DSP younger than 21 
the hazard rate is about 55 percent lower than the 41-50 group. The hazard rate of the 
51-55 age group is 23 percent lower than the 41-50 group and this difference is 
weakly significant. For persons over 45, the hazard rate is about 38 percent lower than 
the 41-50 group. 
15 Alternatively, Heckman and Singer (1984a) suggest letting the unobservable take a non-parametric 
form. However, Trussell and Richards (1985) indicate that this is just as subject to distributional biases 
as when the distribution oft is estimated non-parametrically. 
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Table 5.2: Duration model estimation results of covariates, hazard ratio 
estimates 
Covariates 
entry age 16-20 
entry age 21-30 
entry age 3 1-40 
entry age 51-55 
entry age 5 6 and over 
sex (male=l) 
marital status (single=l) 
country of birth (foreign=l) 
homeowner(non-owner=l) 
free rent (=1) 
governmentrent(=l) 
private rent (=1) 
number of children 
age of the youngest child 
having earned income ( = 1) 
average amt of earned income/100 
having unearned income ( = 1) 
average amt of unearned income/100 
NT(=l) 
QLD(=l) 
SA(=l) 
TAS(=l) 
VIC(=l) 
WA(=l ) 
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Hazard ratio estimate 
0.4521 *** 
1.0242 
1.0989 
0.7692* 
0.6212*** 
1.4493*** 
0.9783 
0.7994** 
0.7696* 
1.1406 
0.9193 
1.1876 
1.0079 
1.0026 
0.9794 
1.3259*** 
0.6610*** 
1.0611 
1.2581 
1.0680 
1.2134 
0.6732 
0.9809 
1.2295 
(Continue) 
Table 5.2: Duration model estimation results of covariates, hazard ratio 
estimates (Continued) 
Covariates 
cohort 96 (=1) 
cohort 97 (=1) 
cohort 98 (=1) 
cohort 99 (=1) 
enter DSP from outside income support system (=I) 
transition from other income supports ( = 1) 
unemployment rate 
No. of spells 
No. of failures 
Log likelihood 
Hazard ratio estimate 
1.1 736 
1.2837* 
1.3628* 
1.1044 
1.9408*** 
1.5521 *** 
0.9133 
3658 
655 
-2381.27 
*** Significant at 1 percent level; ** 5 percent level; * 10 percent level. 
The inverse U shape impact of entry age on the hazard rate may reflect individual 
health conditions and labour market prospects of DSP recipients. For those who enter 
into DSP at a very young age (i.e. less than 21 years), their disabilities might have 
presented for a long time (say, from birth) and recovery may be very difficult if not 
impossible. Therefore, they have the lowest hazard rate. For persons who enter into 
DSP between age 21 and 50, their disabilities are unlikely to have been present from 
birth and they are more likely to have been employed for a period of time before 
entering into DSP. In addition, as they are at their labour market prime age, they may 
prefer to work rather than to stay on DSP if they could recover from their disabilities. 
Also, compared with older persons their age makes it easier to get a job if they 
recover. These issues may partly explain why for these age groups the hazard rate is 
the highest. For the older age groups, 51 and over, like the 21-50 group, their pre-
benefit work experience may also make them prefer to work if they could recover. 
But because of their age the probability of getting a job must be lower and the older 
the age the lower the probability. This may explain why for the older persons, the 
hazard rate decreases with entry age. 
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The hazard rate between males and females is significantly different. Other things 
being equal, being male increases the hazard rate by 45 percent. If exiting DSP is not 
dominated by death, this difference may reflect difference in labour market 
opportunities between males and females. It is also possible that the difference in 
socially expected roles between males and females may also have a greater stigma 
impact on male DSP recipients than on female recipients. The difference in the hazard 
rate between males and females may also reflect the differences in the nature of their 
disabilities. It is perhaps more likely that more male disabilities will be the results of 
accidents or job injuries (given the occupation difference between males and females) , 
and this kind of disability may be easier to recover from than chronic diseases. 
Whether a recipient is born in Australia is also important in determining the hazard 
rate. Every thing else being equal, if a person is not Australian born, this reduces the 
hazard rate by about 20 percent compared with a person born in Australia. This may 
be because an immigrant is possibly less competitive in the labour market than a 
native Australian. 
The financial variables are also very interesting. Having earned income seems to 
reduce the hazard rate, although the reduction is not statistically significant. The 
amount of earned income, however, does have a significant impact. The variables 
measuring the amount of earned and unearned income enter the model in units of 
$100. The magnitude of the hazard ratio estimate implies that an increase in earned 
income by $100 per fortnight will raise the hazard rate by 33 percent16. Having earned 
income shows that the person has some ability to work, but having earned income, of 
itself, may not make a significant difference in terms of the probability of leaving the 
program, since DSP recipients are allowed to have earned income (though up to a 
16 As the variable, the amount of earned income, is the individual average over the DSP recipiency 
period, its coefficient is identified by the variation of this variable across individuals . It is likely, 
however, that the earned income of each individual may vary with the duration on DSP. Individual 
earned income may increase with duration if the individual recovers from disability gradually. It may 
also decrease with duration if individual disability becomes worse or recipiency of benefit makes the 
individual prefer to work less. 
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specified level 17). However, if the earned income is very high, the person has an 
incentive to leave DSP for work because the opportunity cost of staying on DSP is 
high now. In addition, the benefit will be cancelled if a recipient's earned income is 
too high because DSP is subject to means test. 
Having unearned income reduces the hazard rate, compared with having no unearned 
income, by 24 percent. One explanation may be that having unearned income may 
reduce the incentive of a recipient to leave the program for work, and they prefer to 
combine the disability benefit with other unearned income rather than leave DSP fqr 
work. The amount of unearned income has no significant impact, although it has the 
right sign. 
For the recipient source variables, the omitted category is recipients who transferred 
from unemployment benefit. The hazard ratio estimates imply that the hazard rate of 
those who entered into DSP from outside the income support system is almost twice 
that of those who transferred from unemployment benefit. The hazard rate of those 
who transferred from other income support payments is 55 percent higher than those 
who transferred from unemployment benefit. Recipients who transferred from 
unemployment benefit have the lowest hazard rate. 
Looking at those who transferred from unemployment benefit (i.e. they did not go 
directly to DSP), it may be that their disabilities were not as severe ( or obvious) as 
those who entered into DSP directly (i.e. from outside the income support system). 
However, once having entered, the previously unemployed leave more slowly than 
direct entrants. The lower hazard rate may imply that the experience of 
unemployment may have reduced their incentive to give up DSP for work. Perhaps 
they have had bad experiences in the labour market and lack confidence about their 
ability to perform if they leave DSP. If this is true, it provides supportive evidence for 
the discouraged worker story. Alternatively, those who came from outside the income 
17 Income subject to an income test in Australia is the combination of earned and unearned income. For 
example, in June 2002, for a single DSP recipient, income up to $112 per fortnight has no impact on 
DSP payment. Income over this threshold will reduce DSP payment. DSP payment will be totally 
withdrawn if income is equal or greater than $1181 per fortnight for a single person. These thresholds 
vary with number of children and marital status. 
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support system leave more quickly because the nature of their disabilities may be 
different. The disabilities of those who came from outside the income support system 
might be more likely to be caused by accidents or job injuries. Recovery from these 
disabilities may be easier or quicker than it is for chronic disabilities or perhaps the 
recipients received a substantial amount of compensation. If they recover, they will 
leave DSP by themselves. If they receive a substantial amount of compensation, it is 
likely they will be forced to leave due to DSP means test. 
Recipients from other income support payments also have a much higher hazard rate 
than those who transferred from unemployment benefit. Given the composition of this 
recipient source, this result may not be a surprise (see Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3: Payment types prior to transition to DSP of those who transferred 
from other income support payments (other than unemployment benefit) 
Payment types prior to transition 
Codes Definitions of Codes 
CAR Carer payment 
F-W/FMM/F-A Family payments 
PA/PT A Partner allowance 
PGL Partner of persons on low income 
PGN/PGP/MPA Partner of Newstart, Pension and Mature Age 
Allowance recipients 
PPS/SPP Sole parent payment 
SA/SKA 
SPB/SPL 
WA/WDA/WID 
WFA/WFD 
Others 
Sickness allowance 
Special benefit 
Widow allowance & widow pension 
Wife pension 
Including drought relief, crisis, disability wage 
supplement and other parenting payments. 
, -, .,, ,-~-- . ,. . :- . . ., . " -- . 
. ·-.:=- 1 . ·: ,.: . ~ 
:,•·;:: -~-~- ~~~- -~ . -,-;f _.- . ·c::-· ·;>.>\:~ •~-
Number of Percent 
persons (%) 
22 2.46 
45 5.04 
109 12.21 
17 1.90 
39 4.37 
75 8.40 
433 48.49 
72 8.06 
41 4.59 
31 3.47 
9 1.01 
.;·,·--.;;.:-. • • 
· ·
1lOOi@O~: 
Among those who transferred from other income support payments, about half were 
from sickness allowance payment. Given the temporary nature of the sickness 
allowance, it is possible that a substantial proportion of these recipients could recover . 
from their sickness even after they transferred to DSP. Another 18 percent were 
partners of income support payment recipients, if their partners of these DSP 
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recipients lost their entitlements to income support payment, say through high-earned 
income, it is also likely that these recipients would lose their entitlement to DSP. 
Another weakly significant variable is home ownership. Home owners have a higher 
hazard rate than non-home owners. It is very difficult to explain why this is the case. 
The unemployment rate is included as a time varying variable. This rate is added to 
each record (not person) according to state, gender, year and quarter. The impact of 
the unemployment rate variable has the right sign - an increase in the unemployment 
rate reduces the hazard rate. But this effect is not accurately estimated. This may 
suggest that labour market conditions may not have much effect on DSP ·outflows. 
This is in contrast to the finding in the earlier chapters that DSP inflows are 
significantly affected by labour market conditions. This may imply that when 
individuals make a decision on whether to participate in the DSP program, they take 
into account labour market conditions and their prospects of employment. But, once 
on the program, labour market conditions are not important in their decision on 
whether to stay in the program or leave it. 
The cohort variables provide some information on whether recipients entering DSP at 
different years are statistically different in terms of leaving the program. All cohort 
hazard rates are compared with the 1995 cohort. It seems that recipients entering after 
1995 have a higher hazard rate than those entering in 1995, but only differences 
between the 1997 and 1995 cohort and the 1998 and 1995 cohorts are weakly 
significant. 
The number of children and age of the youngest child are not significant. Neither is 
there any state specific impact on the hazard rate. 
Table 5.4 and Figure 5.5 present the estimates for the piece-wise baseline hazard 
function for the specified duration intervals 18 . 
18 Note that the hazard rate estimate for a specific duration interval equals the exponential of the 
corresponding coefficient estimate. 
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It appears that the baseline hazard rate peaks during the 3 to 4 fortnight interval and 
then declines monotonically until the 24th fortnight. It picks up at around the one year 
period and then falls again. For durations between 44 fortnight and four years the 
hazard rate fluctuates, but it appears to move around a constant average. Because 
unobserved heterogeneity is rejected in the model estimation, the declining baseline 
hazard rate suggests duration dependence during the first 44 fortnights period, but 
once a person stays on the program for longer than 44 fortnights the baseline hazard 
seems to no longer depend on the duration. 
Table 5.4: Duration model baseline hazard rate estimates 
Time intervals (foutnights) Hazard rate 
0-2 0.00653 
3-4 0.00783 
5-8 0.00660 
9-12 0.00616 
13-16 0.00523 
17-20 0.00463 
21-24 0.00350 
25-28 0.00538 
29-32 0.00415 
33-36 0.00414 
37-40 0.00354 
41-44 0.00237 
45-52 0.00277 
53-58 0.00355 
59-64 0.00323 
65-70 0.00447 
71-76 0.00282 
77-82 0.00388 
83-88 0.00292 
89-94 0.00314 
95-103 0.00324 
104+ 0.00257 
* All estimates are significant at 1 percent level. 
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Figure 5.5: Baseline hazard rate estimates 
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5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter applies the duration model to the FaCS LDS data to identify factors that 
determine the hazard rate of leaving the DSP. Many factors affect the rate of leaving 
DSP. The estimation results show that entry age, gender, whether or not a recipients is 
born in Australia, amount of earned income while on DSP, having or not having 
unearned income, and whether recipients transferred from unemployment benefit have 
significant impacts on the hazard rate. 
The impact of entry age is not linear. Persons who enter into the program between age 
21 and 50 have the highest hazard rate. Persons younger and older than these ages on 
entry into DSP will have a lower hazard rate. Furthermore, for those older than 50 
years of age at entry, the older the entry age, the lower the hazard rate. 
Females have a lower hazard rate than males and persons born in Australia have a 
higher hazard rate than do non-Australian born recipients. An increase in earned 
income will increase the hazard rate and having unearned income lowers the hazard 
rate. Persons coming from unemployment benefit have a lower hazard rate than both 
those directly from outside the income support system and those from other income 
support payments. 
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In summary, there is a clear link between recipient characteristics and how long they 
are likely to stay on the DSP. Those who leave the DSP program most quickly are 
characterized as middle age ( especially, 31-40)~ male, Australian born, coming from 
outside the income support system, having no unearned income and with high earned 
income when receiving DSP benefit. Those who are the slowest to leave are 
characterized as very young (younger than 21 years old) or near to the Age Pension 
age when they entered into DSP, female, non-Australian born, have transferred from 
unemployment benefit, have unearned income, and without earned income. 
Although the exit destinations of these recipients are unknown ( except for those who 
transferred to the Age Pension), it seems that persons who have the characteristics 
associated with the most rapid exit from the DSP would have a better chance of 
success in the labour market than those recipients who leave the slowest. It would 
probably be reasonable to suggest then that the former are most likely to return to 
work on exit from the DSP. 
An important policy implication of the finding that recipients with different 
characteristics have different potential to leave is that any policy or program aimed at 
facilitating outflows of DSP recipients should focus on those who are most likely to 
leave and treat recipients differently. 
Although those recipients who transferred from unemployment appear to leave the 
slowest, their disability may not be as severe ( or obvious) as those who directly 
entered into DSP from outside the income support system. Therefore, those recipients 
who transferred from unemployment may have the potential to leave faster. Because 
this group of recipients make up a large proportion of DSP inflows, the behaviour of 
this recipient group requires further study. 
Although the unemployment rate variable produces an insignificant impact, this may 
nevertheless have important implications. Together with the finding in Chapter 3, this 
finding implies that worsening labour market conditions push the disabled people into 
the DSP program, but a recovery or a boom of an economy will not draw DSP 
recipients out of the program. Because once in, DSP recipients tend to stay on the 
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program for a long time (see next chapter), this suggests that we need to search for 
better programmatic responses to the variation of labour market conditions. 
With the rejection of existence of unobserved heterogeneity in the model estimation, 
the decline of the estimated baseline hazard rate for duration less than 44 fortnights 
implies that negative duration dependence of exit from DSP exists to some degree. 
For recipients with longer duration, the baseline hazard rate appears to be constant. 
This may suggest, if something can be done to enhance the hazard rate, it is better to 
act at the earlier stage. 
The overall significance of the model without inclusion of a health condition variable 
and the rejection of unobserved heterogeneity, implies that demographic and 
economic factors are important in determining disability benefit participation and 
disability is not only determined by health conditions per se. This does not necessarily 
mean that some recipients are not really disabled but may suggest that other factors 
can signify their disabilities, such as losing a job. 
Higher hazard rate implies shorter duration on the DSP. All the variables that have a 
positive impact on the hazard rate will reduce the completed duration of the recipients 
who have those characteristics as will be shown in the next chapter. 
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Appendix 5A 
Table 5.Al: Summary statistics for persons who transferred to the Age Pension 
fromDSP 
Number of persons/spells 
Average duration (fortnights) 
Demographic characteristics 
Male(%) 
Age at entry 
Male 
Female 
Marital status_couple(¾) 
Australian born (%) 
Proportion having children (%) 
Number of children*** 
Age of the youngest child*** 
Home ownership and rent type 
Home owner (%) 
Government rent (%) 
Private rent (%) 
Free rent (%) 
Other rent (%) 
Financial variables 
Earned income>0 (%) 
Average earned income**** 
Unearned income>0 (%) 
Average unearned income**** 
Persons who transferred to the Age Pension 
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284 
55.80 
(32.38)** 
71.13 
61.70 
(2.24) 
62.87 
(1.37) 
58.80 
(1.02) 
73.59 
61.97 
3.52 
1.5 
(0.84) 
11.7 
(4.06) 
69.01 
4.58 
11.62 
4.93 
78.87 
7.04 
145 .31 
(134) 
73.94 
111.72 
(140) 
(Continue) 
Table 5.Al: Summary statistics for persons who transferred to the Age Pension 
from DSP ( continued) 
Where coming from 
Transition from 
unemployment (%) 
other income support payments (%) 
Outside income support system (%) 
Proportion by states 
NSW &ACT 
NT 
QLD 
SA 
TAS 
VIC 
WA 
Proportion by entry years 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
** Standard deviations in parentheses. 
*** For those who have children. 
Persons who transferred to the Age Pension 
16.55 
20.42 
63.03 
36.62 
0.35 
16.55 
11.27 
2.11 
23.94 
9.15 
38.73 
27.46 
18.31 
11 .62 
3.87 
**** For those who have earned or unearned income. 
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Table 5.A2: Duration model parameter estimates and standard errors of 
coviarates 
Covariates Coefficient Std. Err 
entry age 16-20 
-0.7939*** 0.2484 
entry age 21-30 0.0239 0.1632 
entry age 31-40 0.0943 0.1341 
entry age 51-55 
-0.2624* 0.1392 
entry age 56 and over 
-0.4762*** 0.1387 
sex ( male= 1) 0.3711*** 0.1050 
marital status ( single= 1) 
-0.0220 0.1120 
country of birth (foreign= 1) 
-0.2238** 0.1002 
homeowner(non-owner=l) 
-0.2619* 0.1543 
free rent (=1) 0.1316 0.1949 
governmentrent(=l) 
-0.0842 0.1942 
private rent (=1) 0.1720 0.1392 
number of children 0.0078 0.0680 
age of the youngest child 0.0026 0.0140 
having earned income (=l) 
-0.0208 0.1569 
average amt of earned income/100 0.2821 *** 0.0747 
having unearned income (=1) -0.4140*** 0.1243 
average amt of unearned income/100 0.0593 0.0430 
NT(=l) 0.2296 0.4740 
QLD(=l) 0.0658 0.1628 
SA(=l) 0.1934 0.2249 
TAS(=l) 
-0.3956 0.3552 
VIC(=l) 
-0.0193 0.1321 
WA(=l) 0.2066 0.1574 
cohort 96 (=1) 0.1601 0.1246 
cohort 97 (=1) 0.2497* 0.1446 
cohort 98 (=1) 0.3095* 0.1690 
cohort 99 (=1) 0.0993 0.2135 
enter DSP from outside ( = 1) 0.6631 *** 0.1344 
transition from other income support (=l) 0.4396*** 0.1215 
unemployment rate 
-0.0907 0.0747 
*** Significant at 1 percent level; ** 5 percent level; * 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.A3: Parameter estimates and standard errors of baseline hazard rate 
Time interval (foutnights) Coeffficient Std. Err 
0-2 
-5.0319 0.6475 
3-4 
-4.8492 0.6455 
5-8 
-5.0204 0.6363 
9-12 
-5.0893 0.6360 
13-16 
-5 .2531 0.6375 
17-20 
-5.3748 0.6414 
21-24 
-5.6542 0.6399 
25-28 
-5.2254 0.6395 
29-32 
-5.4858 0.6393 
33-36 
-5.4878 0.6408 
37-40 
-5.6427 0.6413 
41-44 
-6.0445 0.6525 
45-52 
-5.8907 0.6188 
53-58 
-5.6413 0.6239 
59-64 
-5.7339 0.6317 
65-70 
-5.4095 0.6347 
71-76 
-5.8710 0.6341 
77-82 
-5.5516 0.6355 
83-88 
-5.8376 0.6429 
89-94 -5.7649 0.6566 
95-103 -5.7336 0.6305 
104+ 
-5.9622 0.5746 
* All estimates are significant at 1 percent level. 
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Table 5.A4: Summary statistics of DSP recipients by recipient sources 
Recipient sources 
outside unemployment other payments 
Demographic variables 
Entry age 48.04 45.18 46.49 
(15 .25)* (12.49) (10.84) 
Entry age of males 49.56 · 45.94 46.43 
(14.98) (12.76) (12.11) 
Entry age of females 44.44 43.59 46.54 
(15.28) (11.74) (9.84) 
Proportion of males 0.7033 0.6782 0.4181 
Prop of couples 0.6192 0.3535 0.458 
Prop of Aus born 0.6949 0.7213 0.6797 
Prop having children 0.103 0.1226 0.2441 
Number of children 1.85 1.98 1.9 
(0.91) (1.18) (1.12) 
Age of youngest child 8.82 8.45 9.03 
(4.76) (5.34) (5.41) 
Home ownership and rental arrangement 
Home owner 0.5511 0.36 0.4502 
Government rent 0.0363 0.1041 0.112 
Private rent 0.1416 0.2972 0.28 
Other rent 0.8221 0.5977 0.6081 
* Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
152 
Appendix SB 
Empirical survival and hazard functions by selected variables 
Figure 5.Al: Empirical survival function by country of birth 
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Figure 5.A2: Empirical hazard function by country of birth 
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Figure 5.A3: Empirical survival function , 
age groups 16-20, 21-30 and 31-40 
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Figure 5.A4: Empirical hazard function, 
age groups 16-20, 21-30 and 31-40 
--16-20 --21-30 
- - - - - -31-40 
13 26 39 52 65 78 
Fortnights 
154 
., 
\ J I 
' , a I 
I " \ 
I ,t H 
I 
. ,, \ 
\ 
f f \ \ I 
. 
91 104 117 130 
Figure 5.A5 Empirical survival function, 
age groups 41-50, 51-55 and 55 & over 
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Figure 5.A6: Empirical hazard function, 
age groups 41-50, 51-55 and 55 & over 
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Figure 5.A 7: Empirical survival function by whether having children 
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Figure 5.A8: Empirical hazard function by whether having children 
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Figure 5.A9: Empirical survival function by homeownership 
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Figure 5.Al 0: Empirical hazard function by homeownership 
0.040 
(]) 0.035 
....., 
(U 0.030 I.... 
"'O 
I.... 0.025 co 
--Homeowner -Non homeowner! 
N 
(U 
0.020 ..c 
(U 
0.015 (.) 
I.... 
E 0.010 
w 0.005 
0.000 
0 13 26 39 52 65 78 91 104 117 130 
Fortnights 
157 
Figure 5.Al 1: Empirical survival function by rent type 
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Figure 5.A12: Empirical hazard function by rent type 
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Figure 5.A13: Empirical survival function by whether having unearned income 
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Figure 5.A14: Empirical hazard function by whether having unearned income 
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Figure 5.Al5: Empirical survival function by recipient sources 
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Figure 5.Al 6: Empirical hazard function by recipient source 
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Figure 5.Al 7: Empirical survival function by entry cohorts 
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Figure 5.A18: Empirical hazard function by entry cohorts 
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Chapter 6 
Length of Stay On the DSP Program 
6.1. Introduction 
As discussed earlier, the number of DSP recipients is determined not only by inflows 
but also by duration of recipients on the program. Unlike the unemployment benefit 
program, duration on DSP is normally very long; once entering into the DSP program 
not many recipients leave within a short period. Projections of future expenditures on 
the DSP program critically depend on the estimated length of stay by the recipients. 
Furthermore, when comparing costs for recipients with different characteristics, 
duration differences among them become very relevant. Taking entry age as an 
example, if a 20 years old new recipient is expected to stay on the program for 10 
years, this person's cost is equivalent to five 60 years old new recipients if the latter 
are expected to stay for only two years. Policy makers may also be interested in how 
the length of stay varies with subgroup characteristics, such as age and gender. 
However, little is currently known about the length of stay on the DSP program in 
Australia. The only information available is the duration distribution at the end of a 
financial year published by the program administrative authority1. Table 6.1 presents 
some examples of this kind of data. Although this information reveals how long the 
current recipients had stayed on the program up to the date when data were extracted, 
we still do not know how long a typical recipient will stay in the program until they 
leave, or how long a cohort of recipients who enter into the program in the same 
month ( or year) will be expected to stay. In other words, the duration presented in 
Table 6.1 is the length of the incomplete or interrupted spells and does not reflect the 
1 Before July 1997 social security programs were administered by the Department of Social Security 
(DSS). DSS was subsequently restructured into the Department of Family and Community Services 
(FaCS). 
162 
actual length of sta/. The information in Table 6.1 may therefore be useful in 
estimating the costs already occurred, but it is less useful in projecting future program 
costs which are of more policy interest. 
Table 6.1: Proportion of DSP recipients by incomplete duration - all recipients 
< 1 year 1 - 5 years 5-10 years 10-15 years 15-20 years over 20 years 
Jun-86 11.3 39.4 26.4 11.7 5.6 5.6 
Jun-91 11.2 35.8 26.6 13.3 6.3 6.8 
Jun-96 12.6 41.3 21.1 11.4 6.4 7.2 
Jun-99 13 46 20 9 5 7 
Source: June 1999 figures come from FaCS (1999), Characteristics of Disability Support Pension 
Customers . Figures for other years from DSS ( 1997) Trends and Characteristics of 
Disability Payments , Information Paper. 
In other countries, especially in the US, recent papers discussing duration on disability 
benefit have been published. Using a random sample of Social Security beneficiaries 
who were first entitled to disabled-worker benefits in 1972 and were followed till 
January 1981, Hennessey and Dykacz (1989) estimated their final exit destinations 
and expected duration on benefit. First, they applied a competing risk model to their 
sample. They distinguished three exit destinations (or outcomes): recovery, death and 
retirement. In their model they related these outcomes to a set of covariates including 
primary diagnosis, educational level, past occupation, primary insurance amount, sex, 
race, and age at entitlement. Then they used the estimated parameters to project the 
outcomes beyond the observable period and to calculate the proportion of recipients 
who ultimately left the program for each reason. They projected that 11 percent of the 
recipients would ultimately leave the program due to recovery, 36 percent due to 
death, and 53 percent due to retirement at age 65 . Average completed duration in the 
program was estimated to be 9.3 years, although considerable variations existed by 
entry age, sex, educational level and primary diagnosis. 
Rupp and Scott (1995) used a follow-up of a 197 4-82 cohort of new awardees of 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability benefits to estimate the average stay of 
2 As will be discussed later in a steady state the duration of the completed spells can be inferred from 
the duration of the interrupted spells, but steady state conditions do not hold for DSP recipients . 
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different awardee groups. Instead of employing a formal model, as in the Hennessey 
and Dykacz 1 s paper, Rupp and Scott projected the exit rate beyond the ten-year 
follow-up period by assuming that the exit rate after this period was only a function of 
age. Their estimated mean length of all the first SSI disability benefit spells was 5.5 
years. It was 11.3 years for disabled children, 1.3 years for disabled adults eligible for 
both the Social Security Administration's Disability Insurance (SSDI) and SSI, and 
6.4 years for adults eligible for SSI only. When multiple spells were accounted for, 
the projected mean total pre-retirement-age SSI disability stay almost doubled to 10.5 
years for all awardees and increased to 26.7 years for children. 
This chapter provides estimates of the duration of completed spells (referred to as 
'completed duration' later) of DSP recipients in Australia based on the parameters 
estimated in the previous chapter. The basic idea is that, using the results in the 
previous chapter, the survival function can be estimated and the survival rate beyond 
the observable data period can be predicted. The completed duration can then be 
calculated using the predicted survival rate. 
6.2. Completed and interrupted spells 
This section first discusses the difference between completed and interrupted spells 
and then shows why the duration statistics published by the administrative authority 
are not adequate in understanding the length of stay of DSP recipients. 
The difference between completed and interrupted spells is emphasized in the 
literature of unemployment duration. Figure 1, which follows Akerlof and Main 
( 19 8 0) and Sal ant ( 1977), illustrates the difference of these two· measures in the 
context of DSP duration. 
Suppose the duration of DSP spells is a random variable and a survey3 about duration 
is conducted at time to. To simplify, further assume there are only six spells for six 
DSP recipients and only four of the six spells are in progress and surveyed at to. The 
other two spells not surveyed are either concluded before the survey or have not yet 
3 This is equivalent to an extraction of data from the FaCS LDS data. 
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started. The durations of the spells encountered in and up to the time of the survey 
( denote Ti for spell or individual i), are obviously incomplete since the spells are still 
in progress at to. Ti then is the duration or length of an interrupted spell. Then the 
length of each of the four spells until its conclusion is called the length of a completed 
spell ( denote St). In life statistics, T, represents age and St is life span of person i. 
Figure 6.1: Completed and interrupted spells 
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Corresponding to the four surveyed spells, the following mean durations of spells can 
be identified: 
4 4 
T = Li: 14 and sc = Lst / 4 (6.1) 
i=l i=l 
The statistic T , or E(T) in general, is the average length of the interrupted spells. In 
regard to unemployment, it corresponds to the official statistics on mean duration of 
unemployment reported by employment authorities from unemployment surveys. 
Obviously, the durations in Table 6.1 also measure the length of DSP interrupted 
spells. 
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Since the interrupted spell is only part of the completed spell, T ( or E(T)) 
underestimates the average length of the four completed spells encountered by the 
survey. The average length of the four completed spells of the current recipients 
( captured in the survey) is represented by S c ( or E(S c) in general) . 
Both T ( or E (T)) and S c ( or E (Sc) ) are derived . from the spells captured in the 
survey, but one more relevant statistic is the average duration of all spells ever 
occurring. If we denote the two spells not encountered by the survey by s;, this 
corresponds to : 
(6 .2) 
i=l i=l i=l 
where Si represents the length of the completed spell for person i no matter whether 
i is encountered or not in the survey. While T can be estimated using cross section 
survey data, the estimates of S and Sc need longitudinal data so that completed 
spells can be obtained. The period of the longitudinal data required for the task 
depends on the nature of the spells. In the case of DSP, the required period will be 
quite long. 
Relationship between T(orE(T)) ,S(orE(S)) and Sc (orE(Sc)) 
As noted above, the length of a completed spell captured in a survey will exceed the 
length of a interrupted one. In steady state, captured spells are on average halfway 
through their full length at the time of a survey. This is known as "interruption bias". 
Therefore, the average length of the interrupted spell is half the average length of the 
completed spell captured by the survey. The relationship between E(T) and E(S), 
where S represents all spells ever occurring, is more complicated. Because of the 
interruption bias, Ti is an underestimate of the St captured in the survey. On the other 
hand, it is the spells with longer than average completed length that are more likely to 
be in progress at the time of a survey and then captured in the survey. This is known 
as "length bias" . These two effects are in conflict. Which effect is dominant is 
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determined by the exit rate (Salant 1977). Salant (1977) also shows, the following 
relationship holds between E(T) and E(S): 
E(T) = _!__{Var(S) + l} 
E(S) 2 E 2 (S) (6.3) 
if the exit rate rises with duration, E(T)<E(S); if the exit rate is constant, E(T)=E(S) 
and the effect of length-bias and interruption-bias exactly offset each other; and if the 
exit rate falls with duration, E(T)>E(S). 
6.3. Destination outcomes and duration distribution of the 1995 entry 
cohort 
Before discussing the estimation method and results, this section documents the 
experience of the recipients who entered into DSP between 3 March 1995 and 31 
December 1995 (the 1995 entry cohort). This cohort is followed to the end of the data 
set (i.e., 16 June 2000) to find out how many of them had exited (this refers to exit 
from DSP without transferring to the Age Pension), transferred to the Age Pension 
(referred to as 'retirement' later), or were still on DSP. The duration distribution of 
this cohort is also documented. 
6.3.1. Destination outcomes and distribution of the number of spells 
From the FaCS one percent sample LDS data, 763 new recipients entered into the 
DSP program between 3 March 1995 and 31 December 1995. Table 6.2 presents the 
destinations of this cohort as on 16 June 2000, the end of the data set. 
Over the observable period, 16 percent of the cohort exited from DSP, 14 percent 
transferred to the Age Pension ( or became retirement) and 70 percent were still 
receiving DSP benefits. Consistent with the results in the previous chapter, a larger 
proportion of males had left by exit and retirement than females. These destination 
outcomes also differed among different recipient sources. Those who transferred from 
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unemployment benefit had the lowest proportion of leaving (including exit and 
retirement) and highest proportion staying on. 
Table 6.2: Destinations of the 1995 entry cohort (percent) 
(i). Overall (%) 
Total Male Female 
Exit 15.73 17.45 12.25 
Retirement 14.42 17.25 8.70 
Still on 69.86 65.29 79.05 
(ii). By recipient source (%) 
Outside of From From other 
income support unemployment payments 
Exit 14.4 10.74 20.92 
Retirement 19.2 10.74 9.21 
Still on 66.4 78.52 69.87 
Given the time limitation of the observable period, the proportion of recipients 
transferring to the Age Pension (or became retirement) was determined by the age 
composition of the new recipients. Larger proportions of males and of those who 
came from outside the income support system transferred to the Age Pension. This 
was because a larger proportion of older new recipients were males and came from 
outside the income support system. 
Is 'churning' significant in the DSP program? From Table 6.3 , it seems that the 
answer is no. For the 1995 entry cohort as a whole, less than 10 percent of the 
recipients had more than one spell and only 2.5 percent had more than two spells. 
However, note that, those who came from outside the income support system had the 
highest proportion having more than one spell (12 percent) and those who transferred 
from unemployment had the lowest proportion having more than one spell ( 5 
percent)4. 
4 As will be shown in Chapter 7, recipients who returned to work were more likely to have multi-spells 
than those who exited to other destinations, such as the Age Pension. 
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Table 6.3: Distribution of the number of spells of the 1995 entry cohort 
By recipient sources 
No. of spells Total Outside the From From other 
income support unemployment payments 
1 90.56 88.00 94.63 92.05 
2 6.95 9.60 2.68 5.44 
3 1.83 1.87 1.34 2.09 
4-7* 0.66 0.53 1.34 0.42 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
* The highest number of spells for this cohort is 7. 
6.3.2. Duration distribution 
Due to data limitations, only a truncated distribution of this cohort can be 
documented. The latest entry recipients in this cohort could have more than four and 
less than five years completed duration. So, the duration is truncated at four years (i.e. 
longer than four years durations are included in the over four-year group). Another 
problem when looking at duration is how to deal with multi-spell recipients. There are 
two options: (i) look only at first spells; or (ii) look only at those with only one spell. 
The second option was chosen for two reasons: (i) there were not many recipients 
having multi spells. As shown in Table 6.3, among the 763 recipients 91 percent had 
one spell; (ii) for those with multi-spells, the duration of their first spells was 
normally short. If only first spells were used, the shorter duration spells may be over 
represented. In addition, to avoid the impact of transition to the Age Pension on 
duration, only those who entered into DSP at the age 55 or younger were considered5. 
Table 6.4 presents the duration distribution of this cohort whose entry ages were 55 or 
younger6'7 . 
5 From the data, among the 1995 entry cohort, no person aged 55 or younger transferred to the Age 
Pension over the observable period between 3 March 1995 and 16 June 2000 
6 Note that the results from Chapter 5 show that the hazard rate of the 1995 cohort is lower than the 
other entry cohorts. 
7 Table 6.Al and 6.A2 in Appendix 6A presents the duration distribution for the whole cohort by entry 
age. 
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Table 6.4: Duration distribution of the 1995 entry cohort, entry age 55 or 
younger 
(i). Overall (%) 
Duration Total Male Female 
<=1 year 5.27 6.49 3.63 
l<and<=2 3.08 3.44 2.59 
2<and<=3 3.52 4.20 2.59 
3<and<=4 3.52 5.73 0.52 
> 4 years 84.62 80.15 90.67 
100.00 100.00 100.00 
(ii). By recipient source (%) 
Outside the From From other 
income support unemployment payments 
<=1 year 5.41 2.08 6.90 
l<and<=2 2.70 1.04 4.60 
2<and<=3 2.70 3.13 4.60 
3<and<=4 2.70 4.17 4.02 
> 4 years 86.49 89.58 79.89 
100.00 100.00 100.00 
, 
At least two features stand out from Table 6.4: (i) consistent with the results in the 
previous section most of the cohort were still on DSP at the end of the data period and 
therefore most of the recipients in the cohort (more than 80 percent) had durations 
longer than four years; (ii) the next largest proportion consisted of those with a 
duration of one year or less. The proportions of recipients with 1-2, 2-3, and 3-4 years 
of duration were smaller and similar in magnitude. This implies that the proportion of 
recipients who left DSP within one year were relatively high and the proportion of 
recipients who left after a one year period were relatively small. This is consistent 
with -the baseline hazard rate estimation results in the previous chapter: for the less 
than one year period, the baseline hazard rate is relatively high and after this the 
baseline hazard is low and varies around a constant. 
Also, for each duration interval of four years or less, males were a larger proportion 
than females; a larger proportion of females than males had durations of more than 
four years. This is consistent with the results in Chapter 5 that males had a higher 
hazard rate than females. 
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The duration distribution by recipient source shows that recipients who transferred 
from unemployment benefit had the lowest rate of leaving within four years. This is 
consistent with the results in Chapter 5. But Table 6.4 shows that recipients who 
transferred from other income support payments had the highest proportion leaving 
within a four-year duration. This result is not consistent with that in Chapter 5. There 
may be two reasons for this: (i) the results in Chapter 5 were derived from a very 
large recipient sample (including entry cohorts 1995 to 1999); and (ii) as shown in 
Chapter 4, the composition of recipients transferring from other income support 
payments in the 1995 entry cohort were quite different from other entry cohorts. 
6.4. Estimation method and results 
6.4.1. The Method 
What is of interest is the expected, completed length of stay of DSP recipients with a 
certain characteristic (say entry age or gender) once they enter into the DSP program. 
In principle, this can be estimated by tracing an entry cohort with that characteristic 
through their entire into DSP recipiency experience8. For example, if we want to 
know how long a recipient who enters at age 20 will be expected to stay on the 
program, we can follow a cohort who started receiving this benefit at the same time 
and were 20 years old on entering the program up to the time when all the recipients 
in the cohort have left. The average duration of this cohort is the expected length of 
stay of a recipient who enters at age 20. 
If the number of recipients m the cohort at the start is denoted as f (0) and 
f(x) represents the number of individuals remaining on the DSP program after each 
of x periods, where 0 < x < m and m is the maximum number of periods on DSP, 
then the average duration of the cohort can be written as: 
8 If the interest is in the average duration of a cohort starting their spells at a particular time, Kai ts ' 
(1970) showed that, if the continuation rate is constant and steady state conditions hold, then the 
average length of a cohort starting their spells in a certain year is equal to the average length of the 
spells ending in that same year. But obviously, for DSP recipients, none of these conditions holds. 
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S = f x(f (x-l)- f(x)) 
x=I f (0) 
= f f(x) 
x=O f (O) 
(6.4) 
where s x = f (x) If (0) is the survival rate just after x periods. 
Therefore, from equation ( 6.4 ), the key information needed to estimate the average 
completed duration is the survival rate s i· If a cohort could be followed until all 
recipients exited, these survival rates could be calculated directly from data. However, 
given that the longest data period for the DSP recipients in the LDS data set is five 
and a half years (January 1995 to June 2000), direct derivation of the survival rates for 
all periods is not possible. Therefore, the problem of estimating completed duration 
reduces to estimating the survival rates, especially the survival rates beyond the 
observable data period. 
The estimation of the survival rates is based on the results in the previous chapter. In a 
discrete time case, the relationship between the survival function and the hazard 
function is9: 
st == exp[-L h(j)], (6.5) 
j~t 
where h0) is the hazard rate in the duration interval [i-1, j]. Given the parameter 
estimates in Chapter 5, h0) can be calculated using equation (5.10) 10 for any group of 
recipients with characteristics X: 
,... ,... ,... 
hi (t) = h0 (t) exp {Xi' /J}, 
9 This is the discrete version of equation (5.10) in Chapter 5. 
10 When conducting the calculations, the heterogeneity term 0 is ignored because, as discussed in the 
last chapter, existence of heterogeneity is not confirmed from the model estimation. 
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A 
A 
where h0 is the baseline hazard rate estimate and f3 the vector of coefficient 
estimates for covariates. 
In this chapter, expected duration by entry age, gender and recipient source are 
estimated because, as shown in the previous chapter, these factors are statistically 
significant in determining the hazard rate. Before reporting the estimated results, it is 
worth noting that the following assumptions underlie the calculations: 
(a) The baseline hazard rate for duration periods longer than the observable 
ones. In the sample used to estimate the parameters in the previous chapter, 
the longest duration is 140 fortnights. To estimate the hazard rate and then the 
survival rate beyond 140 fortnights, the baseline hazard rate for longer 
duration periods has to be assumed. From the previous chapter, the baseline 
hazard estimate for durations between 104 and 140 fortnights is 0. 0025 7. It 
may be reasonable to assume that durations longer than 140 fortnights have 
the same baseline hazard rate as 0.00257. This hazard rate is slightly smaller 
than the average of the baseline hazard estimates between 52 and 103 
fortnights. As noted in the previous chapter the slight increase in the hazard 
rate after two years duration was probably due to the review of DSP recipients. 
Since the review normally takes place between two years and five years 
benefit recipiency, for those who survived the review their hazard rates should 
be lower than the hazard rate between 52 and 103 fortnights. Therefore, our 
assumption of 0.00257 per fortnight for durations longer than five years is 
probably not low. 
(b) The possible maximum period of DSP recipiency. In theory, DSP duration can 
go to infinity. But because a recipient will normally be transferred to the Age 
Pension when reaching the Age Pension age, in practice DSP duration cannot 
become infinite. Therefore, for a DSP recipient, the maximum period 
(fortnights) on DSP is equal to the product of 26 (fortnights per year) 
multiplied by the difference between the Age Pension age and their entry age. 
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Since the female Age Pension age is changing, we assume two Age Pension 
ages for females: 60 and 65. Males' Age Pension age.is 65. 
6.4.2. Estimation results11 
Three sets of results are estimated. The first shows the expected length of stay of 'a 
typical recipient': Australian born, single, non-home owner, other rent type, no-child, 
no-earned income, no-unearned income, living in ACT or NSW, entered into DSP in 
year 1995 and entered by transition from unemployment benefit12 . The unemployment 
rate is assumed equal to 6.8, the quarterly average over the period 1995 to 1999. 
The second set of results show the expected duration by entry age and gender, 
assuming all other covariates equal the mean values in each gender and age group cell 
of the sample used for duration model estimation in the previous chapter. These 
recipients are defined as 'mean recipients by entry age and gender'. 
The third set of results show the expected duration by entry age, gender and recipient 
source, again, assuming all other covariates equal their mean values in each gender, 
age group and recipient source cell of the sample. These are 'mean recipients by entry 
age, gender and recipient source'. To simplify the calculations for the last two sets of 
results, the average entry age of each age group by gender and/or recipient source is 
used to calculate the maximum period. The average entry age and the maximum 
period by gender, and by gender and recipient source are provided in Table 6.A3 in 
Appendix 6A. 
Of particular interest is the expected duration of a cohort that enters the program at 
the same time (say in the same year). Instead of calculating the expected duration for 
each recipient in a cohort and then calculating averages by characteristics of interest, 
'mean recipients' are used to represent the cohort. This greatly simplifies the 
11 Due to the nonlinear nature of the model in the previous chapter and the procedures involved in 
calculating the expected duration, it is difficult to estimate the variance of expected duration. 
Therefore, in this chapter only the estimates of expected duration are calculated and reported. 
12 Note that the results in the previous chapter show that those who transferred from unemployment 
have the lowest hazard rate. 
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calculations, but provides similar results. The values of the variables taken by the 
'mean recipients' for expected duration calculations are provided in Table 6.A3 to 
6.A7 in Appendix 6A. 
Table 6.5 presents the first set of results for the 'typical recipients' as defined earlier. 
For example, a male with the characteristics described earlier and entering into DSP at 
age 16, would be expected to stay on the program for 33 years. For a female entering 
at the same age, the expected duration would be 34 years if the female Age Pension 
age is 60, and 3 7 years if the female Age Pension age is 65. The expected duration 
decreases with entry age because this is the expected duration before the Age Pension 
age. 
Table 6.5: Expected duration of 'typical recipients' and the ratio of expected 
duration to the time between entry age and retirement 
Expected duration Ratio of expected duration 
Entry (years) to time before retirement 
age Male Female Male Female 
a b a b 
16 32.7 34.0 36.9 0.67 0.77 0.75 
21 20.2 23.5 25.2 0.46 0.60 0.57 
31 17.3 19.0 21.0 0.51 0.66 0.62 
41 15.0 14.5 17.2 0.63 0.76 0.72 
51 11.0 8.0 11.9 0.79 0.89 0.85 
56 7.9 3.8 8.2 0.87 0.96 0.91 
60 4.6 4.7 0.92 0.95 
a, Female Age Pension age is assumed 60. 
b, Female Age Pension age is assumed 65. 
Table 6.5 also presents the ratio of the expected duration to the time between DSP 
entry age and the Age Pension age for typical recipients. For example, a male 'typical 
recipient' with the characteristics described earlier who enters DSP at 16 years of age 
would be expected to spend 67 percent of his time from DSP entry to the Age Pension 
age on DSP. Overall, regardless of Age Pension age (60 or 65) and DSP entry age, 
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female recipients would spend a larger proportion of their time on DSP than did male 
recipients. Also this ratio increases with entry age for recipients who enter after 20 
years of age. 
Note that these typical recipients are assumed to come from unemployment benefit. 
From the results in the previous chapter, those who transferred from unemployment 
benefit had the lowest hazard rate. Therefore for recipients coming from outside the 
income support system and other income support payments, the expected duration 
would be shorter than those who transferred from unemployment benefit (see Table 
6.7). 
Table 6.6 presents the second set of results for the 'mean recipient by entry age and 
gender'. From Table 6.6, the average expected duration of a cohort is 9-10 years. If 
the female Age Pension age were still at 60, on average males and females would 
have roughly similar expected completed durations (8.8 and 9 .5 years, respectively). 
If the Age Pension age for females were 65 (the same as males'), females' expected 
completed duration would be about 3 years longer than males. This is because, other 
things being equal, fem ales have a lower hazard rate than males as shown in the 
previous chapter. In addition, the younger the entry age, the bigger the difference of 
the expected duration between males and females. For the older entry ages, the impact 
of the Age Pension age, which provides an institutionalized leaving date, becomes 
significant. Also note that the impact of the female Age Pension age on female 
expected duration is smaller for the younger entry age groups than for the older ones. 
Again, for the younger age, the impact of the Age Pension age is negligible. 
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Table 6.6: Expected duration of 'mean recipients by entry age and gender' 
Entry age 
16-20 
21-30 
Male 
21.6 
12.3 
Expected duration (years) 
Female 
a 
26.1 
15.8 
b 
27.7 
16.7 
a 
23.5 
13.5 
31-40 11.4 13.3 14.6 12.2 
41-50 10.2 9.9 12.2 10.0 
51-55 8.4 5.9 9.3 7.3 
56+ 4.3 2.1 6.3 3.8 
. · ~·A:ve~e~:* : .. · d)~r~::;. f.;;c)F;tF:~'t;!&tJt{rv.:fa0~r;\·};f[lQJJL -;\': ... · ''i;r/9:~0 
* Weighted average of male and female durations. 
**Weighted average over age groups. 
a, Female Age Pension age is assumed 60; 
b, Female Age Pension age is assumed 65. 
Total* 
b 
24.1 
13.8 
12.7 
11.1 
8.8 
4.8 
·. .~ 
.. •··· ...... lf>:rQ:-.• 
From the results in the previous chapter, the hazard rate for the age groups, 21-30, 31-
40 and 41-55, is similar. If there is no the Age Pension, we would expect these three 
age groups to have a similar expected duration. However, due to the exogenous Age 
Pension age, the older the entry age, the closer to the Age Pension age and the shorter 
the expected duration on DSP before retirement. Therefore, although the difference in 
the mean values of other variables (see Table 6.A4 in Appendix 6A) among these 
three age groups may contribute to the difference in the estimated expected duration, 
the main effect should come from the Age Pension age. 
For comparison, Table 6.7 presents the interrupted duration estimation as on 2 July 
1999 using the FaCS one percent sample LDS data13 . As noted earlier, these are 
durations of interrupted spells. The duration of interrupted spells underestimates the 
duration of completed spells. As noted earlier, since steady state conditions do not 
hold here, the completed durations do not equal twice the duration of interrupted 
spells and the effect of the Age Pension is a further confounding influence. 
13 Table 6.A8 in Appendix 6A presents these estimations at three other points of time. They are similar. 
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Table 6.7: Duration of interrupted spells as on 2 July 1999 
Age groups 
16-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-55 
Average duration of interrupted spells (years) 
Male Female Total 
12.72 12.69 12.71 
9.14 10.40 9.58 
8.18 
7.47 
5.29 
7.65 
5.32 
3.94 
7.99 
6.61 
56+ - 3.22 2.04 
4.8 
2.97 
_ Ay~g~::::: · ::{:J;:, .·/ )~~9~01!":Ji~tp{.i,' ... :· )646(>; i 6-·82·· - :. '\ ~-' ': ·.;. ;:, . 
. ..; .. · .... :-.c._: . 
We learnt from the previous chapter that the hazard rate is statistically significantly 
different between recipient sources. Those who transferred from unemployment 
benefit had the lowest hazard rate and those who came from outside the income 
support system had the highest hazard .rate. Those who transferred from other income 
support payments fell between. Therefore, it is worth comparing the expected 
duration by recipient sources. 
Table 6.8 presents these estimates. It is clear that recipients who transferred from 
unemployment benefit had a longer expected completed duration than those from 
either outside the income support system or other income support payments. The 
difference of the expected durations between those who transferred from other income 
support payments and those who came from outside the income support system seems 
not to be significant. The previous chapter discussed why recipients from different 
sources might have different hazard rates. Those reasons equally apply here to explain 
why recipients from different sources had different expected durations, as the 
expected duration is determined by the hazard rate. 
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Table 6~8: Expected duration of 'mean recipients by entry age, gender and 
recipient source' 
(a). Recipients from outside the income support system (year) 
Age 
groups 
Male 
16-20 18.9 
21-30 9.4 
31-40 7.5 
41-50 7.9 
51-55 7.4 
56+ 3.9 
·-. '·· ,_. ., ,,.. 
_ A:v_eragiif ,l1(~/}t 
Female 
a 
24.3 
11.0 
12.3 
8.6 
5.5 
1.8 
b 
25.7 
11.3 
13.3 
10.3 
8.6 
5.8 
a 
21.1 
10.0 
8.9 
8.1 
6.6 
3.5 
Total* 
(b ). Recipients who transferred from unemployment benefit 
b 
21.7 
10.1 
9.2 
8.8 
7.9 
4.3 
-,•.•:· ~i~:-l ;;i. __ • 
16-20 27.7 30.7 33.3 28.9 29.9 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-55 
15.6 
13.6 
11.8 
9.0 
18.0 
14.9 
10.8 
6.1 
19.2 
16.6 
13.5 
9.9 
56+ 5.1 2.3 6.7 
16.3 
14.0 
11.4 
8.0 
4.5 
-~ ~~~tij-~~-~~¼~~JD~~f fj1~:~~-{i]],\?J:';::;~-,:~:}~~i l11:inJ&l~lJ.~~·;k'~,,-~:- .:-.,::'");': D>D:d'::.di/i:,,,f:,:;{lc:~;~ i!;~ifl:J}i(t'i2£''.jjg{{i, 
16.7 
14.6 
12.5 
9.3 
5.4 
( c ). Recipients who transferred from other income support payments 
16-20 22.6 23.7 25.2 23.1 23.6 
21-30 11.4 15.2 16.0 13.0 13.3 
31-40 9.9 12.1 13.2 11.3 11.9 
41-50 9.3 9.4 11.5 9.4 10.6 
51-55 8.2 5.9 9.2 6.8 8.8 
56+ 4.4 2.2 6.4 3.2 5.4 
A y~~i~]1-:. :~:t~;-J-,i i~l-~r~: >II}rj;·•:-:::tt,rlsri {t{ll[!l!1}:i.); _;·~•:t;;f i1~ti;t. . •.;::;::::t·•·j]i;,~)~lft~:s•·;'·~~;:·}~~l I~l!?-~!~t. 
*Weighted average over male and female durations. 
** Weighted agerage over age groups. 
a, Female Age Pension age is assumed 60; 
b, Female Age Pension age is assumed 65. 
6.5. Distribution of benefit-years by entry age 
Given the level of benefit, current costs of the DSP program are mainly determined by 
the existing number of DSP recipients. However, projection of future costs of the 
program requires estimation of expected completed duration of recipients as noted 
earlier. Another interesting and policy relevant issue is the comparative costs of 
179 
individual recipients in the same entry cohort but with different characteristics, such 
as entry age and gender. To compare these costs, we need to know the expected 
completed durations of different recipients. 
Because recipients with different entry ages have different expected durations, their 
individual contributions to the cost of the program differ. One simple way to assess 
the contribution to the costs of recipients by different entry ages is to look at the 
benefit-years of each group rather than estimating the direct cost in terms of money. 
Benefit-years for any entry age group is simply the product of the number of 
recipients in that group and their estimated expected duration. 
Figure 6.2 presents the distributions of expected benefit-years and the distribution of 
recipients by entry age for the whole recipient sample used in Chapter 5 model 
estimation. Here a female retirement age of 60 is assumed in the calculations. (For the 
comparison by gender, see Appendix 6B.) 
Figure 6.2: Comparison of distributions of recipients and benefit-years 
by entry age 
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The largest proportion of recipients was the 56 years and over age group, but their 
contribution to the costs of the DSP program was the second lowest because they had 
the shortest expected duration on DSP. In contrast, the 16-20 years old age group 
represented the smallest proportion of recipients, but their contribution to program 
costs was the third largest because they had the longest expected duration. Except for 
recipients whose entry age was over 50, for all the other entry age groups, their 
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contributions to the costs of the program were greater than their representation in the 
entry cohort of DSP recipients. 
6.6. Conclusion 
By predicting the survival rate beyond the observable period, this chapter estimated 
the expected completed duration prior to retirement of DSP recipients. The average 
expected completed duration was 9-10 years for an entry cohort, but it varied with 
gender, entry age and recipient source. Female recipients had a longer expected 
duration (9 .5 years if female retirement age was 60 and 12 years if female retirement 
age was 65) than their male counterparts (8.8 years). Recipients who transferred from 
unemployment had the longest expected completed duration (10.8-11.8 years 
depending on female retirement age), while recipients who came from outside the 
income support system had the shortest expected completed duration (7.6-8.3 years). 
Recipients who transferred from other income support payments had an average 
expected completed duration of 8.2-9.7 years. 
The younger the entry age of the new DSP recipients, the longer was the expected 
completed duration. Not all recipients stayed on the program until retirement (i.e. 
until reaching the Age Pension age). In terms of the proportion of time spent on DSP 
before reaching retirement, for new recipients who entered after 20 years of age, the 
older the entry age, the larger the time proportion, but for those who entered at an age 
younger than 20, this proportion was larger than for those who entered between 21 
and 30 years of age. The fact that on average new recipients only spend part of their 
pre-retirement time on DSP gives rise to a question: why do not all new DSP 
recipients stay on the DSP until retirement age and then transfer across to the Age 
Pension? Presumably a DSP recipient would stay on DSP benefit until the Age 
Pension age unless they died or recovered before that time. So death and recovery can 
be the reasons why not all DSP recipients stay on the program until retirement. But, 
the more import#Aeason that recipients leave may be the means test nature of this 
benefit. Even if an individual does not recover, the benefit can still be cancelled for 
various reasons as will be shown in Chapter 7. 
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Entry age and gender are not the only characteristics that affect expected completed 
duration. Other important factors that might well be expected to determine this 
duration are the diagnosis and the seriousness of a recipient's disability. However, at 
present the data are not available to distinguish expected duration differences among 
different diagnoses. We should also expect that death exit and cancellation exit would 
follow different processes and are determined by different factors. If adequate 
termination reason data are available, it should be possible to model death termination 
and cancellation termination separately. This should allow an estimation of the 
proportion of recipients in a cohort who will ultimately exit from the program due to 
death and the proportion due to cancellation and retirement. 
Differences in expected completed duration for recipients with different 
characteristics, especially entry age, suggest that a change in the composition of new 
recipients may change the expected completed duration of the cohort and therefore 
have an impact on the number of recipients. For instance, if the proportion of younger 
recipients increases in new recipients, the number of recipients will increase over time 
even the total number of the new recipients remains the same. 
A final caveat is that the expected completed duration estimated here may 
underestimate the total length of stay of a recipient because only the expected 
completed duration of the first spells of DSP recipients was estimated in this chapter 
but some recipients had multiple spells on the DSP program. 
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Appendix 6A 
Table 6.Al: Duration distribution of the 1995 entry cohort, the whole cohort 
(a). Overall(%) 
Duration 
<=l year 
l<and<=2 
2<and<=3 
3<and<=4 
Total 
7.53 
6.80 
4.78 
6.95 
> 4 years 73.95 
-, ,.... . ... ., - . ~ -· , . , ... ·,, ... 
' : '. ;'' ': ' ;,, '; ;_ .· ' . <::, .. > l 6-JY}PO .· .· 
(b). By recipient source(%) 
<=l year 
l<and<=2 
2<and<=3 
3<and<=4 
Outside of 
income support 
8.48 
10.00 
5.15 
6.06 
Male 
9.11 
7.81 
4.99 
8.46 
69.63 
_1;~~f0:0·• 
From 
unemployment 
5.67 
2.13 
3.55 
7.09 
Female 
4.35 
4.78 
4.35 
3.91 
82.61 
1,00 I:'\(\ : . . 
. -I ~---.· U. ~ --~ :· ~:- _. 
From other 
income supports 
7.27 
5.00 
5.00 
8.18 
> 4 years 70.30 81.56 74.55 
Table 6.A2: Duration distribution of the 1995 entry cohort by entry age 
Duration 16-20 
<=l year 0.00 
1 <and<=2 3 .23 
2<and<=3 0.00 
3<and<=4 3 .23 
21-30 
2.00 
4.00 
4.00 
2.00 
31-40 
4.17 
2.08 
1.04 
5.21 
41-50 
9.15 
1.22 
5.49 
3.66 
51-55 56 & over 
3.51 11.86 
6.14 13.98 
3.51 7.20 
2.63 13.56 
> 4 years 93.55 88.00 87.50 80.49 84.21 53.39 
.. .. ' ,, r:: ',·: ioo}eo: .... •:1:0Qi00 ,1'.0ti;eo ... f00:oo<' 'l£0(lj)(): ':;~::fli€i):: _: 
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Table 6.A3: Mean entry age and maximum period of DSP recipiency 
before retirement 
Age groups Mean entry age Retirement at 65 Retirement at 60 
(a). The entire sample 
16-20 Female 17.21 1242.54 1112.54 
Male 17.01 1247.74 
21-30 Female 26.38 1004.12 874.12 
Male 25.72 1021.28 
31-40 Female 35.95 755.3 625.3 
Male 35.82 758.68 
41-50 Female 45.94 495.56 365.56 
Male 45.82 498.68 
51-55 Female 53.16 307.84 177.84 
Male 53.22 306.28 
56+ Female 57.82 186.68 56.68 
Male 59.99 130.26 
(b ). Recipients from outside the income support system 
16-20 Female 16.73 1255.02 1125.02 
Male 16.46 1262.04 
21-30 Female 25.7 1021.8 891.8 
Male 26.33 1005.42 
31-40 Female 35.04 778.96 648.96 
Male 35.82 758.68 
41-50 Female 46.14 490.36 360.36 
Male 46.02 493.48 
51-55 Female 53.36 302.64 172.64 
Male 53.08 309.92 
56+ Female 58.08 179.92 49.92 
Male 60.41 119.34 
(Continue) 
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Table 6.A3: Mean entry age and maximum period ofDSP recipiency 
before retirement ( continued) 
Age groups Mean entry age Retirement at 65 Retirement at 60 
( c) Recipients from unemployment benefit 
16-20 Female 18.08 1219.92 1089.92 
Male 17.85 1225.9 
21-30 Female 26.45 1002.3 872.3 
Male 25.53 1026.22 
31-40 Female 36.16 749.84 619.84 
Male 35.71 761.54 
41-50 Female 45.73 501.02 371.02 
Male 45.67 502.58 
51-55 Female 53.21 306.54 176.54 
Male 53.35 302.9 
56+ Female 57.61 192.14 62.14 
Male 59.36 146.64 
( d). Recipients from other income support payments 
16-20 Female 19.2 1190.8 1060.8 
Male 19.25 1189 .5 
21-30 Female 26.72 995.28 865.28 
Male 25.74 1020.76 
31-40 Female 36.02 753.48 623.48 
Male 36.09 751.66 
41-50 Female 46.06 492.44 362.44 
Male 45.93 495.82 
51-55 Female 52.96 313.04 183.04 
Male 53.1 309.4 
56+ Female 57.69 190.06 60.06 
Male 59.92 132.08 
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Table 6.A4: Mean values of other variables used in calculating the expected 
Duration, the whole sample 
Age 16-20 Age 20-30 Age 31-40 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Number of persons 98 143 102 204 209 292 
Mean age at entry 17.21 17.01 26.38 25 .72 35 .95 35.82 
Marrage status ( single= 1) (%) 94.9 99.3 78.43 84.8 62.68 61.99 
Country of birth (Non-Australia=!)(%) 7.14 11.89 12.75 17.16 22.01 19.18 
Average number of children 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.24 0.84 0.73 
Average age of the youngest child 0 0.09 0.17 0.23 3.17 1.5 
Homeownership( non-owner= 1) (%) 100 100 94.12 95.1 78.95 81.16 
Free rent(%) 30.61 40.56 11.76 10.78 6.22 5.48 
• Government rent (%) 5.1 1.4 7.84 8.33 17.7 12.33 
Private rent (%) 11.22 7.69 43.14 40.2 43.54 42.47 
Earned income>0 (%) 18.37 25.17 15.69 16.18 15.31 18.84 
Average earned income($) 12.22 19.99 33.98 23.8 14.22 25.43 
Unearned income>0 (%) 8.16 2.8 13.73 10.78 18.18 15.07 
Average unearned income ($) 2.62 0.63 4.95 8.97 23.36 12.79 
NT(=l) (%) 0 2.1 1.96 0.49 1.44 0.68 
QLD(=l) (%) 20.41 20.98 14.71 24.51 19.62 24.32 
SA(=l) (%) 10.2 11.89 16.67 7.84 7.18 7.53 
TAS(=l) (%) 2.04 2.1 2.94 3.92 4.31 4.45 
VIC(=l) (%) 27.55 19.58 31.37 25 29.67 21.92 
WA(=l) (%) 8.16 7.69 1.96 8.33 7.66 7.19 
Cohort 96 (=1) (%) 13.27 16.08 15.69 20.59 18.66 21.92 
Cohort 97 (=l) (%) 19.39 26.57 17.65 19.12 15.79 18.49 
Cohort 98 (=1) (%) 20.41 20.28 28.43 19.61 20.57 16.44 
Cohort 99 (=l) (%) 28.57 25 .17 15.69 20.1 23.44 19.52 
From outside income support system(%) 68.37 66.43 19.61 17.65 12.44 22.26 
Transition from Unem(%) 26.53 27.97 51.96 61.76 38.76 55 .82 
Transition from other Eayments ~% 2 5.1 5.59 28.43 20.59 48 .8 21.92 
(Continue) 
186 
Table 6.A4: Mean values of other variables used in calculating the expected 
Duration, the whole sample ( continued) 
Age 41-50 Age 51-55 Age 56 & over 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Number of persons 368 449 267 361 304 861 
Mean age at entry 45.94 45.82 53.16 53.22 57.82 59.99 
Marrage status (single=l) (%) 67.12 54.34 55.81 39.61 45.72 26.13 
Country of birth (Non-Australia=l) (%) 29.35 27.62 37.08 38.23 39.47 39.37 
Average number of children 0.26 0.56 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.07 
Average age of the youngest child 2.38 2.47 0.88 1.34 0.44 0.54 
Homeownership( non-owner= 1) (%) 57.34 62.36 34.83 45.43 33.22 28.11 
Free rent(%) 4.08 3.12 3.37 3.88 5.59 3.02 
Government rent (%) 14.4 8.91 9.74 6.65 7.57 4.18 
Private rent (%) 28.26 31.4 13.86 22.44 11.51 13.36 
Earned income>0 (%) 10.6 12.25 8.24 9.7 7.89 7.2 
Average earned income($) 16.53 18.33 9.61 14.16 13.41 9.4 
Unearned income>0 (%) 30.43 22.05 49.06 37.95 63.49 67.02 
Average unearned income ($) 24.97 20.37 35.39 39.32 67.8 68.28 
NT(=l) (%) 0 0.45 0.75 0.83 0.66 0.58 
QLD(=l) (%) 17.12 23.16 19.48 18.56 16.45 17.42 
SA(=l) (%) 7.07 8.46 8.24 8.59 9.87 10.69 
TAS(=l) (%) 4.62 4.9 3 2.22 3.62 1.97 
VIC(=l) (%) 26.63 20.04 21.35 25.76 22.7 24.85 
WA(=l) (%) 10.33 7.57 10.49 8.03 11.18 8.71 
Cohort 96 (=l) (%) 17.39 17.82 17.23 20.78 19.08 21.72 
Cohort 97 (=1) (%) 19.02 18.04 20.97 20.78 22.37 18.23 
Cohort 98 (=l) (%) 20.92 18.49 22.85 18.28 21.38 16.96 
Cohort 99 (=1) (%) 22.28 21.38 18.35 21.33 25 19.28 
From outside income support system (%) 21.2 28 .73 27.72 31.86 38.49 53.66 
Transition from Unem(%) 41.58 51.67 34.08 50.69 25 .33 34.61 
Transition from other Eayments {%) 37.23 19.6 38.2 17.45 36.18 11.73 
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Table 6.AS: Mean values of other variables used in calculating the expected 
Duration, recipients from outside the income support system 
Age 16-20 Age 20-30 Age 31-40 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Number of persons 67 95 20 36 26 65 
Mean age at entry 16.73 16.46 25.7 26.33 35.04 35.82 
Marrage status ( single= 1) (%) 95.52 100 65 69.44 50 49.23 
Country of birth (Non-Australia=!)(%) 8.96 10.53 5 25 30.77 16.92 
Average number of children 0 0 0.3 0.5 0.38 0.89 
Average age of the youngest child 0 0 0.45 0.47 1.81 2.43 
Homeownership( non-owner= 1) (%) 100 100 85 91.67 69.23 69.23 
Free rent(%) 38.81 50.53 15 19.44 7.69 3.08 
Government rent (%) 4.48 0 0 8.33 3.85 7.69 
Private rent(%) 5.97 1.05 35 33.33 42.31 40 
Earned income>0 (%) 20.9 27.37 20 16.67 11.54 27.69 
Average earned income($) 10.6 20.15 70.49 40.7 3.44 59.94 
Unearned income>0 (%) 11.94 3.16 25 19.44 46.15 27.69 
Average unearned income ($) 3.74 0.78 12.39 18.91 99.14 29.74 
NT(=l) (%) 0 1.05 0 0 0 1.54 
QLD(=l) (%) 20.9 23.16 30 30.56 15.38 29.23 
SA(=l) (%) 11.94 7.37 15 5.56 0 6.15 
TAS(=l) (%) 1.49 2.11 0 2.76 7.69 6.15 
VIC(=l) (%) 28.36 22.11 30 27.58 73.08 21.54 
WA(=l) (%) 8.96 6.32 5 8.33 3.85 6.15 
Cohort 96 (=1) (%) 16.42 18.95 5 13.89 19.23 23 .08 
Cohort 97 (=1) (%) 19.4 25.26 10 11.11 7.69 13.85 
Cohort 98 (=1) (%) 20.9 21.05 25 5.56 7.69 7.69 
Cohort 99 {=1} {%} 2.88 25.26 10 8.33 7.69 6.15 
(Continue) 
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Table 6.AS: Mean values of other variables used in calculating the expected 
Duration, recipients from outside the income support system ( continued) 
Age 41-50 Age 51-55 Age 56 & over 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Number of persons 78 129 74 115 117 462 
Mean age at entry 46.14 46.02 53.36 53.08 58.08 60 .4 1 
Marrage status ( single= 1) (%) 46.15 37.98 27.03 22.61 25.64 18.4 
Country ofbirth (Non-Australia=!)(%) 24.36 25 :58 35.14 34.78 42.74 38 .74 
Average number of children 0.1 0.65 0.03 0.32 0.01 0.05 
Average age of the youngest child 0.97 3.15 0.31 1.85 0.11 0.43 
Homeownership (non-owner=l) (%) 51.28 51.16 28.38 36.52 15.38 24.89 
Free rent(%) 2.56 2.33 2.7 2.61 0.85 3.46 
Government rent (%) 7.69 6.2 2.7 3.48 1.71 2.6 
Private rent (%) 25.64 22.48 17.57 18.26 5.13 7.79 
Earned income>0 (%) 11.54 17.83 9.46 8.7 10.26 8.44 
Average earned income($) 26.42 33.45 7.1 15.67 18.23 13.14 
Unearned income>0 (%) 48.72 37.98 68 .92 56.52 77.78 77.71 
Average unearned income ($) 55.03 53.51 72.5 92.03 109.63 97.03 
NT(=l) (%) 0 0.78 0 1.74 0 0.43 
QLD(=l) (%) 28.21 20.16 14.86 16.52 11.97 16.02 
SA(=l) (%) 10.26 13.18 10.81 7.83 11.11 10.82 
TAS(=l) (%) 5.13 7.75 4.05 1.74 3.42 2.6 
VIC(=l) (%) 19.23 21.71 27.03 27.83 23.08 24.24 
WA(=l) (%) 8.97 7.75 5.41 6.96 11.11 8.66 
Cohort 96 (=1) (%) 14.1 21.71 14.86 18.26 23.93 22.29 
Cohort 97 (=1) (%) 12.82 16.28 17.57 20 19.66 16.45 
Cohort 98 (=l) (%) 14.1 11.63 21.62 24.35 24.79 15 .58 
Cohort 99 ~=12 ~%2 17.95 13.95 17.57 15.65 17.09 16.88 
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Table 6.A6: Mean values of other variables used in calculating the expected 
Duration, recipients from unemployment benefit 
Age 16-20 Age 20-30 Age 31-40 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Number of persons 26 40 53 126 81 163 
Mean age at entry 18.08 17.85 26.45 25.53 36.16 35.71 
Marrage status ( single= 1) (%) 96.15 97.5 88.68 89.68 79.01 66.87 
Country of birth (Non-Australia=l) (%) 3.85 12.5 9.43 17.46 20.99 18.4 
Average number of children 0 0.025 0.019 0.2 0.36 0.65 
Average age of the youngest child 0 0.33 0.02 0.21 1.74 1.32 
Homeownership (non-9wner=l) (%) 100 100 100 96.03 88.89 85.89 
Free rent(%) 15.38 20 15.09 7.94 6.17 5.52 
Government rent (%) 3.85 2.5 9.43 9.52 14.81 12.88 
Private rent (%) 15.38 25 41.51 41.27 50.62 44.17 
Earned income>O (%) 7.69 20 15.09 15.87 14.81 16.56 
Average earned income($) 13.15 14.37 34.54 24.19 8.56 13.22 
Unearned income>O (%) 0 2.5 9.43 8.73 11.11 11.66 
Average unearned income ($) 0.23 0.36 2.99 5.93 5.36 7.21 
NT(=l) (%) 0 2.5 3.77 0.79 2.47 0 
QLD(=l) (%) 15.38 17.5 13.21 20.63 17.28 25.15 
SA(=l) (%) 3.85 20 9.43 9.62 9.88 7.98 
TAS(=l) (%) 3.85 2.5 0 4.76 1.23 3.68 
VIC(=l) (%) 30.77 10 39.62 27.78 29.63 20.86 
WA(=l) (%) 3.85 12.5 1.89 7.14 8.64 7.36 
Cohort 96 (=1) (%) 3.85 5 13.21 15.87 12.35 13.5 
Cohort 97 (=1) (%) 19.23 35 18.87 23.81 20.99 22.7 
Cohort 98 (=1) (%) 19.23 22 39.62 27.78 32.1 23.93 
Cohort 99 {=12 {%2 46.15 30 22.64 29.37 30.86 30.06 
(Continue) 
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Table 6.A6: Mean values of other variables used in calculating the expected 
Duration, recipients from unemployment benefit ( continued) 
Age 41-50 Age 51-55 Age 56 & over 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Number of persons 153 232 91 183 77 298 
Mean age at entry 45.73 45.67 53 .21 53.35 57.61 59.36 
Marrage status ( single= 1) (%) 81.7 62.5 79.12 49.18 72.73 34.9 
Country of birth (Non-Australia=!)(%) 27.45 28.45 36.26 37.16 40.26 37.25 
Average number of children 0.12 0.56 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.09 
Average age of the youngest child 1.16 2.23 0.13 1.11 0.22 0.77 
Homeownership (non-owner=l) (%) 63.4 69.4 42.86 51.91 46.75 30.54 
Free rent (%) 4.58 2.59 4.4 4.37 5.19 2.68 
Government rent (%) 17.65 11.64 16.48 8.74 18.18 5.37 
Private rent(%) 30.07 24.91 10.99 24.59 12.99 18.46 
Earned income>0 (%) 8.5 10.78 8.79 8.2 9.09 4.7 
Average earned income($) 10.57 13.1 13.78 12.88 17.01 5.73 
Unearned income>0 (%) 18.3 15.09 38.46 26.78 45.45 56.38 
Average unearned income ($) 13.04 7.05 21.56 9.81 36.55 37.01 
NT(=l) (%) 0 0.43 0 0.55 0 1.01 
QLD(=l) (%) 17.65 23.71 15.33 16.94 10.39 17.45 
SA(=l) (%) 5.23 7.33 9.89 10.93 15.58 10.07 
TAS(=l) (%) 5.23 4.31 2.2 2.19 5.19 1.01 
VIC(=l) (%) 30.72 20.26 19.78 25.14 20.78 25.5 
WA(=l) (%) 7.84 7.33 13 .19 7.1 14.29 9.06 
Cohort 96 (=1) (%) 13.07 13.36 12.09 16.39 12.99 18.46 
Cohort 97 (=1) (%) 20.92 19.83 19.78 24.59 19.48 23.15 
Cohort 98 (=1) (%) 28.1 25.43 30.77 19.13 25.97 20.13 
Cohort 99 ~=12 ~%2 31.37 30.17 21.98 28.42 33.77 24.83 
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Table 6.A 7: Mean values of other variables used in calculating the expected 
duration, recipients from other income support payments 
Age 16-20 Age 20-30 Age 31-40 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Number of persons 5 8 29 42 102 64 
Mean age at entry 19.2 19.25 26.72 25.74 36.02 36.09 
Marrage status ( single= 1) (%) 80 100 68.97 83.33 52.94 62.5 
Country of birth (Non-Australia=l) (%) 0 25 24.14 9.52 20.59 23.44 
Average number of children 0.2 0 0.62 0.14 1.33 0.76 
Average age of the youngest child 0 0 0.28 0.07 4.67 1.02 
Homeownership (non-owner=l) (%) 100 100 89.66 95.24 73.53 81.25 
Free rent(%) 0 25 3.45 11.9 5.88 7.81 
Government rent (%) 20 12.5 10.34 4.76 23.53 15.63 
Private rent(%) 60 0 51.72 42.86 38.24 40.63 
Earned income>O (%) 40 25 13.79 16.67 16.67 15.63 
Average earned income($) 28.99 46.28 7.78 8.16 21.45 21.5 
Unearned income>O (%) 0 0 13.79 9.52 16.67 10.94 
Average unearned income ($) 0 0.2 3.4 9.59 18.34 9.79 
NT(=l) (%) 0 12.5 0 0 0.98 1.56 
QLD(=l) (%) 40 12.5 6.9 30.95 22.55 17.19 
SA(=l) (%) 20 25 31.03 4.76 6.86 7.81 
TAS(=l) (%) 0 0 10.34 2.38 5.89 4.69 
VIC(=l) (%) 0 37.5 17.24 14.29 18.63 25 
WA(=l) (%) 20 0 0 11.9 7.84 7.81 
Cohort 96 (=1) (%) 20 37.5 27.59 40.48 23.53 42.19 
Cohort 97 (=1) (%) 20 0 20.69 11.9 13.73 12.5 
Cohort 98 (=1) (%) 20 0 10.34 7.14 14.71 6.25 
Cohort 99 ~=l) ~%) 0 0 6.9 2.38 21.57 6.25 
(Continue) 
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Table 6.A 7: Mean values of other variables used in calculating the expected 
Duration, recipients from other income support payments ( continued) 
Age 41-50 Age 51-55 Age 56 & over 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Number of persons 137 88 102 63 I 10 101 
Mean age at entry 46.06 45 .93 52.96 53.1 57.69 59.92 
Manage status ( single= I) (%) 62.77 56.82 55.88 42.86 48.18 35.64 
Country of birth (Non-Australia=!)(%) 34.31 28.41 39.22 47.62 35.45 48.51 
Average number of children 0.51 0.43 0.14 0.3 0.09 0.07 
Average age of the youngest child 4.55 2.1 1.97 I.OS 0.95 0.41 
Homeownership (non-owner=l) (%) 54.01 60.23 32.35 42.86 42.73 35.64 
Free rent(%) 4.38 5.68 2.94 4.76 10.91 1.98 
Government rent (%) 14.6 5.68 8.82 6.35 6.36 7.92 
Private rent (%) 27.74 35.23 13.73 23.81 17.27 23.76 
Earned income>0 (%) 12.41 7.95 6.86 15.87 4.55 8.91 
Average earned income($) 17.55 9.98 7.71 15.09 5.76 3.16 
Unearned income>0 (%) 33.58 17.05 44.12 36.51 60.91 49.5 
Average unearned income ($) 21.19 6.91 20.81 28.8 45.18 29.03 
NT(=l) (%) 0 0 1.96 0 1.82 0 
QLD(=l) (%) 10.22 26.14 26.47 26.98 25.45 23.76 
SA(=l) (%) 7.3 4.55 4.9 3.17 4.55 11.88 
TAS(=l) (%) 3.65 2.27 2.94 3.17 2.73 1.98 
VIC(=l) (%) 26.28 17.05 18.63 23.81 23.64 25.74 
WA(=l) (%) 13.87 7.95 11.76 12.7 9.09 7.92 
Cohort 96 (=I)(%) 24.09 23.86 23.53 38.1 18.18 28.71 
Cohort 97 (=1) (%) 20.44 15.91 24.51 11.11 27.27 11.88 
Cohort 98 (=I)(%) 16.79 10.23 16.67 4.76 14.55 13.86 
Cohort 99 {=12 {%2 14.6 9.09 15.69 11.11 27.27 13.86 
193 
Table 6.A8: Duration of interrupted spells (years) 
On 5 July 1996 
16-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-55 
56+ 
Male 
12.45 
8.92 
7.69 
7.41 
5.07 
2.90 
•':;.: ,·.: _ .Ji:vierage •- : _- ·6'45> .. , • ~ ::1 
, ··~·-· : . .. ,. 
On 4 July 1997 
16-20 12.66 
21-30 8.90 
31-40 7.94 
41-50 7.35 
51-55 5.05 
56+ 3.01 
On 3 July 1998 
16-20 12.39 
21-30 8.88 
31-40 7.93 
41-50 7.58 
51-55 5.20 
Female 
12.38 
10.81 
7.55 
5.11 
3.08 
1.69 
',6;:74 ··:, 
= ,, . 
12.80 
10.78 
7.82 
5.15 
3.33 
1.67 
12.73 
10.31 
8.10 
5.16 
3.72 
Total 
12.42 
9.59 
7.64 
6.58 
4.46 
2.75 
6-i54 
12.72 
9.54 
7.9 
6.53 
4.48 
2.81 
.,, > :·Y ·~ .•. ~---✓~-. 
6 i::A 
· ·V":t 
, ...... ,. -·,,_·,;,: 
12.54 
9.38 
7.99 
6.62 
4.67 
56+ 3.11 1.87 2.86 
¥,., ~ 
.; -. 
:'-~~,·;,r~-~" ~*etage'.>- .. ~: 2< ~--· .-,6;t$_S/ < ~:I;T}-l, '. -•- • ·\~~631?, ''. .. t···· ·6:-'½11! -~ 
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Appendix 6B 
Figure 6.Al: Comparison of distributions of recipients and benefit-years 
by entry age, female 
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Figure 6.A2: Comparison of distributions of recipients and benefit-years 
by en try age, male 
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56+ 
Chapter 7 
DSP Exits-Where Do They Go? 
7.1. Introduction 
To fully understand the dynamics of DSP recipients, we need to know where they 
come from (Chapter 4), how long they stay on the program (Chapter 5 and 6), where 
they go if they leave, i.e. their exit destinations, and what individual characteristics 
determine their exit destinations. The best way to answer questions about the 
determination of exit destinations would be to follow an entry cohort and know the 
exit destinations of all recipients in this cohort. Unfortunately, such data is not 
available. From the data that is available, only the exit destinations for recipients who 
have left DSP during a specific time period are known. But, at least for those 
recipients who have left DSP, it is possible with these data to learn whether recipients 
who have exited to different destinations have different characteristics. This chapter 
addresses questions related to exit destinations. 
Once a disabled person is granted a DSP benefit, there are three main reasons for 
termination: transfer to the Age Pension (referred to as "retirement" later), death, and 
benefit cancellation. Benefit cancellation includes all those who leave not through 
retirement or death. Most terminations take place through retirement or moving on to 
the Age Pension. For example, of DSP recipients who exited in the financial year 
1998-99, 57 percent transferred to the Age Pension, 19 percent died and 24 percent 
were cancelled for various reasons (FaCS, 1999). The patterns of termination are 
similar over time ( see Figure 7 .1 ). 
One of the problems with the above division of exit destinations by the administrative 
authority is that we do not know whether those who left due to cancellation recovered 
and returned to work or were just cancelled because of the means test requirements of 
DSP benefits. This differentiation is important from a policy point of view. In 
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addition, returning to work is more likely to be based on individual choice, while 
means tested cancellations can be regarded as forced termination. 
Figure 7.1: Proportion of DSP recipients who left to different destinations, 
1980 to 1995 
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Source: DSS [1997]. Trends and characteristics of disability payments, Information paper. 
I 
This chapter uses three different FaCS data sets to focus on exit: to distinguish those 
who returned to work and to examine whether those who returned to work were 
different from those who left due to other reasons. The findings show that recipients 
who exited to different destinations possessed different characteristics. 
7.2. The data and the method to distinguish those who returned to 
work 
One data set at FaCS, which can be used to identify DSP recipients who returned to 
work, is available for the period 8 May 1998 to 25 February 2000. Among the coded 
termination reasons in this data set1, four reasons can be regarded as returning to 
work: EAN (cancelled due to earnings), FTW (return to work-notify by 14 days), 
RTW (return to work) and CLR (cancelled by clients request). While treating CLR as 
a return to work is based on the assumption that only those recipients who returned to 
work would like to withdraw from DSP voluntarily, for the other three cases, the 
reason is obvious. This data set contains no other information about recipients so it 
was matched with the FaCS one percent sample LDS data and another data set 
containing disability type information for DSP recipients who received DSP benefits 
1 See Table 7 .A 1 in Appendix 7 A for details of termination reason codes and definitions. 
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during the period 3 July 1998 to 10 September 1999. These three data sets enable four 
exit destinations - retirement, death, returning to work and other cancellation - to be 
combined with the characteristics of recipients who had exited to different 
destinations2• 
The termination reason data set and the disability type data set cover different time 
periods. To utilize the termination reason and disability information, a period covered 
by both data sets must be chosen. The period chosen was 3 July 1998 to 25 February 
2000. The reasons for choosing this period and a detailed descriptions on the 
derivation of the recipient sample are provided in Appendix 7 A. Roughly speaking, 
the sample included those recipients who exited DSP during the period 3 July 1998 to 
25 February. Over this period, 801 persons3 exited the DSP program with identifiable 
reasons and disability types. Of these just over 55 percent transferred to the Age 
Pension, 11 percent left due to death 4, 9 percent returned to work based on the 
definition above and 24 percent were cancelled for other reasons. The characteristics 
of these recipients will be discussed in the next section. 
7.3. Difference among recipients who exited to different destinations 
This section examines the characteristics of recipients who exited DSP to different 
destinations. Table 7 .1 presents descriptive statistics on the recipients by exit 
destinations. A subset of variables which appear to have different means across 
recipients who exited to different destinations is briefly discussed. Because those who 
2 Retirement is identified by combining the information in the FaCS one percent LDS data and the 
termination reason data, as discussed in Appendix 7 A. Death can be directly identified because there is 
a death code in the data. Except for disabilities and termination reasons, all other information is from 
the FaCS one percent LDS sample data. 
3 The units of analysis are persons rather than spells. If multi-spells occur, the exit destination is 
determined by the destination of the last spell. Multi-spells occur when there is more than 2 fortnights 
break in benefit recipiency. 
4 The sample data does not exactly replicate the aggregate published data. Termination due to death is 
lower than the published figures , while termination due to cancellation is higher. This difference may 
result from the sampling error involved in selecting the sample. 
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returned to work are the most interesting group of people, variables for other exit 
destination recipients are compared with this group. 
Table 7.1: Summary statistics of DSP recipients who left DSP by exit destination 
All Return Other 
Eersons Retirement work cancellation Death 
Number of persons 801 443 75 196 87 
Demographic characteristics 
Male 0.7054 0.7427 0.6533 0.6480 0.6897 
Entry age 50.34 56.46 34.90 43 .97 46.84 
(11.88) (6.34) (13.53) (12.25) ( 10.09) 
Male 51.76 57.44 35.35 44.86 48.§9 
(11.73) (5.80) (14.90) (12.53) (9.87) 
Female 46.96 53.65 34.05 42.33 42.96 
(11.56) (7.00) (10.70) (11.64) (9.66) 
Marriage status_couple 0.5518 0.6682 0.2800 0.4796 0.3563 
Australian born 0.6729 0.5779 0.7600 0.8112 0.7701 
Proportion having children 0.0899 0.0406 0.1467 0.1786 0.092 
Number of children 1.81 1.28 1.82 2.09 1.75 
(0.97) (0.67) (0.87) (1.07) (0.89) 
Age of the youngest child 9.33 11 .94 7.73 8.29 10.25 
(4.52) (3.54) ( 4.67) ( 4.46) (4.59) 
Home ownership and rent type 
Home owner 0.5069 0.6456 0.2800 0.3878 0.2644 
Government rent 0.0836 0.088 0.0533 0.0663 0.1264 
Private rent 0.211 0.1309 0.2667 0.3316 0.2989 
Free rent 0.0712 0.0609 0.1200 0.0663 0.092 
Other rental 0.6342 0.7201 0.5600 0.5357 0.4828 
Disability types 
Cancer/Tumor 0.0637 0.0316 0.0400 0.0918 0.1839 
Circulatory System 0.0924 0.1016 0.0133 0.0816 0.1379 
Intellectual/learning 0.0312 0.0023 0.1600 0.0459 0.0345 
Musculo skeletal 0.3021 0.3499 0.2533 0.2908 0.1264 
-
Nervous system 0.0237 0.0203 0.0533 0.0255 0.0115 
Psychological/psychiatric 0.1036 0.0339 0.2533 0.0179 0.1609 
Respiratory system 0.0499 0.0429 0.0533 0.0459 0.0920 
Others 0.0799 0.0587 0.1333 0.1173 0.0575 
Unknown 0.2534 0.3589 0.0400 0.1224 0.1954 
Financial variables 
Earned income>0 0.1199 0.0474 0.5467 0.1582 0.0345 
Average earned income** 179.51 94.86 186.43 233 .58 118.75 
(197.35) (99.24) (197.99) (234.07) (136.32) 
Unearned income>0 0.4806 0.6005 0.3200 0.3163 0.3793 
Average unearned income** 100.14 94.60 79.41 130.21 103.42 
(158.07) (134.85) (157.74) (214.26) (203.75) 
Whether multi spells ( spell> 1) 0.1149 0.0316 0.4133 0.2296 0.023 
Duration on DSP (years)*** 6.20 7.60 2.70 4.20 6.50 
(6.1) (6.1) (3.7) (5.8) (6.2) 
Note: * Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
** Average earned and unearned income per fortnight for those who had them. 
*** If a recipient has multi-spells, only the last spell was counted. 
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Males were a large proportion of recipients who exited for all destinations, but this 
proportion seemed to be larger among those who transferred to the Age Pension. 
Entry age refers to the age when a recipient was granted DSP. However when multi-
entries occurred, the age at last entry was used. As discussed earlier, when multi-
entries ( or spells) occurred, only the exit destination of the last spell was counted. 
Those who returned to work were the youngest at entry, with an average entry age of 
35, and those who transferred to the Age Pension were the oldest, with an average 
entry age of 56. The entry age of those who exited due to death and other 
cancellations was in between. 
To further explore the relationship between entry age and exit destinations, Table 7 .2 
presents the distribution of entry age by exit destinations. 
Table 7.2: Distribution of entry age by exit destination 
All Return Other 
Age persons Retirement work cancellation Death 
16-20 2.87 0.00 16.00 4.59 2.30 
21-30 6.62 0.23 24.00 14.29 6.90 
31-40 9.86 3.16 28.00 16.33 13.79 
41-50 19.10 11.74 16.00 29.59 35.63 
51-55 15.86 17.61 6.67 13.78 19.54 
56+ 45.69 67.27 9.33 21.43 21 .84 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Of those who returned to work 40 percent had entered into DSP at an age younger 
than 31 and only 16 percent had entered after 5 0 years of age. In contrast, among 
those who transferred to the Age Pension, 85 percent entered after 50 years of age and 
almost very few entered at an age younger than 31. For both groups of recipients who 
exited due to other cancellation and death, a larger proportion entered after 40 years 
of age, while this proportion was even larger among those who exited due to death. 
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A very large proportion of those who returned to work were single in contrast to those 
who transferred to the Age Pension. 
As for the disabilities of these recipients, Table 7.1 shows that there was a relatively 
larger proportion of psychological/psychiatric disability among those who returned to 
work. This is probably because this disability has a periodic nature. When the 
disability is not present, the recipients can go back to work. The proportion with 
intellectual/learning disability was also relatively large among those who returned to 
work. 
To further explore the relationship between disability and exit destination, Figure 7.2 
presents the distribution of exit destinations by disability types. The proportion 
returning to work was the highest for the intellectual/learning disability (55 percent), 
followed by psychological/psychiatric disability (28 percent) and nervous system 
disability (22 percent). Circulatory and unknown disabilities had the lowest 
proportion returning to work (both 1.6 percent). 
Figure 7 .2: Distribution of exit destinations by disability type 
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Disability types 
The variables discussed so far reflect the characteristics of the recipients when 
entering into DSP. Variables which may . affect the behavior of recipients when 
receiving DSP benefit can also be constructed, including: financial variables, whether 
an individual experienced multi-spells of DSP recipiency and the duration on DSP. 
These variables are also presented in Table 7 .1 . 
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For a recipient the financial variables take the average value over the observable 
period of DSP recipiency. If multi-spells occurred the average over the last DSP spell 
was taken. Among those who left DSP, a few earned income, specifically 12 percent 
and the average income level was $179 per fortnight. This level of earned income 
suggests very low hours of work, probably less than 15 hours per week. The standard 
deviation for earned income is in the parenthesis. It is clear that there was 
considerable variation in earned income among those who had it. 
For the proportion having earned income, there was considerable variation across the 
groups. Among those ·who returned to work, the proportion having earned income was 
very high ( over one half). It was very low among those who transferred to the Age 
Pension and those who exited due to death. When looking only at those who had 
earned income, those who exited due to other cancellations had earned the most, and 
those who transferred to the Age Pension earned the least. 
As might be expected, unearned income was more common than earned income. 
About 50 percent of these recipients received unearned income. On average the 
amount was $100 per fortnight. The proportion having unearned income among those 
who returned to work was similar to the proportion of those who exited due to other 
cancellations, but only about half of those who transferred to the Age Pension had 
unearned income. For those who had unearned income, the average unearned income 
was larger for the other cancellation recipients than for those who returned to work 
and transferred to the Age Pension. It is not possible from the data to distinguish 
unearned income sources for these recipients. Presumably, the higher proportion of 
those who transferred to the Age Pension having unearned income might arise 
because they were receiving a superannuation pension as a main source of unearned 
income. The highest amount of unearned income of those who exited due to other 
cancellations might be because they were receiving injury compensation. 
A multi-spell variable was constructed, indicating whether a recipient had reentered 
into the DSP program before the last observed spell from which their final exit 
destinations were observed. Reentry is defined as having more than two fortnights 
break of benefit recipiency. The number of spells of those with an exit experience 
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before the start of the data period ( 6 January 1995) cannot be identified. Therefore, 
this variable is not a perfect measure of multi-spells experience. 
Of all the recipients in the sample, about 13 percent had more than one spell. Among 
those who returned to work this proportion was very high ( 41 percent) and among 
those who transferred to the Age Pension and who exited due to death it was very low 
(3 and 2 percent, respectively). Table 7.3 presents a detailed distribution of the 
number of spells by exit destination for the 801 recipients5. 
Table 7.3: Distribution of the number of spells by exit destination of those who 
exited DSP between 3 July 1998 and 25 February 2000 
Number of All Return Other 
spells persons Retirement work cancellation Death 
1 88.51 96 .84 58.67 77.04 97.70 
2 7.74 2.48 22.67 16.84 1.15 
3 2.25 0.68 12.00 3.06 0.00 
4 to 7* 1.50 0.00 6.67 3.06 1.15 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
* 7 is the highest number of spells. 
The number of spells was related to entry age. Recipients with a young entry age 
tended to have multi-spells. Note that those who returned to work were also younger. 
For recipients who entered after 30 years of age, the older the entry age, the less likely 
they were to have multi-spells as implied in Table 7.46. 
As for the duration on DSP before exit, those who returned to work had a much 
shorter completed duration, with approximately 60 percent experiencing a duration of 
less than two years and 20 percent less than half a year. Note that this duration refers 
5When looking at all DSP recipients who ever appeared in the LDS data set between 6 January 1995 
and 16 June 2000, the whole period covered by the one percent LDS data, the proportion having more 
than one spell is lower than that for the recipient sample used in this chapter. See Table 7 .A3 in 
Appendix 7B. Note that the sample used here includes only those who exited DSP during the period 3 
July 1998 to 25 February 2000. 
6 The proportion having multi-spells between males and females is similar and not reported here. 
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to the last recipiency spell. As shown earlier, those who returned to work also had the 
highest proportion having more than one spell. Those who transferred to the Age 
Pension had the longest duration. Table 7 .A4 in Appendix 7B presents the duration 
distribution by exit destination of these recipients. 
Table 7.4: Distribution of the number of spells by entry age of those who exited 
DSP between 3 July 1998 and 25 February 2000 
Number of Age groups 
spells 16-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-55 56 & over 
1 65.22 60.38 77.22 90.85 93.70 93.72 
2 26.09 26.42 12.66 6.54 3.15 4.92 
3 8.70 11.32 1.27 1.31 1.57 1.37 
4 to 7* 0.00 1.89 8.86 1.31 1.57 0.00 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
* 7 is the highest number of spells. 
From these descriptions, it is apparent that recipients who exited to different 
destinations might be groups of people with different characteristics. Those who 
returned to work were more likely to be younger, single, non-home owners, with a 
psychologicaVpsychiatric or intellectuaVlearning disability, having earned income 
when receiving DSP and having multi-spells of benefit recipiency. In contrast, those 
who transferred to the Age Pension were more likely to be older when entering DSP, 
married, home owners, having no earned income but having unearned income and 
having only one spell of recipiency. Those who exited due to other cancellations lay 
in between. 
However, there is a problem with this descriptive companson. The effect of any 
observed difference in one aspect cannot be separated from the effect of the difference 
in others. For instance, a lower proportion of those who returned to work were 
married and had their own homes. But this relationship between low home ownership 
and returning to work might arise because this group was younger when they entered 
into DSP and it is age rather than home ownership that matters. To control for 
interrelationships among variables and to estimate the effect of different variables, an 
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econometric model is needed. Furthermore, an econometric approach allows a test 
whether the difference in the effect of one variable is statistically significant among 
recipients who exited to different destinations. This is the task of the next section. 
7.4. For those who leave, what determine their exit destinations? 
This . section employs the multinomial lo git (MLG) model to examine what individual 
characteristics and other factors were associated with a specific exit destination 
among those who left DSP. The MLG model was discussed in Appendix 4C of 
Chapter 4. 
Note, however, in the context of the recipient sample described in the previous 
section, by no means does this model estimation try to establish an unconditional 
causal relationship between explanatory variables and exit destinations. To establish 
an unconditional causal relationship would require a sample which contains a random 
entry cohort for whom all the exit destinations are known. But such data is not 
available as noted earlier. The sample used here includes only those who left DSP 
during a specific period of time. Therefore, it is probably better to regard this model 
estimation as a better way to summarize the data. In this sense the model estimation 
here is not a behavioral model. For these reasons, any interpretation of the estimation 
results should always be conditional on recipients who have left DSP. 
Table 7 .5 presents the estimation results by comparing those who returned to work, 
those who transferred to retirement and those who exited due to other cancellations. 
The included variables are those whose summary statistics are presented in Table 7 .1 
( except duration on DSP). The recipients who exited due to death were dropped in 
this estimation 7 . 
7 This is because death is not an exit destination of research interest. However, the estimation results 
for comparing death with other destinations are presented in Appendix 7B. 
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Table 7.5: MLG estimation results on exit destinations 
ln( p Work ) ln( pOther-cancellations ) ln( P work ) 
p Re tirement pRe tirement p Other - cancellations 
(1) (2) (3) 
Demographic variables 
Deviation of entry age from 16 0.2257* 0.2748** -0.0491 
Std.Err 0.1203 0.1094 0.0588 
Deviation of entry age -squared -0.0090*** -0.0089*** -0.00002 
Std.Err 0.0021 0.0018 0.0012 
Sex (male=l) 1.4760*** 1.1655*** 0.3105 
Std.Err 0.4665 0.3401 0.3615 
Marital status ( single= 1) 0.6594 -0.2410 0.9004** 
Std.Err 0.4946 0.3078 0.4403 
Country of birth (foreign=l) 0.3174 -0.5114* 0.8288** 
Std.Err 0.4707 0.3009 0.4176 
No. of children 0.1828 0.4325 -0.2497 
Std.Err 0.6160 0.5561 0.2885 
Age of youngest child 0.0577 0.0152 0.0425 
Std.Err 0.0952 0.0812 0.0610 
Home ownership and rental arrangements 
Home owner(non-homeowner= 1) 0.1523 0.4110 -0.2587 
Std.Err 0.6548 0.4514 0.5366 
Rent type (free rent=l) 0.0776 0.1442 -0.0666 
Std.Err 0.8774 0.6580 0.6634 
Rent type (Gov't rent=l) -0.7356 -0.8634 0.1277 
Std.Err 1 .OJ 39 0.6529 0.8635 
Rent type (private rent= 1) 0.0802 0.3555 -0.2753 
Std.Err 0.6568 0.5001 0.4776 
Financial variables 
Earned income>O 1.5879** -0.4892 2.0771 *** 
Std.Err 0.7621 0.6907 0.4667 
Amount of earned income 0.0055 0.0065* -0.0010 
Std.Err 0.0036 0.0035 0.0014 
Unearned income>O 0.4606 -0.4264 0.8870** 
Std.Err 0.5161 0.3320 0.4475 
Amount of unearned income -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002 
Std.Err 0.0019 0.0012 0.0016 
(Continue) 
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Table 7.5: MLG estimation results on exit destination (continued) 
ln( p work ) 
pretirement 
(1) 
Disability types 
Cancer/tumor (=l) 7.0586*** 
Std.Err 1.2524 
Circulatory(= 1) 3.2819** 
Std.Err 1.4631 
Intellectual and learning(=l) 6.0622* 
Std.Err 3.2971 
Musculo _skeletal(= 1) 5.3119*** 
Std.Err 0.9313 
Nervous system(=l) 6.3585*** 
Std.Err 1.3498 
Psychological/psychiatric(= 1) 6.0245*** 
Std.Err 1.0244 
Respiratory system(= 1) 6.7466*** 
Std.Err 1.1941 
Other disabilities (=l) 5.7528*** 
Std.Err 1.0426 
Whether multi -spells( spells>=2) 3.2424*** 
Std.Err 0.6217 
Constant -4.8348** 
Std.Err 1.9821 
Summary statistics of model specification 
Number of observations 714 
645.14 
48 
-306.76 
0.5160 
LR test 
Degrees of freedom 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R-squared 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent level; 
** Significant at 5 percent level ; 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
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ln( P other - cancellati ons ) In( p Work 
p Re tirement p Other-cancellati ons 
(2) (3) 
6.4993*** 0.5593 
0.8185 1.0305 
4.4696*** -1.1878 
0.69 71 1.3280 
5.2358 0.8264 
3.1880 0.9976 
4.5000*** 0.8119 
0.6098 0. 7665 
5.2915*** 1.0670 
1.0367 1.0244 
4.8560*** 1.1684 
0. 7414 0. 7785 
5.1549*** 1.5917 
0.8029 1.0087 
4.6998*** 1.0530 
0.7154 0.83 70 
2.3961 *** 0.8463** 
0.5531 0.3633 
-2.3843** -2.1505 
1. 7383 1.1358 
) 
The estimates in the first column in Table 7.5 compare recipients who returned to 
work and those who transferred to retirement. The second column compares those 
who exited due to other cancellations and those who transferred to retirement. 
Coefficient estimates for those who returned to work relative to those who exited due 
to other cancellations can be inferred from the estimates in column (1) and (2)8. Their 
corresponding standard errors are, however, not readily determined. Thus the third 
column also reports the results for those who returned to work compared with those 
who exited due to other cancellations. 
Due to the highly nonlinear nature of the MLG model, the interpretation of the 
coefficients is not straightforward, but the sign of the coefficient indicates the 
direction of change of the odds ratio, given a small change in the independent variable 
when all other variables are kept constant (see Appendix 4C in Chapter 4). A brief 
discussion of the significant variables follows. 
The deviation of entry age from 16 enters the model estimation rather than the entry 
age itself because 16 is the minimum eligible age for DSP. The square of this variable 
is included to capture a higher order impact. The deviation of entry age from 16 is 
significant in equation (2) and weakly significant in equation (1 ). The square of the 
deviation of entry age is significant in both equations ( 1) and (2)9, implying that the 
impact of the deviation of entry age variable is not linear on the log odds ratios. To 
illustrate the impact of this variable on the probability of exit to a particular 
destination ( conditional on having exited), Figure 7 .3 presents the predicted exit 
probability to each destination by entry age, keeping other variables constant at their 
mean values 10. 
8 From the equation ( 4.a6) in Appendix 4C, it can be easily shown that the coefficients on each 
independent variable in the third estimation is the difference between the corresponding coefficients of 
the second and the first estimation; That is 
p Work / 
ln( p Work ) _ ln( / pRe tirement ) = (/3 _ /3 ) ' X 
- p -~ Work Other - cancellation i · 
Pother-cancellation Other- cancellation 
pRe tirement 
9 In equation (1 ), a joint test of the deviation of entry age from 16 and its square is strongly significant. 
1° Continuous variables are set at the means. For dummy variables the overall sample proportions of 
ones are used. 
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Figure 7.3: Predicted probability of exit to different destinations 
( conditional on having exited) by entry age 
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Entry age 
Among those who left, the probability of returning to work monotonically decreased 
with entry age. In other words, other things being equal, among those who exited 
DSP, the younger the recipients at entry the higher the probability of returning to 
work. Among those who exited DSP, for those who entered before 50 years of age, 
the probability of retirement was very low and it increased rapidly with entry age 
from then on. This is consistent with the simple tabulation results in Table 7 .2. 
The above results are not difficult to understand. If a recipient enters into DSP at a 
very young age, the individual has to wait for a long time to reach the Age Pension 
age. During that time, many life events may happen that lead the individual to leaving 
the benefit. In addition, for young recipients their expected life earnings loss is large if 
they stay on DSP. This may also provide an incentive for them to leave before 
reaching retirement age. 
The gender variable is significant in equations (1) and (2), implying that, other things 
being equal, relative to the probability of transferring to the Age Pension, male 
recipients have a higher probability of returning to work or leaving due to other 
cancellations than female recipients. This may reflect the origin of the disability. Male 
disabilities may be more likely to be the results of accidents or work injuries. For 
these disabilities it may be easier to recover or to get compensation. The former leads 
to returning to work and the latter leads to other cancellations of the benefit. 
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The marital status variable is significant only in equation (3), implying that among 
those who had exited DSP, being single had a higher probability of returning to work 
relative to the probability of exit due to other cancellations. The country of birth 
variable is also only significant in equation (3), implying that among those who had 
exited DSP, relative to the probability of exit due to other cancellations, the 
probability of returning to work for non-Australian born recipients was higher than for 
Australian born recipients. These may be because single or non-Australian born 
recipients had a greater incentive to return to work because they had no other persons 
to tum to for support. In addition, for single people there is no chance that their 
benefits will be cancelled because of a spouse's very high income. It is also less likely 
that immigrants will have enough unearned income or assets to lead to the DSP 
benefit being cancelled. 
The earned income indicator variable is significant in equations (1) and (3). The sign 
of this variable indicates that among those who had exited DSP, other things being 
equal, having earned income was associated with a higher probability of returning to 
work. This is consistent with the feature of the program. Having earned income is 
itself an indicator that the recipient has the ability to do some work and is then less 
likely to be eligible for DSP benefit ( either due to recovery or means tested 
cancellation). But it is not clear through what mechanism this variable works. Having 
earned income may increase the likelihood of returning to work because work 
experience builds up skills of the recipients and their employability, which then 
encourage the recipients to leave for work. However, it is also possible that only those 
who have some capacity seek to work and then have earned income and leave the 
program. This is a self-selection result. If the latter is true, labour market programs 
aimed at helping DSP recipients work may have little impact because those with some 
earning capacities will exit to work anyway. But such program may speed up the 
process of leaving. Clearly, programs trying to move DSP recipients out to work will 
have a big role to play if the former is also true. 
The unearned income indicator variable is significant in equation (3), implying that 
having unearned income also increased the probability of returning to work relative to 
exit due to other cancellations. This is not easy to explain because it is not possible to 
distinguish the sources of the unearned income. 
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For the disability variables, the omitted disability type is the unknown disabilities. 
Except for the intellectual/learning disability, all other disabilities are significant in 
equation (1) and (2), all with positive sign, implying that compared with the omitted 
unknown disabilities, these disabilities increased the probability of returning to work 
or exit due to other cancellations, relative to the probability of retirement. From 
equation (3), it appears that the disability types had no impact on the relative 
probabilities between returning to work and other cancellations. 
The multi-spell variable is consistently significant in all three equations. The sign of 
the coefficient indicates that having multi-spells on DSP was associated with a higher 
probability of returning to work or leaving due to other cancellations, relative to the 
probability of transferring to the Age Pension. This result may be trivial because the 
Age Pension likes an absorptive state and those who transferred to the Age Pension 
would not transfer back to DSP. But for recipients who returned to work and who 
exited due to other cancellations, the possibility of coming back to DSP was high. 
Having multi-spells was also associated with a higher probability of returning to work 
relative to other cancellations. In other words, compared with recipients who exited 
due to other cancellations, those who returned to work were more likely to have 
multi-spells. It is not clear whether this suggests that those who returned to work 
would for some reasons be more likely to have multi-spells or that those with multi-
spells would be more likely to return to work. If the former is true, return to work is 
only a temporary phenomenon. If the latter is true, it may imply that for those who 
returned to work, they may have tried to work prior to the final exit and the trials may 
update their skills and facilitate their returning to work. From the policy point of 
view, the latter is the expected outcome. 
Finally, for the MLG model, a test on whether any two outcomes (i.e. , destinations 
here) can be collapsed into one outcome may be conducted (Freese and Scott, 2001 ). 
This is equivalent to test whether all the explanatory variables except for the constant 
term are jointly significant in a log odds ratio equation. Table 7.6 presents the results 
for a Wald test, which show that at the 1 percent significan(elevel the hypothesis that a 
pair of destinations can be combined is rejected for any pair of destinations. The 
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rejection of this hypothesis implies that two groups of recipients who exited to 
different destinations were statistically different in terms of the included observable 
variables. 
Table 7.6: A Wald test for combining pairs of exit destinations 
Pair of destinations tested 
Retirement - other cancellations 
Retirement - return to work 
Other cancellations - return to work 
7 .4. Conclusion 
Chi2 
125.627 
119.424 
54.96 
P>Chi2 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
In addition to the exit destinations commonly quoted by the administrative authority, 
using a data set containing the termination reason information, this chapter 
distinguished those who returned to work from other exit destinations. Combining this 
information with the other two FaCS data sets makes it possible to compare recipients 
who returned to work with those who transferred to the Age Pension and those who 
exited due to other cancellations. It would seems that recipients who returned to work 
possessed different characteristics compared with recipients who exited due to other 
reasons. 
Compared with those who transferred to the Age Pension, those who returned to work 
were more likely to be young when entering into DSP. They were also more likely to 
be male, have earned income when receiving DSP benefit and be multi-spell 
recipients. Those who exited due to other cancellation were also more likely to be 
young, male and multi-spell recipients compared with those who transferred to the 
Age Pension. But, those who returned to work and those who exited due to other 
cancellation were different in terms of marital status, country of birth, whether or not 
they had earned income and whether or not they were multi-spell DSP recipients. 
Those who returned to work were more likely to be single, non-Australian born, have 
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earned income and have had multi-spells of benefit recipiency, compared with those 
who exited due to other cancellations. 
The results of this chapter are important in terms of policy implications and future 
research. DSP recipients consist of different groups of people who come from 
different sources (Chapter 4) with different characteristics and behave differently in 
terms of leaving the program and labour force attachment when receiving the DSP 
benefit. Future research therefore needs to study DSP recipients by different groups 
rather than as a whole and policy design also needs to differentiate targeted groups in 
order to be more effective. 
Among other characteristics, entry age is an important factor associated with exit 
destinations of DSP recipients. We learn from this chapter that only those who enter 
into DSP at a relatively young age11 are more likely to return to work and those who 
enter at an older age, such as over 55, are more likely to stay until retirement. For the 
older recipients, probably little can be done to enhance their outflows into the work 
force. On the other hand, labour market programs aimed at helping DSP recipients to 
return to work should target at newly entering young recipients. 
Another important result is that those who return to work are more likely to have 
multi-spells. From a policy point of view, it is important to find out the exact 
relationship between returning to work and multi-spells, do multi-spells help 
recipients return to work or is it the case that those who return to work are more likely 
to come back and experience multi-spells? Here again different relationships imply 
different policy strategies. 
11 The young age here is relative and should not include those who enter at 16, the youngest eligible 
age for DSP. As noted earlier, for those who enter at 16, disabilities may come from birth and are 
serious . They are unlikely to recover and return to work. 
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Appendix 7A 
Termination reasons codes and definitions in the FaCS data sets, and 
the selection of the sample 
The one percent sample FaCS LDS data set does not include the termination reason 
field. Although transfers between different benefit programs can be identified, for 
example transfer from DSP to age pension or other benefit programs, recipients who 
exited income support payments due to other reasons, such as death, are not directly 
identifiable. Fortunately, FaCS has recently provided a termination reason data set, 
which provides detailed termination reasons for all recipients who exited from any 
income support payment program. The customer ID numbers ( cust_id) in the two data 
sets can be matched so that exit destinations for those who exited any benefit program 
can be identified. Different benefit programs may share common termination reasons 
or there niay be program specific reasons. Table 7.Al lists the termination reason 
codes and definitions for DSP recipients. 
The time period covered by the termination reason data set is shorter than the one 
percent sample data set. The former extends from 8 May 1998 to 25 February 2000, 
while the latter from 6 January 1995 to June 2000. This means that only the 
destinations of the recipients who exited DSP during the period covered by the 
termination data set can be identified. Therefore only those DSP recipients who 
terminated their DSP benefits during this period can be included in this study. 
There is another data set that contains the disability type variable for DSP recipients. 
This can also be matched with the one percent sample. Since disability is an important 
variable in determining the behavior of DSP recipients, it would be very useful if this 
variable could be included in modeling the exit behaviors of the recipients. But, 
again, this data set covers a different time period. It extends from 3 July 1998 to 10 
September 1999. 
The difference in the covered period between the termination reason and the disability 
type data sets means that there are two groups of DSP recipients for whom their 
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termination reasons can be identified but not their disability types: those who exited 
between 8 May 1998 and 3 July 1998 and those entered the program after 10 
September 1999 and subsequently exited before 25 February 2000. While dropping 
the former does not cause any problem except that we are left with fewer 
observations, dropping the latter may lead to sample selection bias: the shorter 
duration recipients may be underrepresented in the sample. One solution may be to 
select only those who exited during the period covered by the disability type data set. 
But this would lead to about 280 recipients who entered the pro gram before 10 
September 1999 and exited between 10 September 1999 and 25 February 2000 (hence 
their termination reasons and disability types are available) being dropped out. In 
contrast, there are only 17 recipients who entered the program after 10 September 
1999 and subsequently exited before 25 February 2000 and dropping these recipients 
from the sample may not cause a serious problem. The sample selection here follows 
this approach. 
In addition, recipients who meet one of the following criteria are also dropped out for 
obvious reasons: (i) entry date is later than the exit date as cod~d in the termination 
reason data set; (ii) termination status in the termination reason data set is coded as 
rejection (for the rejection status, the benefits are assumed not to be granted at all); 
(iii) entry age is above age pension age (male 65 and female 61 ). After the above 
selection process there are 801 observations left. Table 7.Al in this appendix presents 
the distribution of these 801 observations by termination reasons. 
Those who exited due to death can be directly identified using the termination reason 
data, but those who transferred to the Age Pension cannot, since they are coded as 
IBT (internal benefit transfer) which includes those having transferred to the Age 
Pension and those who transferred to other income support payments. Therefore 
transfers to the Age Pension are identified by tracing whether the individual continues 
to stay in the one percent sample data set by receiving the Age Pension after having 
exited DSP. After identifying death and retirement, all those left are treated as 
cancellations and the summary statistics are provided in Table 7 .Al. 
215 
Table 7.Al: Termination reason codes and definitions 
Code Definition No.of persons 
1 ASS Asset over limit 6 
2 CLR Clients request 12 
3 CMP Precluded due to compo dir/DD 8 
4 COM Compo preclusion 11 
5 DEA Death 87 
6 DOS Departure overseas 1 
7 DVA Service pension/inc support supplement 7 
8 EAN Earnings 37 
9 ENQ Pending enquiries 4 
10 FRC Fail to return correspondence 5 
11 FTM Fail to return DSP medical review 7 
12 FTW Return to work--notify by 14 days 27 
13 IBT Internal benefit transfer 446 
14 IMP Customer in prison 11 
15 INC Income precludes entitlement 19 
16 INV Investigation 3 
17 ITO Interstate transfer out 2 
18 NAR Not resident in Australia 1 
19 NMQ not medically qualified 0 
20 NSI Less than 20 percent impaired 5 
21 NTC Not provide TFN 1 
22 O4W Overseas in NZ 4 weeks 3 
23 0TH Other reasons 15 
24 PER FTR entitlement review 3 
25 RDC Return direct credit payment 2 
26 RSK Greater than 20 percent impaired/can be reskilled 1 
27 RTA Return to Australia 1 
28 RTW Return to work 3 
29 WFT Greater than 20 percent /can work full time 1 
30 WUK Whereabout unlmown 10 
31 Blank (not coded) 62 
Total 801 
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Appendix 7B 
Table 7.A2: MLG estimation results, compared with death exit 
P. ln(pother-cancellati.on ) ln(preturn-work) ln( retzremtent ) 
pdeath pdeath pdeath 
(1) (2) (3) 
Demographic variables 
Age at grant /5 
-0.3772*** -0.1128* -0.1654** 
Std.Err 0.0986 0.0633 0.0769 
Age at grant / 5-squared 0.0100*** 0.0017 0.0018 
Std.Err 0.0017 0.0012 0.0015 
Sex (male= 1) 
-1.3047*** -0.2376 0.0674 
Std.Err 0.3687 0.3194 0.4386 
Marital status ( single= 1) 
-0.2422 -0.3862 0.5159 
Std.Err 0.3527 0.3521 0.5229 
Country of birth ( f oreign-1) 0.2293 -0.3415 0.5593 
Std.Err 0.3389 0.3508 0.4905 
No. of children 
-0.1905 0.2324 -0.0208 
Std.Err 0.5478 0.3484 0.4339 
Age of youngest child 
-0.0075 -0.0303 0.0106 
Std.Err 0.0814 0.0625 0.0814 
Home ownership and rental arrangements 
Home owner(non-homeowner= 1) -1.2451 *** -0.9634** -1.2428** 
Std.Err 0.4742 0.4516 0.6345 
Rent type ( free rent= 1) -0.2975 0.1560 0.1145 
Std.Err 0.6367 0.5847 0.7910 
Rent type ( Gov't rent= 1) 0.7996 -0.0465 0.2778 
Std.Err 0.6078 0.5799 0.9184 
Rent type (private rent=l) 0.2675 0.6319 0.3544 
Std.Err 0.4899 0.4254 0.5754 
Financial variables 
Earned income>O 1.4461 1.1225 3.1936*** 
Std.Err 0.9855 0.8656 0.9031 
Amount of earned income -0.0035 0.0020 0.0010 
Std.Err 0.0053 0.0045 0.0045 
Unearned income>O 0.1274 -0.4244 0.4671 
Std.Err 0.3621 0.3510 0.5040 
Amount of unearned income 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 
Std.Err 0.0013 0.0011 0.0017 
(Continue) 
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Table 7.A2: MLG estimation results, compared with death exit (continued) 
In( P retiremren r ) 
p death 
(1) 
Disability types 
Cancer/tumor (=l) -6.1477*** 
Std.Err 0.7420 
Circulatory(= 1) -4.3444*** 
Std.Err 0.6391 
Intellectual and leaming(=l) -5.4226** 
Std.Err 2.3380 
Musculo _skeletal(= 1) -3.0641 *** 
Std.Err 0.5855 
Nervous system(=l) -4.0890*** 
Std.Err 1.2716 
Psycho 1 o gi cal/psychiatric(= 1) -3.6847*** 
Std.Err 0.7354 
Respiratory system(= 1) -3.9503*** 
Std.Err 0.6867 
Other disabilities (=1) -4.91480*** 
Std.Err 0.7297 
Whether multi spells (spells>=2) -0.2424 
Std.Err 0.8796 
Constant 5.4826*** 
Std.Err 1.6002 
Summary statistics of model specification 
Number of observation 801 
773.72 
72 
-522.21 
0.4256 
LR test 
Degree of freedom 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R-squared 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent level; 
** Significant at 5 percent level; 
*** Sigficant at 1 percent level. 
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In( p other - cancellati on ) 
p death 
In( p return - work ) 
p death 
(2) (3) 
-0.5307 -0.0301 
0.5331 1.0471 
-0.3848 -1.5521 
0.5706 1.3804 
-0.8193 0.0662 
0.9494 1.2408 
0.7745 1.5922* 
0.5017 0.8501 
0.6728 1.8200 
1.2106 1.4570 
0.4970 1.5528 
0.6410 0.9693 
0.0704 1.1926 
0.4974 0.8469 
-0.6602 0. 7522 
0.6571 1.0623 
2.0260*** 2.9134*** 
0.7618 0.8049 
3.1302*** 0.6785 
1.0807 1.4160 
Table 7.A3: Distribution of the number of spells, all DSP recipients between 6 
January 1995 and 16 June 2000 
Number of All Age groups 
spells recipients 16-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-55 56 & over 
1 93.58 92.73 87.57 91.74 93.43 94.41 96.06 
2 5.18 5.48 9.08 6.31 5.51 4.85 3.38 
3 0.84 1.40 1.82 1.11 0.79 0.46 0.47 
4 to 7* 0.41 0.38 1.54 0.83 0.26 0.27 0.09 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
No. of recipients 8379 784 716 1078 1888 1092 2336 
Table 7.A4: Duration distribution by exit destination of those who exited DSP 
All 
Duration persons Retirement 
<0.5 year 6.99 1.58 
0.5<=&< 1 year 8.74 3.61 
1 <= & <2 years 11.86 8.35 
2<= & <3 years 9.24 8.35 
3<= & <4 years 10.36 10.84 
4<= & <5 years 9.11 9.71 
Return 
work 
20.00 
21.33 
20.00 
12.00 
9.33 
Other 
cancellation 
14.80 
15.82 
18.88 
10.71 
7.14 
Death 
5.75 
8.05 
6.90 
8.05 
16.09 
4.00 9.69 9.20 
>=5 years 43.70 57.56 13.33 22.96 45.98 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion And Remark 
The number of DSP recipients has grown very rapidly over the last three decades, 
much faster than the DSP age eligible population. In 1971 fewer than 2 in 100 males 
aged 16 to 64 received DSP benefits, but in 1999, 6 in 100 of this population received 
DSP benefits. 
The number of DSP recipients is determined by inflows and outflows. This thesis 
explains the growth of the DSP program in an inflow-outflow framework and 
explores the determinants of DSP inflows and outflows. This concluding chapter 
summarizes the main findings and provides concluding remarks. 
8.1. What do we learn from this thesis? 
8.1.1. Inflows, outflows and DSP program growth 
Either an increase in inflows ( or the inflow rate) or a decrease in outflows ( or the 
outflow rate) can increase the number of DSP recipients. A decrease in the outflow 
rate is equivalent to an increase in the completed duration on DSP benefit. h1 this 
inflow - outflow framework, what do we learn about the reasons for the growth of the 
DSP program over the last three decades? 
Chapter 2 showed that over the last three decades both the increase in the inflow rate 
and the decrease in the outflow rate have contributed to the DSP program growth. But 
the increase in the inflow rate appeared to have contributed more than the decrease in 
the outflow rate. Over the period 1971 to 1999, 36 percent of the increase in the 
number of DSP recipients could be attributed to inflow rate changes, 33 percent could 
be attributed to outflow rate changes and 16 percent could be attributed to population 
growth. 
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Following the introduction of the Disability Reform Package (DRP) in 1991, the 
inflow rate increased sharply and stayed at a higher level during the 1990s. Over the 
period 1991 to 1999, 47 percent of the increase in the number of DSP recipients could 
be attributed to the inflow rate change over this period. In contrast, only 10 percent 
could be attributed to the outflow rate change and 7 percent to population growth. 
Therefore, over the last three decades, increases in the inflow rate were more 
important than decreases in the outflow rate in contributing to the program growth. In 
addition, changes in the number of DSP recipients were closely associated with 
variations in DSP recipient inflows. Hence, to understand the growth of the DSP 
program, we need to explain the changes in inflows and the inflow rate. This is the 
task of Chapter 3. In addition, the impact of inflows on the number of DSP recipients 
is long lasting and is determined by the distribution of completed duration of inflows. 
Therefore, it is probably better to work on inflows rather than on the number of DSP 
recipients (this is like a stock) to understand the growth of the program. 
Inflows are determined by the number of applications from potential recipients and 
grants of the applications by the administrative authority. Using aggregate data 
including national aggregate time series and cross-states-time-series data, Chapter 3 
looked at the determinants of the application rate, defined as the number of 
applications per 1000 DSP age eligible population, and the grant rate, defined as the 
number of grants per 1000 DSP age eligible population. It was found that labour 
market conditions represented by the unemployment rate and policy changes had 
significant impacts on DSP application and grant rates. Other factors, such as the 
relative value of DSP benefit and changes in population structure ( or population 
ageing) did not appear to have any significant impact on the application and grant 
rates and therefore no significant impact on the past rate of program growth. As for 
policy changes, the results showed that while the policy change in 1980 reduced the 
application and grant rates as expected, the policy change in 1991 increased these 
rates, a result which was probably not expected at the time the policy was 
implemented. 
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Simulated results from Chapter 3 showed that changes in the unemployment rate over 
the period 1970 to 1999 was able to explain 40 percent of the increase in the number 
of DSP recipients over this period and the policy change in 1991 was able to explain 
31 percent of the increase in the number of recipients from 1990 to 1999. The policy 
change in 1980, which only tightened the eligibility rules without changing the 
legislative eligibility criteria, was very important in reducing the inflow rate and 
inflows, which then substantially contributed to containing the growth of the program. 
As for labour market conditions, it was also found from Chapter 3 that it was the one-
year lagged unemployment rate that had the significant impact on the application and 
grant rates. This may suggest that many individuals who applied for DSP when 
becoming unemployed during a recession might only do so after some search for 
other sources of support (such as looking for a job). 
One would expect grants to respond to policy changes. But, in addition, the results 
from Chapter 3 indicated that DSP applications not only respond to the change in 
legislative eligibility criteria, the aggregate time series data suggested that 
applications also respond to the change in the way in which the eligibility rules are 
implemented even without changes in legislation. Either individuals form their own 
probability of success when making an application decision, or applications are 
mainly lodged following the advice from government agencies who know the 
eligibility rules much better than the individual applicants. 
8.1.2. Sources of DSP inflows 
To understand fully the determinants of inflows, we would like to know how 
individuals decide on whether to participate in the DSP program, but there is no 
available data which goes directly to the reasons for individual decisions. However, 
the FaCS one percent sample LDS data allows us to examine one main source of DSP 
inflows - transitions from unemployment benefit to DSP. 
Using the LDS data, it was found (Chapter 4) that over the period between 1995-96 
and 1999-2000, over 60 percent of DSP recipients came from other income support 
payments, of which most were former unemployment benefit recipients. Among those 
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who transferred from unemployment to DSP, not only did a large proportion (50 to 70 
percent) experience multi-spells of income support payment recipiency prior to the 
transition, but also 55 to 66 percent had more than half a year pre-transition 
unemployment duration, with the average pre-transition unemployment duration 
being more than one year. 
When a multinomial logit model was applied to the 1995-96 unemployment cohort to 
identify the factors that determine the probability of transition from unemployment to 
DSP, it was found that among other factors , unemployment duration had a significant 
impact. The longer the duration on unemployment benefit the more likely was the 
transferred to DSP. For an unemployed person, with the mean characteristics of the 
group who transferred to DSP from unemployment and an unemployment duration of 
two months, the probability of transferring to DSP was 4 percent; if the person had 
been unemployed for one year, the probability increased to 7 percent; if on 
unemployment benefit for three years, the probability increased to 18 percent. 
Another important factor in determining the transition probability is individual age 
when becoming unemployed. The older the age of an unemployed person the more 
likely was the transition to DSP. For a typical unemployed person, if becoming 
unemployed at age of 55, the probability of transferring to DSP was 25 percent. If the 
unemployed person was 30 when becoming unemployed, the probability of 
transferring was only 3 percent. 
Marital status, whether having earned income, the amount of earned income when 
receiving unemployment benefit and the activity test types required when receiving 
unemployment benefit are also important in determining the transition probability. 
Single unemployed persons were more likely to transfer to DSP compared with 
married persons; having earned income and an increase in the amount of the earned 
income reduced the probability of the transition. 
The importance of the unemployment duration on the transition from unemployment 
to DSP, and the fact that a large proportion of DSP inflows came from unemployed 
persons, suggests a direct link between unemployment and DSP participation. This 
reinforces the finding in Chapter 3, where the significant positive impact of the 
unemployment rate on the application and grant rates of DSP benefits was 
established. This relationship will be further discussed later. 
8.1.3. Duration and exit destinations of DSP recipients 
Since the number of DSP recipients is also determined by the duration of recipients, it 
is important to understand how duration is determined, or equivalently the factors that 
determine the hazard rate of DSP recipients. Chapter 5 addressed this issue by 
applying the duration model to a selected sample from the FaCS one percent sample 
LDS data. The estimation results showed that the age at entry into DSP, gender, 
country of birth, amount of earned income, whether having unearned income and 
recipient source were all statistically significant determinants of the hazard rate or 
duration. 
The entry age had an inverse U-shape impact on the hazard rate. Recipients who 
entered into DSP between 21 and 40 years of age had the highest hazard rate and 
among them the hazard rate was not statistically significantly different. DSP 
recipients with an entry age younger than 21 had the lowest hazard rate. For recipients 
entering after 50 years of age, the older the entry age the lower the hazard rate. This 
inverse U-shape impact of entry age may reflect individual health conditions and the 
labour market prospects of DSP recipients. Other things being equal, males had a 
higher hazard rate than their female counterparts and Australian born recipients had a 
higher hazard rate than immigrants. The amount of earned income when receiving 
DSP increased the recipient's hazard rate, but having unearned income reduced the 
hazard rate. Interestingly, recipients who transferred from unemployment had the 
lowest hazard rate, while those who came from outside the income support system 
had the highest hazard rate, and the hazard rate of those who transferred from other 
income support payments fell somewhere between. 
These results indicate that recipients with different characteristics have different 
potentials for leaving the DSP program. Those who leave DSP the fastest are 
characterized as middle age ( especially, 31-40), male, Australian born, coming from 
outside the income support system, having no unearned income and with very high 
earned income when receiving DSP benefit. Those who leave the slowest are 
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characterized as very young (younger than 21 years old) or close to the Age Pension 
age on entering into DSP, female, non-Australian born, having transferred from 
unemployment, having unearned income and no earned income when receiving DSP 
benefits. One important policy implication of these findings is that any policy or 
program aimed at facilitating outflows of DSP recipients will need to acknowledge 
and respond to these recipient differences and also focus on those who are more likely 
to leave. 
Ho\vever, although those recipients who transfer from unemployment appear to leave 
the slowest, their disability may not be as severe ( or obvious) as those who go directly 
to DSP from outside the income support system. That is they may have the potential 
to leave faster. Because these recipients consist of a large proportion of inflows, the 
behavior of this recipient group warrants further study. 
The unemployment rate variable was included in the duration model estimation and 
its impact on the hazard rate was not confirmed by the model estimation results. This 
is in contrast to the finding in Chapter 3 that DSP application and grant rates were 
significantly affected by the unemployment rate. These results imply that when 
individuals make a decision on whether to participate in the DSP program, they take 
into account labour market conditions and their prospects of employment. But, once 
on the program, labour market conditions are not important in affecting their decision 
on whether to leave the program. Therefore, while an economic recession pushes the 
disabled people into the DSP program, a boom will not draw them out. 
Based on the parameters estimated in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 estimated the expected 
completed duration of DSP recipients. This estimation is important because the 
projection of future program costs depends on the estimation of completed duration, 
and the time horizon of the impact of a change in inflows on the number of DSP 
recipients depends on the completed duration. 
From Chapter 6, the average expected completed duration before retirement was 
about 9 years for a cohort, but it varied with gender, entry age and recipient source. 
Female recipients had a longer expected completed duration (9.5 years if the female 
retirement age was 60 and 12 years if the female retirement age was 65). Their male 
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counterparts had a shorter duration (8.8 years). Recipients who transferred from 
unemployment had the longest expected completed duration (10.8-11.8 years 
depending on the assumption about the female retirement age), while recipients who 
came from outside the income support system had the shortest expected completed 
duration (7.6-8.3 years). Recipients who transferred from other income support 
payments had an average expected completed duration of 8.2-9.7 years. The younger 
the entry age of the DSP recipients the longer the expected completed duration. In 
terms of the proportion of time spent on DSP before reaching retirement, for new 
recipients who entered after 20 years of age, the older the entry age, the larger this 
time proportion. But for those who entered at an age younger than 20, this time 
proportion was larger than those who entered between 21 and 30 years of age. 
Chapter 5 identified the factors that determine the speed of leaving DSP and did not 
consider the destinations of exit. To understand the full dynamics of DSP recipients, 
we would like to know how the exit destination is determined. However, data are not 
available for identifying the determinants of exit destinations of typical DSP 
recipients, although this is an important issue. From currently available data, it is only 
possible to identify the exit destinations of the recipients who exited during a specific 
time period. But by combining the one percent sample LDS data with other two FaCS 
data sets available, it is possible to distinguish those who returned to work from other 
exit destinations and examine whether recipients who exited to different destinations 
had different characteristics. 
The findings in Chapter 7 showed that, among those who exited DSP during a specific 
time period, the proportion returning to work was very small (less than IO percent) 
and the majority transferred to the Age Pension (55 percent). Indeed, recipients who 
exited to different destinations appeared to be different groups of people, especially 
comparing those who returned to work with those who transferred to the Age Pension. 
Compared with those who transferred to the Age Pension, those who returned to work 
were more likely to be young when entering into DSP. They were also more likely to 
be male, have earned income when receiving DSP benefits and be multi-spell 
recipients. Those who exited due to other cancellations were also more likely to be 
young, male and multi-spell recipients compared with those who transferred to the 
Age Pension. But, those who returned to work and those who exited due to other 
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cancellations were different in terms of marital status, country of birth, whether or not 
they had earned income and whether or not they were multi-spell DSP recipients. 
Those who returned to work were more likely to be single, non-Australian born, have 
earned income and have multi-spells of benefit recipiency, compared with those who 
exited due to other cancellations. 
One important point to emerge from the above findings is that DSP recipients are 
quite clearly different groups of people. They came from different sources (Chapter 
4). Recipients with different characteristics behaved differently in terms of leaving 
speed (Chapter 5) and exit destinations (Chapter 7). As noted in Chapter 7, this has 
important implications in terms of policy development and future research. To put it 
simply, future research should probably study DSP recipients by different groups (say 
by recipient source or entry age) rather than as a whole. Similarly, policy 
development should also be differentiated to target different recipient groups so that 
policy will be more effective. 
8.2. Concluding remark 
From the findings of this thesis, several points stand out and may be worth re-
emphasizing: 
( a) This thesis showed that DSP participation and unemployment have a close 
relationship. It is well established in the literature, and from the results in 
Chapter 3, that worsening labour market conditions raise disability benefit 
participations through increased recipient inflows. In addition, Chapter 4 
showed a direct link between unemployment and DSP inflows: a great 
proportion of DSP inflows were from the unemployed persons and 
unemployment duration had a positive impact on the transitions from 
unemployment to DSP. The fact that those DSP recipients who transferred 
from unemployment did not directly apply for DSP benefit before their 
prolonged experience of unemployment, might imply either that they knew 
they were not eligible for the benefit, or that if they were eligible, they did not 
want to apply at the time of becoming unemployed. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
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if the former is true, this suggests that unemployment leads to deterioration of 
individual health conditions or unemployment makes a person more 
acceptable to the administrative authority to be granted the DSP benefit. If the 
latter is true then it might mean that these persons do want or hope to go back 
to work at the time of becoming unemployed. They applied for DSP later 
perhaps because they could not find jobs. This appears to be consistent with 
the finding in Chapter 3 that only the lagged unemployment rate had a 
significant impact on DSP applications. If this is true then it further suggests 
that perhaps it is not the disability that makes a person apply for DSP benefit, 
rather it is the failure of getting a job when being unemployed that works as a 
driving force, at least for most of those who transferred from unemployment to 
DSP. Whatever the case, this could suggest that more employment 
opportunities might be the most important measure to prevent people from 
turning to DSP. 
(b) Disability benefit participation is the result of interactions of many factors 
involving health conditions, labour market prospects, and the relative value of 
DSP benefit. Although the impact of the relative value of DSP benefit on the 
inflow rate was not confirmed in Chapter 3, probably because the 
determination of the DSP benefit in Australia is quite different from other 
nations and there was little variation in its value, its impact is established in 
the literature. Individual labour market prospects not only depend on labour 
market conditions, they are als<? determined by individual characteristics, such 
as age and gender. Given health conditions and labour market conditions, 
older people are more likely to apply for the benefit because their labor market 
prospects are not quite as good, and probably also because of this, they are 
more likely to be granted DSP benefit by the administrative authority. 
( c) From ( a) and (b ), it seems, for the marginal disability benefit applicants, that it 
is probably not a preference for leisure to work that makes them apply for DSP 
benefit, rather it may be because there are simply no employment 
opportunities for them. If they need an income to live on, they must turn to 
DSP. 
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( d) There are asymmetric impacts of labour market conditions on DSP inflows 
and outflows. While the impact of labour market conditions on inflows is 
confirmed in this thesis, and well established in the literature, its impact on 
outflows is not confirmed as shown in Chapter 5. In addition, the aggregate 
data did not show any association between the outflow rate and the 
unemployment rate. Once in, DSP recipients tend to stay. As discussed earlier, 
the reason may be that: (i) it is not easy to establish eligibility for DSP 
(especially for the marginal persons) ; (ii) DSP recipiency experience may have 
a stigma impact on employment; and (iii) human capital depreciates when 
receiving DSP. Only those who fully recover and/or who are sure to get a job 
when leaving (no matter what the labour market conditions are) choose to 
leave. 
( e) It is understandable why disability benefit policies are normally targeted at 
inflows, such as implementing new eligibility requirements for new 
applicants, rather than at outflows. The incentive of a potential applicant to 
work may be higher than that of a long staying current DSP recipient. If an 
application for DSP has a stigma impact on the labour market outcome, the 
stigma impact of having been receiving the benefit must be greater. Therefore, 
the labour market prospects for current DSP recipients must be worse than for 
the potential applicants. Therefore, while tightening rules for potential 
applicants may encourage them to work, directly cutting off recipients from 
benefits may only move them from one benefit payment to another. 
However, the hazard rate is clearly affected by individual characteristics 
(Chapter 5). In addition, Chapter 7 showed that only recipients with certain 
characteristics were more likely to return to work from the DSP program. 
Thus labour market programs targeted at selected recipients may be more 
effective in facilitating the transition from DSP recipiency to work. 
(f) Long duration of DSP recipients means that any change in policy which 
impacts on inflows would have a prolonged impact on the number of DSP 
recipients. Together with the finding that applications respond to policy 
changes (Chapter 3) ( even without change in the legislative eligibility 
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requirement as in 1980), this suggests that any policy change which could 
effectively relax the eligibility requirements must be considered and assessed 
carefully before implementation, and the policy changes in 1991 may be a 
good lesson in this regard. These policy changes seem still to be influencing 
the growth of the DSP program a decade later. 
8.3. Questions need further research 
Due to data limitations and the scope of this thesis, some interesting questions are not 
addressed, but they are important from both academic and policy points of view. The 
obvious questions which need further research include, 
( a) Why has the outflow rate been decreasing over the last three decades? We 
learned from Chapter 2 that the increase in the inflow rate and the decrease in 
the outflow rate had contributed to the growth of the DSP program. In this 
thesis the focus was on explaining the change in the inflow rate because it was 
more important. The reasons for the decrease in the outflow rate were not 
explained because to do this would require detailed information on the 
characteristics of the inflows of the last three decades and such data does not 
seem to be available at this time. If this kind of data became available in the 
future, the reasons for the past decrease in the outflow rate should be 
examined. 
(b) Not all persons with disability participate in the DSP program, some choose to 
work. Then, given health conditions, what determines the individual DSP 
participation decision? Although Chapter 3 provides a model for DSP 
participation, it did not actually answer this question empirically, agam, 
because of unavailability of data. 
(c) What is the total completed length of stay on DSP? Chapter 6 estimated the 
expected completed duration of the first spells for DSP recipients. But, 
' churning' occurs among DSP recipients. Some recipients having left DSP 
come back later and the completed duration of the first spells does not reflect 
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their true length of total stay on DSP. However: to estimate the total completed 
length of stay \Ve need a data set spanning a much longer period than currently 
available. Hopefully these data will become available with further 
development of the FaCS LDS data in the future. 
( d) How does the DSP program interact with other income support payment 
programs? Chapter 4 examined the transition of recipients from 
unemployment to DSP and Chapter 5 found that DSP recipients who 
transferred from unemployment had a lower hazard rate than those from 
outside the income support system. But there are other important questions in 
this regard, such as, how does policy change in other income support payments 
affect individual behavior in terms of entering into and leaving DSP benefit? 
For DSP recipients who transfer from other income support payments (such as 
unemployment), what are their total times on the income support system (not 
just on DSP)? Do those DSP recipients who transfer from other income 
support payments have a longer total time on the income support system than 
those who come from outside the income support system? When the FaCS 
LDS data become available for a longer period of time these questions can be 
addressed. 
231 
Bibliography 
Aarts, L. J. M. [ 1987]. Work Capacity of the Disabled, in Emanuel, et al. (ed.), 
Disability Benefits: Factors Determining Application and Awards, Contemporary 
Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis Series, Vol. 59, Greenwich, London: JAI 
Press. 
Aarts, L. J. M. and P. R. de Jong [1996]. The Dutch Disability Program and How It 
Grew, in Aarts, L. J. M., et al. ( ed.), Curing the Dutch Disease: An International 
Perspective on Disability Policy Reform, International Studies on Social Security, 
Vol. 1, (Avebury, Aldershot, UK). 
Aarts, L. J. M. and P. R. de Jong [1992]. Economic Aspects of Disability Behavior, 
Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Agresti, A. [1990]. Categorical Data Analysis, Wiley Series in Probability and 
Mathematical Statistics, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Akerlof, G. A. and B. G. M. Main [1980]. Unemployment Spells and Unemployment 
Experience, American Economic Review, 70(5): 885-93. 
Aldrich, J. H., and F. D. Nelson [1984]. Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models, 
Sage University Paper, Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Science, 
California: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Autor, D. H. [2001]. The Rise in Disability Recipiency and the Decline in 
Unemployment, MIT Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 0 1-15. 
Autor, D. H. and M. G. Duggan [2001]. The Rise in Disability Recipiency and the 
Decline in Unemployment, Unpublished paper. 
Baldwin, M. and W. G. Johnson [1994]. Labor Market Discrimination against Men 
with Disabilities, Journal of Human Resources, 29(1): 1-19. 
232 
Baldwin, M. L. and W. G. Johnson [1995]. Labor Market Discrimination against 
Women with Disabilities, Industrial Relations, 34(4): 555-77. 
Barrett, G. F. [2000]. The Dynamics of Participation in the Sole Parent Pensions, 
Longitudinal Data Set Workshop, FaCS. 
Bartel, A. and P. Taubman [1979]. Health and Labor Market Success: the Role of 
VariousDdiseases. Review of Economics and Statistics , 61(1): 1-8. 
Bazzoli, G. J. [1985]. The Early Retirement Decision: New Empirical Evidence on the 
Influence of Health, Journal of Human Resources, 20(2): 214-34. 
Benitez-Silva, H., M. Buchinsky, H. Chan, J. Rust and S. Sheivasser [1999]. An 
Empirical Analysis of the Social Security Disability Application, Appeal, and Award 
Process, Labour Economics, 6(2): 147-78. 
Berkovec, J. and S. Stern [1991]. Job Exit Behavior of Older Men, Econometrica, 
59(1 ): 189-210. 
Berkowitz, E. D. and R. V. Burkhauser [1996]. A United States Perspective on 
Disability Programs, in Aarts, L. J. M., et al. (ed.), Curing the Dutch Disease: An 
International Perspective on Disability Policy Reform, International Studies on Social 
Security, Vol. 1 (Avebury, Aldershot, UK). 
Black, D., K. Daniel and S. Sanders [2002]. The Impact of Economic Conditions on 
Participation in Disability Programs: Evidence from the Coal Boom and Bust. The 
American Economic Review, 92(2): 27-50. 
Blank, R. M. [1989]. Analyzing the Length of Welfare Spells, Journal of Public 
Economics, 39: 245-273. 
233 
Bond, K. and P. Whiteford [2000]. Trends in the Rates of Receipt of Income Support 
and Employment Outcomes Among People of Workforce Age: Australia 1965-1999, 
Unpublished paper. 
Bound, J. [1989]. The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance 
Applicants, American Economic Review, 79(3): 482-503. 
Bound, J. [1991a]. The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance 
Applicants: Reply; American Economic Review, 81(5): 1427-34. 
--- [1991 b]. Self-Reported Versus Objective Measures of Health 1n Retirement 
Models, Journal of Human Resources, 26(1): 106-38. 
Bound, J. and R. V. Burkhauser [1999]. Economic Analysis of Transfer Programs 
Targeted on People with Disabilities, in Ashenfelter, D., et al. ( ed.), Handbook of 
Labor Economics, Volume 3, New York and Oxford: Elsevier Science. 
Bound, J., S. Kossoudji and G. Ricart-Moes [1998]. The Ending of General 
Assistance and SSI Disability Growth in Michigan, in Rupp, K., et al. ( ed.), Growth in 
Disability Benefits: Explanations and Policy Implications, (W. E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI). 
Bound, J., M. Schoenbaum and T. Waidmann [1995]. Race and Education 
Differences in Disability Status and Labor Force Attachment 1n the Health and 
Retirement Survey, Journal of Human Resources, 30: 227-67. 
Bound, J. and T. Waidmann [1992]. Disability Transfers, Self-Reported Health, and 
the Labor Force Attachment of Older Men: Evidence from the Historical Record, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics , 107(4): 1393-419. 
Bound, J. W., Timothy [2000]. Accounting for Recent Declines in Employment Rates 
among the Working-Aged Disabled, NEER Working Paper, No.7975. 
234 
Burkhauser, R. V. [1998]. Policies to Make Work Pay for People with Disabilities, in 
Rupp, K., et al. ( ed.), Growth in Disability Benefits: Explanations and Policy 
Implications, (W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI). 
Burkhauser, R. V., J. S. Butler and Y. W. Kim [1995]. The Importance of Employer 
Accommodation on the Job Duration of Workers with Disabilities: A Hazard Model 
Approach, Labour Economics, 2(2): 109-30. 
Burkhauser, R. V. and M. C. Daly [1996]. Employment and Economic Well-Being 
Following the Onset of a Disability: the Role for Public Policy, in Mashaw, J., et al. 
( ed.), Disability, Work and Cash Benefits, (W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research, Kalamazoo, MI). 
--- [1998]. Disability and Work: The Experiences of American and German Men, 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Econon1ic Review, 2: 17-29. 
Burkhauser, R. V., J. S. Butler, Y. Kim, and R. R. Weathers II [1999]. The 
Importance of Accommodation on the Timing of Disability Insurance Applications: 
Results from the Survey of Disability and Work and the Health and Retirement Study, 
Journal of Human Resources, 34(3): 589-611. 
Burkhauser, R. V., R. H. Haveman and B. L. Wolfe [1993a]. How People with 
Disabilities Fare When Public Policies Change, Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, 12(2): 251-69. 
--- [1993b]. How Current Disability Transfer Policies Discourage Work: Analysis 
from the 1990 SIPP, Journal of Vocational Rehabilitation, 7: 9-27. 
Cass, B., F. Gibson and F. Tito [1988]. Towards Enabling Policies: Income Support 
for People with Disabilities, Social Security Review (SSR), Issue paper No.4. 
Carter, M. and R. G. Gregory [1981]. Employment, Unemployment and Government 
Income Support: Results from the 1976 Census, in Stricker and Sheehan (1981), 
235 
Hidden Unemployment: The Australian Experience, the Institute of Applied 
Economic and Social Research, University of Melbourne. 
Centrelink [1998]. Centrelink Performance Report, September - October, Canberra. 
Corak, M. [1996]. Measuring the Duration of Unemployment Spells, Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 29(0): S43-49. 
Cox, D.R. and D. Oakes [1984]. Analysis of Survival Data, London: Chapman & 
Hall. 
Creedy, R. D. and R. Disney [ 1989]. Public and Private Partnerships in Social 
Security: Recent UK Policy, in Klevmarken, B. G., et al, (ed.), The Political Economy 
of Social Security, Elsevier Science Pub. Co. 
Daly, Mary C. [1994]. The Economic Well-being of Men with Disabilities: a 
Dynamic Cross-national View, Unpublished PhD dissertation (Syracuse University). 
Dawkins, P., Mark N. Harris and Joanne Loundes [2000]. Repeated Spells on 
Benefits: An Analysis of "Churning", Using the Faes Longitudinal Administrative 
Data Set, Longitudinal Data Set Workshop, FaCS. 
de Mooij, R. A. [1999]. Disability Benefits and Hidden Unemployment in the 
Netherlands, Journal of Policy Modeling, 21(6): 695-713. 
Devine, T. J. and N. M. Kiefer [1991]. Empirical Labor Economics: The Search 
Approach. 
Diamond, P. and E. Sheshinski [ 1995]. Economic Aspects of Optimal Disability 
Benefits, Journal of Public Economics, 57(1 ): 1-23. 
Diebold, F. X. and G. D. Rudebusch [1990]. A Nonparametric Investigation of 
Duration Dependence in the American Business Cycle, Journal of Political Economy, 
98(3): 596-616. 
236 
Disability Task Force [1995] . Evaluation of the Disability Reform Package: Main 
Report, Australian Government Publishing Services. 
Disney, R. and S. Webb [1991]. Why Are There So Many Long Term Sick in Britain? 
The Economic Journal, l 01 ( 405): 252-262. 
Dolton, P. and W. van der Klaauw [1995]. Leaving Teaching in the UK: A Duration 
Analysis, Economic Journal, 105(1): 431-444. 
Doudna, D. J. [1977]. Effect of the Economy on Group Long Term Disability Claims, 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 44(2): 223-35. 
DSS [1997]. Trends and Characteristics of Disability Payments, DSS Social Security 
Information Paper, Canberra. 
Dwyer, D., Jianting Hu, Denton R. Vaughan, and Bernard Wixon [2001]. Counting 
the Disabled: Using Survey Self-Reports to Estimate Medical Eligibility for Social 
Security's Disability Programs, ORES Working Paper Series, No. 90, Social Security 
Administration, Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics, Washington, DC. 
Dwyer, D. S. and 0. S. Mitchell [1999]. Health Problems as Determinants of 
Retirement: Are Self-Rated Measures Endogenous? Journal of Health Economics, 
18(2): 173-93. 
Dykacz, J. M. [1998]. Return of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries to the Di Program: 
Some Insights from the New Beneficiary Followup, Social Security Bulletin, 61(2): 3-
11. 
Dykacz, J. M. and J. C. Hennessey [1989]. Postrecovery Experience of Disabled 
Worker Beneficiaries, Social Security Bulletin , 52(9): 42-66. 
FaCS [ 1999]. Characteristics of Disability Support Pension Customers, Canberra. 
237 
Fitzgerald, J. M. [ 1995]. Local Labor Markets and Local Area Effects on Welfare 
Duration, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 14(1): 43-67. 
Freese, J. and J. S. Long [2001]. Tests for the Multinomial Logit Model, (Sgl55) 
Stata Technical Bulletin (57): 19-25. 
Frick, B. and D. Sadowski [1996]. A German Perspective on Disability Policy, in 
Aarts, L. J.M., et al. (ed.), Curing the Dutch Disease: An International Perspective on 
Disability Policy Reform, International Studies on Social Security, Vol. 1 (A vebury, 
Aldershot, UK). 
Frick, K. [1996]. Essays on Health Insurance Markets: Asymmetric Information and 
Multiple Periods, University of Michigan. 
Greene, W. H. [1993]. Econometric Analysis, 2nd Edition, New York: Macmillan. 
Gruber, J. [1996]. Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply, NEER Working 
Paper, No. 5866. 
Gruber, J. and J. D. Kubik [1997]. Disability Insurance Rejection Rates and the Labor 
Supply of Older Workers, Journal of Public Economics, 64(1 ): 1-23. 
Halberstadt, V. T., R .H. Haveman and B. L. Wolfe [1981]. The Economics of 
Disability Policy in Selected European Community Countries: a Preliminary Study, 
mimeo, Leyden University, The Netherlands. 
Halpern, J. and J. A. Hausman [1986]. Choice under Uncertainty: A Model of 
Applications for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, Journal of Public 
Economics, 31(November): 131-161. 
Halpern, J. D. [1979]. The Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Reasons for 
Its Growth and Prospects for the Future, New England Economic Review, 79: 30-48. 
238 
Hambor, J. C. [1975]. Unemployment and Disability: An Econometric Analysis with 
Time Series Data, Social Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics, 
Staff Paper No. 20, (Washington, DC). 
Hausman, J. A. and D. McFadden [1984]. Specification Tests for the Multinomial 
Logit Model, Econometrica, 52: 1219-1240. 
Haveman, R.H., et al. [1999]. The Changing Economic Status of U.S. Disabled Men: 
Trends and Their Determinants, 1982-1991, Empirical Economics, 24(4): 571-98. 
Haveman, R. H. and L. B. Wolfe [1984]. Disability Transfers and Early Retirement: 
A Causal Relationship? Journal of Public Economics, 24: 47-66. 
--- [1990]. The Economic Well-Being of the Disabled: 1962-84, Journal of Human 
Resources, 25(1 ): 32-54. 
Haveman, R. H., B. L. Wolfe and J. L. Warlick [1984]. Disability Transfers, Early 
Retirement, and Retrenchment, in Aaron, H. J., et al. ( ed.), Retirement and Economic 
Behavior, Studies in Social Economics Series, Brookings Institution. 
Haveman, R. H., P. R. de Jong and B. R. \Volfe [1991]. Disability Transfer and the 
Work Decision of Older Men, Quarterly of Economics, l 06(3): 939-949. 
Heckman, J. J. and B. Singer [1984a]. A Method for Minimizing the Impact of 
Distributional Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data, Econometrica, 
52(2): 271-320. 
--- [1984b]. Econometric Duration Analysis, Journal of Econometrics, 24: 63-132. 
--- [1985]. Social Science Duration Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Heckman, J. J. and J. R. Walker [1990]. The Third Birth in Sweden, Journal of 
Population Economics , 3(4): 235-75. 
239 
Hennessey, J. C. and J. M. Dykacz [1989]. Projected Outcomes and Length of Time 
in the Disability Insurance Program, Social Security Bulletin, 52(9): 2-41. 
--- [1993]. A Comparison of the Recovery Termination Rates of Disabled-Worker 
Beneficiaries Entitled in 1972 and 1985, Social Security Bulletin, 56(2): 58-69. 
Hennessey, J. C. and L. S. Muller [1994]. Work Efforts of Disabled Worker 
Beneficiaries: Preliminary Findings from the New Beneficiary Followup Survey, 
Social Security Bulletin, 57(3): 42-51. 
HMSO [1985]. Reform of Social Security, Background Paper, Vol 3 (No.2), Cmnd 
9519, London. 
Hoffman, S. D. , and G. J. Duncan [1988]. Multinomial and Conditional Logit 
Discrete Choice Models in Demography, Demography, 25(3): 415-426. 
Hogelund, J. [2000]. Work Incapacity and Reintegration: A Literature Review, in 
Pryor, F. L., et al. (ed.), Who's Not Working and Why: Employment, Cognitive Skills, 
Wages, and the Changing U.S. Labor Market: 26-54, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Holmes, P. and M. Lynch [1990]. An Analysis of Invalidity Benefit Claim Durations 
for New Male Claimants in 1977/1978 and 1982/1983, Journal of Health Economics, 
9(1): 71-83. 
Hoyries, H. W. [2000]. Local Labor Markets and Welfare Spells: Do Demand 
Conditions Matter, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(3): 351-368. 
Hu, J., K. Lahiri , D.R. Vaughan and B. Wixon [1997]. A Structural Model of Social 
Security's Disability Determination Process, ORES Working Paper, No. 72 (August). 
Jackson, N. [ 1999]. Understanding Population Ageing: A Background, Australian 
Social Policy (1): 203-223. 
240 
Jain, D. C. and N. J. Vilcassim [1991]. Investigating Household Purchase Timing 
Decisions: A Conditional Hazard Function Approach, Marketing Science, 10(1): 1-23. 
Kaitz, H. B. [1970]. Analyzing the Length of Spells of Unemployment, Monthly 
Labor Review, XCIII (Nov.). 
Kaplan, E. L. and P. Meier [1958]. Nonparametric Estimation from Incomplete 
Observation, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 53: 457-81. 
Keane, M. P. and K. I. Wolpin [ 1997]. The Career Decisions of Young Men, Journal 
of political economy, 105(3): 473-522. 
Kennan, J. [1985]. The Duration of Contract Strikes in U.S. Manufacturing, Journal 
of Econometrics, 28(1 ): 5-28. 
Kiefer, N. M. [1988]. Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions, Journal of 
Economics Literature, XXVI: 646-679. 
Kreider, B. [ 1998]. Workers' Applications to Social Insurance Programs When 
Earnings and Eligibility Are Uncertain, Journal of Labor Economics, 16(4): 849-877. 
--- [1999]. Social Security Disability Insurance: Applications, Awards, and Lifetime 
Income Flows, Journal of Labor Economics , 17(4): 784-827. 
Kreider, B. and R. T. Riphahn [?000]. Explaining Applications to the U.S. Disability 
System: A Semiparametric Approach, Journal of Human Resources, 35(1): 82-115. 
Lancaster, T. [1990]. The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lando, M. E. [1974]. The Effect of Unemployment on Application for Disability 
Insurance, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Statistics 
Association (St, Louis, MO), Washington, DC: American Statistical Association. 
241 
Lando, M. E., M. B. Coate and R. Kraus [1979]. Disability Benefit Applications and 
the Economy, Social Security Bulletin, 42(10): 3-10. 
Lando, M. E., A. V. Farley and M. A. Brown [1982]. Recent Trends in the Social 
Security Disability Insurance Program, Social Security Bulletin, 45(8): 3-14. 
Leonard, J. S. [1979]. The Social Security Disability Program and Labor Force 
Participation, NEER Working Paper, No. 392. 
Leonard, J. S. [ 1986]. Labor Supply Incentives and Disincentives for Disabled 
Persons, in Berkowitz, M., et al. ( ed.), Disability and the Labor Market: Economic 
Problems, Policies, and Programs, Ithaca, N.Y: ILR Press. 
Lillard, L. A. [1993]. Simultaneous Equations for Hazards: Marriage Duration and 
Fertility Timing, Journal of Econon1etrics, 56(1-2): 189-217. 
Lindstrom, D. P. [1996]. Economic Opportunity in Mexico and Return Migration 
from the United States, Demography, 33(3): 357-74. 
Long, J. S. [1987]. A Graphical Method for the Interpretation of Multinomial Logit 
Analysis, Social Methods & Research, 15(4): 420-446. 
Maki, D. R. [1993]. The Economic Implications of Disability Insurance in Canada, 
Journal of Labor Economics, 11(1): 148-69. 
Manton, K. G., E. Stallard and J. W. Vaupel [1986]. Alternative Models for 
Heterogeneity of Mortality Risks among the Aged, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 81(4): 635-644. 
Marvel, H. P. [1982]. An Economic Analysis of the Operation of Social Security 
Disability Insurance, Journal of Human Resources, 17(3): 393-412. 
242 
McFadden, D., W. Tye, and K. Train [1976]. An Application of Diagnostic Tests for 
the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives Property of the Multinomial Logit 
Model, Transportation Research Board Record, 637: 39-45. 
Meyer, B. D. [1990]. Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells, 
Econometrica, 58(4): 757-782. 
Molho, I. [ 1989]. A Disaggregate Model of Flows onto Invalidity Benefit, Applied 
Economics, 21(2): 237-50. 
--- [1991]. Going onto Invalidity Benefit: A Study for Women (1977/78-1983/84), 
Applied Economics, 23(10): 1569-77. 
Morrow, I. [2000]. The Internal Migration of Disability Support Pension Recipients: 
Finding from the FaCS Longitudial Data Set, Australian Social Policy, 2: 55-86. 
Muller, L. S., C. G. Scott and B.V. Bye [1996]. Labor-Force Participation and 
Earnings of SSI Disability Recipients: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Times Series 
Approach to the Behavior of Individuals, Social Security Bulletin, 59(1 ): 22-42. 
Murphy, A. [ 1996]. A Piecewise-Constant Hazard-Rate Model for the Duration of 
Unemployment in Single-Interview Samples of the Stock of Unemployed, Economics 
Letters, 51(2): 177-83. 
Nichol, W. [1988]. Invalid Pension, 1970-1987: Numbers and Characteristics. DSS 
social Security. 
O'Neill, J. A., L .J. Bassi and D. A. Wolf [1987]. The Duration of Welfare Spells, 
Review of Econo,nics and Statistics, 69(1): 241-248. 
Pagano, M. and K. Gauvreau [2000]. Principles of Biostatistics 2nd edition, Pacific 
Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
243 
Parsons, D. 0. [1980a]. The Decline of Male Labor Force Participation, Journal of 
political economy, 88(1): 117-134. 
--- [1980b]. Racial Trends in Male Labor Force Participation, American Economics 
Review, 70: 911-920. 
Parsons, D. 0. [1982]. The Male Labor Force Participation Decision: Health, 
Reported Health, and Economic Incentives, Economica, 49(193): 81-91. 
[1984]. Disability Insurance and Male Labor Force Participation: A Response, 
Journal of political economy, 92(3): 542-49. 
--- [1991a]. The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants: 
Comment, American Economic Review, 81(5): 1419-26. 
--- [1991b]. Self-Screening in Targeted Public Transfer Programs, Journal of Political 
Economy, 99(4): 859-76. 
Piachaud, D. [1986]. Disability, Retirement and Unemployment of Old Men, Journal 
of Social Policy, 15(2): 145 - 162. 
Plant, M. W. [1984]. An Empirical Analysis of Welfare Dependence, The American 
Economic Review, 74( 4): 673-684. 
Prentice, R. and. L. Gloeckler [ 1978]. Regression Analysis of Grouped Survival Data 
with an Application to Breast Cancer Data, Biometric, 34: 57-67. 
Riphahn, R. T. [1997]. Disability Retirement and Unemployment - Substitute 
Pathways for Labor Force Exit? An Empirical Test for the Case of Germany, Applied 
Economics, 29(5): 551-61. 
--- [1999]. Disability Retirement among German Men in the 1980s, Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, 52(4): 629-647. 
244 
Robins, P. K., and K. P. Dickinson [1985]. Child Support and Welfare Dependence: A 
Multinomial Lo git Analysis, De1nography, 22(3): 367-380. 
Rupp, K., and C. G. Scott [ 1995]. Length of Stay on the Supplemental Security 
Income Disability Program, Social Security Bulletin, 58(1): 29-47. 
Rupp, K., S. H. Bell and L. A. McManus [1994l Design of the Project Network 
Return-to-Work Experiment for Persons with Disabilities, Social Security Bulletin, 
57(2): 3-20. 
Rupp, K. and C. G. Scott [1996]. Trends in the Characteristics of DI and SSI 
Disability Awardees and Duration of Program Participation, Social Security Bulletin, 
59(1 ): 3-21. 
Rupp, K. and D. C. Stapleton [1995]. Determinants of the Growth in the Social 
Security Administration's Disability Programs - An Overview, Social Security 
Bulletin, 58(4): 43-70. 
Salant, S. [1977]. Search Theory and Duration Data: A Theory of Sorts, QuarterkJ; 
Journal of Economics, 91(Februrary): 39-57. 
Schechter, E. S. [ 1997]. Work While Receiving Disability Insurance Benefits: 
Additional Findings from the New Beneficiary Followup Survey, Social Security 
Bulletin, 60(1 ): 3-17. 
Slade, F. B. [1984]. Old Men: Disability Insurance and the Incentive to Work, 
Industrial Relations, 23: 260-69. 
Small, K. A. and C. Hsiao [ 1985}. Multinomial Lo git Specification Tests, 
International Economic Review, 26: 619-627. 
Stapleton, D. and K. A. Dietrich [1995]. Longterm trends and Cycles in Application 
and Award Growth, Paper presented at the conference, The Social Security 
Administration's Disability Programs: explanations of recent growth and implications 
?4-
- ) 
for disability policy (Social Security Administration and the Office of the Assistance 
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, US Department of Health and Human 
Services, Washington, DC). 
Stapleton, D., K. A. Coleman, and K. A. Dietrich [1995]. The Effects of Business 
Cycle on the Disability Applications and Awards. Paper presented at the 1995 annual 
conference of the Society of Government Economist, Allied Social Science 
Associations' Meetings, Washington, DC. 
Stapleton, D. , K. A. Coleman, K. A. Dietrich and G. A. Livermore [1998]. 
Econometric Analysis of DI and SSI Application and Award Growth, in Stapleton, K. 
et al. ( ed.), Grovvth in Disability Benefits: Explanations and Policy Implications (W.E. 
Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI). 
Stem, S. [ 1989]. Measuring the Effect of Disability on Labor Force Participation, 
Journal of Human Resources, 24(3): 361-95. 
--- [1994]. Review of Disability and the Displaced Worker, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 32(2): 719-20. 
--- [ 1996]. Semiparametric Estin1ates of the Supply and Demand Effects of Disability 
on Labor Force Participation, Journal of Econometrics, 71(1-2): 49-70. 
Stricker, P. and P. Sheehen [1981]. Hidden Unemployment: the Australian 
Experience, The Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, University of 
Melbourne. 
Swisher, I. G. [1973]. The Disabled and the Decline 1n Men's Labor Force 
Participation, Monthly Labor Review, 96(11): 53. 
Trussell, J. and T. Richards [1985]. Correction for Unmeasured Heterogeneity in 
Hazard Models: An Application of the Heckman-Singer Strategy to Demographic 
Data, Sociological Methodology (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA): 242-276. 
246 
Yelowitz, A. S. [1998]. Why Did the SSI Disabled Program Grow So Much? 
Disentangling the Effect of Medicaid, Journal of Health Economics, 17(3): 321-49. 
Vamplew, W. [1987]. Australians: Historical Statistics (ed.), Broadway, NSW: 
Fairfax, Syme & Weldon Associates. 
247 
